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Fundamental questions about the nature of the modern corporation and how it should be 
governed continue to preoccupy economists, sociologists, lawyers and management scholars. If 
we are to provide adequate answers to questions about the nature and governance of the 
corporation it is imperative to consider closely its historical evolution and transformation and 
recognise that it constitutes a social institution. This dissertation explores and evaluates the 
relevant contributions of one author, namely Adolf Augustus Berle, who developed an approach 
to the corporation and its governance that was profoundly historically sensitive and deeply 
interdisciplinary.  
Berle produced numerous contributions over an extended period exploring the nature, 
evolution and regulation of the corporation. In the contemporary literature his work is often seen 
narrowly as a precursor to the shareholder primacy doctrine. The argument developed in this 
thesis is that it is an error that obscures Berle’s current significance to draw too close a 
connection between his approach and the modern shareholder primacy perspective. It is 
demonstrated that by considering Berle’s work on the corporation in the context of the 
contributions of the institutional economists who influenced him and in relation to recent 
ontologically sophisticated accounts of the corporation the distinctiveness and relevance of his 
approach can be more effectively identified. 
This dissertation is divided into three main parts. The first section examines the 
intellectual connections linking Berle and Thorstein Veblen. It is demonstrated in this part of the 
dissertation that there are clear and substantial links between Berle and Veblen but also some 
significant differences in orientation.  The second main section of the thesis explores the nature 
and evolution of the corporation with a focus on Berle’s own writings on these subjects and the 
recent ontologically informed perspective outlined by Tony Lawson. The final main section of 
the thesis considers Berle’s views on shareholder primacy and traces out how his thinking 
developed on this and related matters. This section concludes with some speculations regarding 









Since the financial crisis of 2008 the corporate world has been the subject of much 
critical scrutiny. Fundamental questions have been raised once again about the nature and 
function of the modern corporation and how it is to be effectively governed. The idea that 
corporations need to be governed in such a way that the interests of the broader community are 
recognised has once more been forwarded and gained some ground. Yet, at the level of 
mainstream corporate governance models the focus remains very much on creating and 
maximising shareholder value. Corporate governance theory and practice has as a consequence 
contributed to promoting an environment characterised by short termism and excessive risk 
taking and jeopardised corporate sustainability and resilience. The conventional paradigm has 
encouraged directors and executives to try and ‘unlock shareholder value’ even if this involves 
cutting back on training and development for their employees, selling vital company assets, 




It is my belief that in order to understand the nature of the corporation and advance and 
evaluate competing proposals for how corporations ought to be regulated in the future we must 
move beyond the kinds of narrow contractual approaches that have been so dominant in recent 
decades. In particular if we are to make progress in crafting powerful new approaches to 
corporate governance then it is crucial that our theories display a greater degree of historical 
sensitivity.  In order to understand the nature of the corporation it is essential that we appreciate 
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 For commentary and critique of this conventional paradigm see Aglietta and Reberioux (2005); 
Buchholz (2012) and Stout (2012). 
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its development as a social institution and this implies abandoning the “history silent neo-
classical approach” (Pagano, 2011: 1298). One way to promote such a historically sensitive 
approach would be to engage directly in historical research on the emergence and development 
of the corporation in specific geographical contexts. In this dissertation I have chosen to take a 
different route. The importance of situating the modern corporation in the context of its historical 
evolution and transformation can also be highlighted by examining closely those authors who 
have previously done most to bring an historical sensitivity to our understanding of the 
corporation as a social entity. One such author was Adolf Augustus Berle, Jr.
2
 In this dissertation 
I consider various of Berle’s contributions to the theory of the corporation and its governance 
and suggest that he provides an example of how historically sensitive research can productively 
proceed in this area.   
Before introducing the aspects of Berle’s work that will form the focus of the dissertation 
it is useful to first provide some very brief biographical context. Born in Boston, Massachusetts 
in 1895, the young Berle displayed by all accounts exceptional intellectual capacity. Receiving 
an accelerated and extensive education by means of home schooling, Berle was academically 
prepared for Harvard at the age of thirteen. He enrolled a year later “in order to allow for more 
social maturity” (Schwarz, 1987: 13). Although many have assumed that he performed 
extraordinarily well as an undergraduate, he in fact attained 4Bs and 2Cs in his first year, 
receiving his first A only in his second year. He is quoted as advising his own son, Peter, who 
was to follow in his father’s footsteps at Harvard, not to be “buffaloed by the myth of your 
                                                          
2
 Berle was born January, 1895, son of Mary Augusta (Wright) and Adolf Augustus Berle. His father was 
an extremely influential and well connected figure and helped Berle Jr. secure a position at his first law 
firm owing to Louis Brandeis being a close friend. Berle, Jr. married Beatrice Bishop (1902 – 1993) and 
had two daughters, Beatrice Berle Meyerson and Alice Berle Crawford and a son, Peter A. A. Berle. Berle 
died in New York City, in 1971, aged 76 (Schwarz, 1987). 
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father’s alleged brilliance which the record in the Dean’s office would not substantiate,” 
(Schwarz, 1987: 13).  
Upon graduation, Berle entered the Harvard Law School in 1913. In 1916, at the age of 
21, Berle left Harvard, the Law School’s youngest graduate in its history. He joined the Boston 
law firm of Brandeis, Dunbar and Nutter for a brief period of time. Soon after, Berle entered the 
United States military during World War I and was sent as an intelligence officer to the 
Dominican Republic. There he was responsible for helping promote sugar production by means 
of sorting out property and contractual conflicts that existed among rural landowners.  
After World War I, Berle became a member of the American delegation that attended the 
Paris Peace Conference - the meeting of the Allied victors to discuss the peace terms for the 
Central Powers. Berle showed an incredible capacity for hard work. Berle did not, however, 
wholly agree with the process. In his letter requesting reassignment, Berle stated that the spirit of 
the treaty was not right, that it neither served “the idealistic or material interests of America, or, 
indeed, of humanity,” (Berle quoted in Schwarz, 1987: 30).  
Berle was one of many other Americans who visited Europe for the first time in 1919. 
The reporting of the war had left a deep impression on the American public. In April Berle and a 
colleague took a staff car and drove 250 miles, toured the Marne, Chateau-Thierry, and other 
battlefields that held so much significance given the events that had so recently unfolded. Berle 
returned “so exhausted and depressed by what he saw of the battlefields that he ended the day by 
downing a half bottle of heavy wine” (Schwarz, 1987: 28). 
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As a commentator on foreign affairs, Berle’s writings often showed an astute 
understanding of extremely complex international relationships, both economic and political 
ones. Speaking of the Second World War Berle observed: 
“The war educated us in sociological cause and effect… As America is the world’s 
banker she bears not only her own burden but those of nations abroad… As never before, 
foreign relations and policies depend on the view of the mass of men as distinct from 
their governments, and the extreme responsibility of the press is once more violently 
illustrated” (Schwarz, 1987: 34 - 35). 
During the 1920s Berle temporarily stopped writing about foreign affairs and focused on his 
career in law. While working at a corporate law office on Wall Street, Berle lived in the Lower 
East Side of New York, among the urban poor (Schwarz, 1987) and while living there also 
assisted the American Indian Aid Association with their efforts to restore lands to the Navajos of 
New Mexico. Schwarz speculates that it was these two experiences in young Berle’s career that 
“contributed to a reputation for putting himself on the line for liberal causes – thereby identifying 
him with social workers, labour leaders, and others who sought to organise the poor both to 
enhance opportunity and to ameliorate their lot. The aspiring attorney exhibited social 
conscience and noblesse oblige, at the same time developing a useful network of wealthy liberal 
friends and associates” (Schwarz, 1987: 37). 
 In the late 1920s, Berle became a professor of corporate law at Columbia Law School and 
he remained on the faculty there until his retirement in 1964. In 1927, Berle obtained a grant 
from the Rockefeller foundation to study the corporation with an economist. He hired an 
economics graduate student from Columbia, Gardiner Means, and together they published the 
now well-known book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property.  
In 1932 Berle also began a long and illustrious public service career involving a series of 
high level government assignments. In the early years of President Franklin Roosevelt’s first 
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administration, when the Great Depression and financial crisis struck, Berle served as a close 
advisor to Roosevelt and was one of the original members of the “Brain Trust” that forged the 
New Deal. It is widely acknowledged that Roosevelt’s “Commonwealth Club Address” was a 
speech written by Berle and according to a poll of public address scholars, ranks as the second-
best presidential campaign speech of the twentieth century (Lucas and Medhurst, 2000). 
Following Roosevelt’s election, Berle left Washington and returned to New York. He 
was a key consultant in the (successful) mayoral campaign of Fiorello LaGuardia. He also served 
as special counsel to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation from 1933 up until 1938.  Later in 
1938, Berle was Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs. He continued to 
informally assist Roosevelt with speech-writing but also provided advice on a wide range of 
economic matters (Schwarz, 1987). 
After World War II, Berle served as Ambassador to Brazil from 1945 for three years, 
before returning to government service for a brief period in 1961. He served under President 
John F. Kennedy, heading an interdepartmental task force on Latin American affairs. During this 
period he also returned to his academic career at Columbia University and continued writing. He 
wrote over a long period of time from the 1920’s through to the late 1960’s. Apart from The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property, his other significant works include The Twentieth 
Century Capitalist Revolution (1954), Tides of Crisis (1957), and Power without Property (1959) 
and The American Economic Republic (1963). 
Berle produced numerous contributions that were largely concerned with the nature, 





 However, in the contemporary literature, his work has often been perceived of as being a 
significant precursor to the shareholder primacy doctrine. The shareholder primacy view – which 
has become increasingly dominant in recent decades – states that the only legitimate role of the 
modern corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth (Stout, 2013) and argues that the best way 
to secure this objective is by increasing the accountability of managers to shareholders.
4
 The 
shareholder primacy perspective was given a particular articulation in a 2001 article “The End of 
History for Corporate Law,” by Reinier Kraakman and Henry Hansmaan, two leading corporate 
scholars from Harvard and Yale law schools, respectively. They argued that the best means of 
pursuing aggregate social welfare was by making corporate managers strongly accountable to 
shareholder interests (Hansmaan and Kraakman, 2001). To Hansmaan and Kraakman (2001) the 
central features of the doctrine were quite clear: managers should only focus on shareholders’ 
interests and this was the best possible way to achieve “aggregate social welfare,” (Hansmaan 
and Kraakman, 2001 in Weinstein, 2010: 2). These authors and many others take it for granted 
that this shareholder-centric approach had become dominant and been adopted so widely due to 
its demonstrable efficiency enhancing attributes.  
Many scholars have interpreted Berle - particularly his earlier work – as an important 
precursor to the contemporary “shareholder primacy” view of the corporation (Million, 1990: 
220-1, Winkler, 2004, 115-6; Matheson and Olson, 1992: 1330; Hill, 2010; Stout, 2012 and 
2013).  Bratton and Wachter summarise the conventional view of Berle’s significance by stating: 
                                                          
3
 Contributions that relate directly to various different aspects of the corporation include Berle, 1921, 
1931, 1932, 1947, 1952, 1954,  1959, 1962  as well as Berle and Means 1932.  
 
4
 The influence of the shareholder primacy doctrine has been considerable and been manifest in various 
developments such as granting shareholders greater control with regard to boards and incentivizing 
managers by tying executive pay to company share price performance. 
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“The generally accepted historical picture puts Berle in the position of being the grandfather of 
modern shareholder primacy” (Bratton and Wachter, 2008: 101).  
 Meanwhile Moore and Reberioux suggest Berle has come to be seen as “the original defender of 
the shareholder wealth maximisation norm in corporate governance” (2010: 1110) and others 
have suggested that “Berle’s argument was premised on the conception of shareholders as 
owners of the corporation” (Fisch, 2006: 647). This is despite the fact that some of his other 
writings suggest very different orientations. 
This might encourage the view that Berle was radically inconsistent in his writings on the 
corporation and its governance. However, it is my belief that the various strands of his work are 
very tightly interlinked and display degrees of both continuity and change. Although Berle was 
certainly concerned from early on about the growing power of managers, the intellectual 
framework out of which he worked was quite at odds with contemporary shareholder primacy 
views. The argument developed in this dissertation is that it is a fundamental error to draw too 
close a connection between the perspective Berle develops and the modern shareholder primacy 
perspective.  Much of Berle’s work has been misconstrued and interpreted out of context. For 
example, with regard The Modern Corporation and Private Property, which has captivated 
scholars for over eighty years now, many commentators have focused on the one chapter where 
Berle discusses issues to do with managers within the modern corporation and ignored much of 
the rest of the book and thereby failed to consider the spirit in which it was written or relevant 
context. If we recognise The Modern Corporation and Private Property as part of a much wider 
inquiry that Berle carries out over a period of decades into the various multifarious civil society 
pressures that corporate managers face then we can appreciate more fully the real significance of 
the book. Berle in fact developed the arguments highlighted in the final chapter of The Modern 
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Corporation in his later book, Power without Property. In trying to appreciate Berle’s 
contributions to our understanding of the nature and governance of the corporation it is crucial to 
not focus too narrowly on just one of his papers or books but to consider his relevant writings 
more broadly and trace through where, how  and why his views changed.  
I seek to demonstrate in this dissertation that Berle’s work carries a much stronger 
message regarding the governance of corporations than is typically assumed and one that still 
remains relevant today. This dissertation seeks to draw out and evaluate Berle’s broader 
intellectual framework with a particular focus on Berle’s ideas about the emergence and 
changing nature of the corporation and his views on the impact of the corporation on the 
community at large. Of course Berle’s work is famous for raising the issue of separation of 
ownership and control and this too will be critically evaluated and discussed. I will be 
extensively reviewing his core works: The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Twentieth 
Century Capitalist Revolution and Power without Property with consideration also being given 
to his numerous journal articles.  
This dissertation will be divided into three main parts. The first part of the dissertation 
focusses on the relationship between Berle and Thorstein Veblen and considers the extent to 
which Berle adopts an approach to the study of the corporate system that is in line with the one 
that Veblen had earlier established.  The second part of the dissertation focusses on the 
fundamental question of the nature of the corporation. It is remarkable that the core question of 
what kind of entity a corporation ultimately is so often gets neglected within conventional 
economics and corporate governance circles. Berle has many important things to say about the 
nature of the corporation and how the legal system interacts with the economic sphere when it 
comes to the constitution of the modern corporation. The second part of this dissertation explores 
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in detail Berle’s writings on the nature of the corporation and draws out certain correspondences 
with recent theories of the corporation developed by those elaborating a specific position in 
social ontology. The third and final part of the dissertation considers the relevance of Berle’s 
analysis for contemporary debates in the area of corporate governance. Let me motivate the 
dissertation further by considering in a little more detail the nature of each part of the 
dissertation.   
The first part of this thesis set out in Chapter 2 examines Berle’s connection to Veblen. 
Many scholars have interpreted Berle’s work as an extension to Veblen’s while others have 
argued that the two writers are opposed in certain important respects. Berle himself makes 
certain references to Veblen’s work in the opening paragraphs of The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property (Berle and Means, 1991 [1932]). Additionally, Berle joined the law faculty at 
Columbia at a time when it held its largest group of institutional economists. This is possibly 
indicative of the fact that Veblen’s work did influence him in some shape or form but the 
connection to Veblen’s work arguably goes beyond a few scattered citations. Ultimately the 
question remains as to whether any of this matters – is it essential that we pick apart Veblen’s 
own school of thought and his connection to Berle in order to better understand Berle?  
My reasons for reviewing Veblen’s work are twofold. First in order to understand any 
individual’s work it is vital that we have a clear idea of the intellectual background that they 
came from and the schools of thought they drew upon. Arguably if any writer is assessed without 
sufficient attention being paid to his or her scholarly background and the sources upon which he 
or she drew then only a very partial reading of his or her contributions is likely to arise.  
Second, it is important to note that Thorstein Veblen was a leading figure in a very 
particular school of economic thought, that of institutional/evolutionary economics. Veblen 
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himself was eager to distinguish his own work from not only classical economics but also what 
he referred to as neoclassical economists (a term that was in fact coined by Veblen). Neoclassical 
economics stems from the idea that human actors are rational and only concerned with utility 
maximisation. Institutional evolutionary economics, on the other hand, argues that human 
activity is an evolutionary process and that all individual action is a product of habits of thought 
and the dynamic interplay with other facets around them. It further argues that human action is 
not best understood in terms of procedures of utility maximisation but insists that it is important 
to recognise a host of dimensions including the cultural, devotional, sexual, etc. Veblen believed 
“any science, such as economics, which has to do with human conduct, becomes a genetic 
inquiry into the human scheme of life; and where, as in economics, the subject of inquiry is the 
conduct of man in his dealings with the material means of life, the science is necessarily an 
inquiry into the life-history of material civilization, on a more or less extended or restricted plan” 
(Veblen, 1909: 628). If it can be established that Berle adopted something like this 
institutional/evolutionary approach, albeit one enriched by his own legal background, then it 
seems most unlikely that he is best understood as a supporter/contributor to the theory of 
shareholder primacy in any straightforward way. The latter is a discourse that has emerged in 
part as a development within conventional, mainstream neoclassical economics. The kinds of 
assumptions and narrow contractual models associated with the shareholder primacy perspective 
are consistent with much of modern day neoclassical economics. The kind of historically 
sensitive, institutionally sophisticated, approach that I argue Berle adopts at least in part from 
Veblen is quite different from and opposed to the conventional framework that underpins the 
shareholder primacy view.     
15 
 
In order to better understand Berle it is vital that we closely examine Veblen’s work and 
consider how similar/different the methodological approaches the two men adopt were. 
Reviewing Veblen’s work gives us a more comprehensive understanding of where Berle’s ideas 
and concepts stemmed from facilitating a richer evaluation of his work. Going further, 
understanding Veblen’s influence on Berle is especially important in clarifying the 
methodological approach that Berle himself adopts. 
The first main part of the dissertation presented in Chapter 2 focuses on identifying core 
elements of Veblen’s methodological approach and the differences/similarities between Veblen 
and Berle in terms of their approach to social science. Questions such as ‘How does Veblen 
distinguish between neoclassical and evolutionary economics?’ and ‘How does Veblen use his 
institutional approach to characterise the evolution of the corporate system?’ are tackled. The 
question of whether Berle’s writings are best seen as an extension of Veblen’s work rather than 
Veblen’s work merely being a stepping stone upon which he developed a new and quite different 
framework is also addressed. This chapter reviews key similarities between the two authors. One 
example of this concerns their methodology but there are also more substantive similarities that 
are also considered. Both Veblen and Berle discuss the issue of ownership and control 
extensively in their writings and explore the changing nature of property relations. Additionally I 
explore the differences that distinguish the two authors. For example, Veblen often distanced 
himself from any kind of political engagement. He has been described by some as a “political 
quietist” (Plotkin, 2010: 80). Berle, on the other hand, adopts a far more optimistic attitude 
towards the possibilities for positive political intervention. Furthermore Berle was of course 
actually directly involved in the national political sphere as part of the Brains Trust, President 
Roosevelt’s group of core political advisors. 
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The second main part of this thesis presented in Chapter 3 explores the nature and 
evolution of the corporation with a focus on Berle’s own writings on this subject and more recent 
writings, specifically those of Tony Lawson (2015a and 2015b). Key issues addressed in Chapter 
3 include how are we to characterise the nature of the corporation and how does the corporation 
differ from the unincorporated firm? What role does the legal system play in the constitution of 
the corporation? The nature and likely influence of the corporation was a central preoccupation 
for Berle throughout his career. The corporation was growing to be an immensely sophisticated 
and complex phenomenon and with its growth Berle saw that many fundamental issues arose that 
he sought to address in his writings. He outlined how the corporation could be understood as a 
real entity and explored whether it could be legitimately characterised as legal in nature. Berle 
seems to have been committed to the view that the corporation is a real, as opposed to a fictional, 
entity. This part of the dissertation explores how Berle defends this position and considers the 
similarities and differences with the account of the corporation as a form of community that is 
socially positioned in a specific manner that has recently been developed by Tony Lawson as 
part of his broader project in social ontology.  Central to Lawson’s account of both the firm and 
the corporation is the notion of social positioning. I suggest that Berle was also sensitive to 
issues of social positioning especially in his famous 1947 paper ‘The Theory of Enterprise 
Entity’. 
In considering similarities with Lawson’s account it is important to point out that Berle 
did not believe that the corporation could be treated in the same way that the business units of the 
early nineteenth century had been. The corporation had grown to such tremendous proportions, 
responsible for hundreds and thousands of livelihoods, and represented a new and hugely 
significant kind of social institution. He viewed the corporation as a complex social totality that 
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impacted on the community in numerous ways and believed that its regulation had to be 
consistent with that line of thinking. Community is a crucial category for Lawson and the 
treatment of community in these two accounts of the corporation is a further focus in this part of 
the dissertation. Lawson in fact contends that both the firm and the corporation are 
fundamentally communities of specific sorts that are irreducible to the sum of their parts. He 
writes: “… all social ‘organisational forms’, indeed all social entities that include human beings 
as components, are forms/examples of communities, and indeed that all are organised through 
relations of rights and obligations which rest on the exercise of human capacities of trusting and 
being trustworthy” (Lawson, 2015b: 7). 
While certain important similarities between Lawson’s account of the corporation and 
that provided by Berle can be identified there are also significant differences. Most especially 
Lawson adopts a view that sees the contemporary corporation as dangerously out of control and 
an institution that is inflicting serious damage on many communities. Berle at least by the later 
stages of his career has an altogether more optimistic view of the potential contribution of the 
corporation. In Chapter 3 this crucial difference is carefully reflected upon. A key conclusion 
drawn from this part of the dissertation is that many of the fundamental ontological questions 
about the nature of the corporation that Berle raised still have not been, or are only very recently 
starting to be, at all adequately addressed.  
As noted previously Berle has been frequently regarded as the original precursor to the 
shareholder value model of governance by many commentators and has even been described as 
the grandfather of modern shareholder primacy. Scholars have stated that one of Berle’s beliefs 
was that the democratic deficit that existed in the management of the American economy in the 
1920s and 1930s would have been largely corrected if shareholder primacy was ensured 
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(Stewart, 2011). It was believed that Berle’s collaboration with Gardiner Means in The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property and his individual writings laid the foundations for 
shareholder capitalism as well as shareholder-centric theories of corporate governance (Coiffi, 
2011: 1081).  
It cannot be denied that Berle did at times during his career adopt a supportive stance towards 
shareholder primacy principles. However those passages in his writings that point to such 
support have often been taken out of context and it has sometimes been assumed that his views 
on this issue remained constant and anticipated arguments only fully developed much later by 
others. The third main part of the dissertation set out as Chapter 4 seeks to provide a contextual 
understanding of Berle’s work. Both Berle’s own theoretical perspective and the economic 
circumstances he encountered and was attempting to understand changed significantly from the 
1920’s through to the late 1960’s. This section traces through the major shifts in Berle’s views 
on shareholder primacy and considers the contemporary relevance of his ideas.  
This chapter begins by reviewing some of the key arguments that have been advanced in 
support of the shareholder primacy view in the contemporary corporate governance literature and 
explores their assumptions. Reviewing these kinds of arguments is essential if we are to develop 
an accurate appreciation of Berle’s contributions as it will enable us to see the distance between 
Berle’s various positions and the shareholder primacy perspective as developed later. This 
shareholder primacy perspective, it has been argued, offers a solution for the problem of 
shareholder apathy that was seemingly rife in the corporate system of the 1970s. The managers 
of  a  public corporation held by thousands or even hundreds of thousands of shareholders, all of 
whom owned a mere fraction of shares on the market, could become effectively  insulated from 
and pursue objectives at odds with the interests of owners.  The shareholder primacy view 
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provided a perspective on the nature and purpose of the corporation that seemed to indicate how 
the tensions that characterised the corporation ought to be resolved. It had its roots in agency 
theory and mainstream approaches to economics.
5
 Outside academia, CEOS and other top 
corporate executives also seemed to specially benefit from the shareholder primacy perspective 
and adopted the framework. During the managerialist era of the 1950s and 1960s, professional 
executives typically earned most of their compensation in the form of flat salaries and bonuses 
that would seem astonishingly reasonable when compared to the amounts that their counterparts 
earn today.
6
 In the 1980s and 1990s  however, due in no small part to the spreading influence of  
shareholder primacy thinking, the top executives pay at public corporations was altered towards  
a more performance-related pay scheme and the stock price was the metric used to measure this. 
These are a few examples highlighting the fact that shareholder primacy theory was viewed by 
many as the light at the end of the tunnel at a time when the efficacy of managerialism
7
 was 
being questioned.  
The shareholder primacy doctrine was quickly taken up by various influential groups 
including academic scholars, policy makers, hedge fund strategists and corporate executives. 
Academically, for example, shareholder primacy seemed to offer a straightforward story about 
corporate structure and purpose while answering the question, “What are corporations for?” 
Additionally, it seemed to offer an exceptionally simple way to measure corporate performance – 
depending primarily on whether the prices of stocks went up or down (Stout, 2005; Stewart, 
                                                          
5
 See Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W. H, 1976, Jensen, M.C. and Fama, E.F. 1983 Jensen, M.C. 2000. 
 
6
 Bebchuck and Fried, 2006, noted that the ratio of CEO pay to average employee pay rose from 140 
times in 1991 to around 500 times in 2003. 
 
7
 Rather than seeing themselves as agents of shareholders, managers instead viewed themselves as 





2011; Stout, 2007). Seeing Berle as a founding father of this kind of approach serves to place 
him in a very specific context.  
Drawing on recent contributions to the history of legal and economic thought
8
 I distinguish 
between various phases in the development of Berle’s thinking on the role of shareholders. I 
demonstrate that partitioning his arguments into ‘early’, ‘middle’ and ‘late’ phases enables us to 
understand his work in a more comprehensive manner and avoid an overly partial assessment. 
When considering the nature of Berle’s position in the early phase of his career I review some of 
Berle’s earliest papers from the 1920s in order to provide a better contextual understanding of his 
arguments. A middle phase commencing in the 1930’s and developed as he entered the national 
political arena is considered. In this section it will be shown that in response to the transformed 
political and economic context Berle significantly changed his views on the most effective model 
of corporate governance. Berle’s later writings where he discusses at length the role of the 
institutional investor and the significance of corporate culture will also be explored. Such an 
examination of the degree of continuity and change in Berle’s ideas allows us to see how 
mistaken it is to select one particular work or phase, for example Berle’s early views towards 
shareholder primacy, and reference this as definitive of his overall position.  The argument that 
Berle ought not to be seen in any straightforward sense as a defender of the shareholder primacy 
view is taken further in later sections of Chapter 4 where I show that many of the criticisms that 
have been recently developed against the shareholder primacy perspective can actually be seen 
as having been anticipated by Berle.   
Berle initially wrote during the first era of financialisation. His later writings were written 
during a period where the destabilizing impacts of processes of financialisation had seemingly 
                                                          
8
 In particular much valuable work tracing the evolution of Berle’s thinking has been completed by 
Bratton and Wachter, 2008 and 2010, and Stewart, 2011 and is considered in Chapter 4. 
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been brought under regulatory control. It is often observed that we are currently living through a 
second era of financialisation. The final section of Chapter 4 speculates on what form a 
progressive corporate governance regime
9
 inspired by Berle’s insights might take.   
Scholars have argued that Berle truly believed shareholding was indicative of an 
efficient, well-developed capital market (Coiffi, 2011). Berle believed that managers were 
untrustworthy and his “prime concern was controlling the self-interested and irresponsible 
actions of management, who controlled one of the most important political actors within 
American society: the corporation” (Stewart, 2011: 1465). It has been further argued that these 
kinds of concerns largely made up the driving forces that pushed Berle to promote shareholder 
rights, believing that managers were effectively trustees for shareholders and naught else 
(Stewart, 2011). So it would be important that we review his work pertaining to this issue. 
Additionally, it would be useful to review the history of the shareholder primacy view itself. 
Chapter 4 seeks to do both. 
Berle enjoyed a long career and produced a substantial amount of work. He is a 
contributor who has been extremely influential and his analyses have continued to resonate in 
present times. That in itself makes his work interesting to explore. However Berle’s thought and 
ideas have widely been misinterpreted. Many scholars have chosen to ‘cherry-pick’ or take 
snippets from Berle’s writings and removed them from their wider context. History of thought 
done in this way is problematic. Firstly such work is prone to misinterpret the author’s ideas and 
contributions and the true meaning behind a particular expression may be lost if taken out of 
context. Second, many authors are likely to change their points of view over time, given this it 
                                                          
9
 It is perhaps useful here to provide some clarification regarding the use of term progressive as deployed 
within this dissertation. I follow Talbot in associating progressiveness with those interventions that 
promote the interests of the broader community rather than narrow sectional interests such as shareholders 
alone (see Talbot, 2013: 73). 
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becomes vital to carefully trace through both continuity and change in an authors’ thinking. The 
result of taking small extracts from Berle’s work and stringing them together so as to generate a 
specific interpretation has led some to drastically misinterpret Berle’s writings and see them as 
laying the foundations for a shareholder primacy model of corporate governance.  
The task undertaken in this dissertation is to identify some of the key trajectories in 
Berle’s thinking regarding the corporation, providing appropriate context. By exploring Berle’s 
work in this way, it is hoped that this dissertation will demonstrate that Berle’s contributions are 
of interest not merely from the perspective of the history of ideas but also because they provide 
an example of how historically sensitive research can productively proceed and continue to carry 














Over the last century the nature of the modern corporation has periodically been a central 
concern for economists, legal scholars and social scientists generally. Thorstein Veblen was one 
economist who early on displayed considerable interest in the emergence and nature of the 
corporation. Understanding the significance and changing nature of the corporation was also a 
central preoccupation for Adolf Berle. Both Berle and Veblen were concerned with 
understanding the significant economic transformations that were in part being ushered in by the 
development of the corporation. The new corporate era brought with it tremendous change in the 
patterns of life both at home and at work. On the back of technological developments there was a 
significant increase in the productive potential of society and both Berle and Veblen were 
interested in understanding how the corporation channeled the new possibilities in particular 
directions.  
In order to obtain a fuller appreciation of Berle’s work it is particularly useful to consider 
relevant aspects of Veblen’s contributions. Veblen’s ideas and approach help us to contextualise 
and understand Berle’s analysis. As Malcolm Rutherford (2004) has demonstrated during the 
period between 1913 and the early 1930s Columbia University became the academic home of a 
large concentration of institutional economists. Berle joined the Law Faculty at Columbia in 
1927 and it is very likely that the institutional economists located there would have had some 
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substantial impact on him. Given that Veblen’s seminal 1898 article ‘Why is Economics not an 
Evolutionary Science?’ provided significant initial impetus to the development of Institutional 
Economics and that Veblen is viewed as one of the founders of Institutional Economics it is 
important in the context of this thesis to explore some of Veblen’s key themes and examine how 
they correspond to relevant elements of Berle’s contributions. Moreover there is direct evidence 
of Veblen’s influence on Berle, at the very beginning of The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property, in the third paragraph of Chapter I, Berle makes a reference to Veblen’s Absentee 
Ownership when opening his discussion on the organisation of property (Berle and Means, 
1991[1932]: 4). This is one of very few references included in the entire book. 
Some scholars who have previously explored the relationship between Veblen and Berle 
have especially highlighted the connections. The argument has been made that there is very 
significant levels of continuity both at a methodological and substantive level between the work 
of Veblen and Berle. For example O’Kelley (2011) goes so far as to view The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property as in part an extension of Veblen’s earlier work on absentee 
ownership. O’Kelley discusses in detail some key issues raised by Veblen (1924) in Absentee 
Ownership and Business Enterprise and then places The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property very much in the context of Veblen’s ideas.10 In this chapter I review the case 
suggesting substantial commonality between Veblen and Berle and find much to support it. 
Understanding these similarities is important in its own right and enriches our reading of Berle 
but it is also helpful in appreciating differences between Berle and modern day advocates of the 
doctrine shareholder primacy. Contemporary defenders of the shareholder primacy doctrine tend 
to build up from arguments derived from contractual accounts of the firm and the corporation. 
                                                          
10
 Meanwhile Wang describes Berle as adopting an “institutionalism - rooted in the theoretical work of 
iconoclastic economist and intellectual Thorstein Veblen” (Wang, 2010: 1223). 
25 
 
These contractual accounts very much adopt the assumptions and presuppositions of 
conventional neoclassical economics. If Berle’s work can be understood as drawing on, or 
embedded within, the older institutional economics then it becomes easier to appreciate how 
distinct Berle’s work is from contemporary shareholder primacy perspectives.   
As well as exploring the similarities between Berle and Veblen I see it as important to 
highlight certain key differences between the approaches adopted by the two men. One 
particularly glaring difference relates to their respective responses to economic issues. Some 
commentators have argued that Veblen was broadly pessimistic about the prospects for 
conventional political intervention, carefully distancing himself from political engagements 
(O’Kelley, 2013; Dugger, 1984; Plotkin, 2010) and leading the life of a “political quietist” 
(Plotkin, 2010: 80). This characterisation of Veblen will be explored further along with a 
comparison with Berle who in many ways can be understood as a public intellectual and, of 
course, took a very active part in American public life. During the Great Depression and the 
financial crisis of the 1930s he had a very prominent public profile and was engaged directly in 
helping to formulate and introduce the policies associated with the New Deal. A further point of 
difference that will be considered concerns their radical credentials, an interesting issue relates to 
how far Berle rows back from certain elements of Veblen’s critique of the emerging American 
corporate system
11
.   
Section 2 of this chapter will look at the similarities between the two authors. Initially the 
focus will be on methodological similarities. It will be shown that both Veblen and Berle were 
                                                          
11
 While the focus in this chapter is on the relation between Veblen and Berle it is important to 
acknowledge that Berle was also influenced by a range of institutional economists. Prominent 
institutional economists such as William Z. Ripley certainly had an impact on Berle’s thinking and 
approach, see Kirkendall, 1961 for details. An obvious extension to the analysis provided in this chapter 
would be to consider how Berle’s contributions were informed by his understanding of other 
institutionalists beyond Veblen. 
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critical of neoclassical economics in part for its failure to recognise that the kind of industrial 
structures that had been the focus of earlier economic theorising had been significantly 
transformed. I will then note how both Veblen and Berle do not take key social institutions such 
as private property and ownership for granted but in complementary ways explore how the 
practices of private property emerged and how they have been transformed over time. I also 
consider how both Berle and Veblen identify groups who they view as well placed to initiate 
progressive developments. In Section 3 I turn to the differences between Berle and Veblen and 
highlight Veblen’s sustained criticism of contemporary pecuniary culture and note that this 
stands in contrast to Berle’s more accommodating, less radical position. In this section I also 
explore differences between the two men in terms of their willingness to engage in practical 
political initiatives. Concluding remarks follow in Section Four.   
 
2.2       Methodological and Substantive Similarities between Berle and Veblen 
 
(i) Classical, Neoclassical and Evolutionary Economics 
 
Veblen first began writing systematically towards the end of the nineteenth century and 
continued for twenty-five years, publishing numerous works in the form of books, articles, and 
reviews developing his evolutionary account of the emerging industrial system. Veblen (1898) 
provided the initial inspiration for a discourse that would soon become known as Institutional 
Economics in his article titled, ‘Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?’  Answering 
this question became the project that Veblen devoted himself to for the remainder of his working 
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life. He became consumed with studying the American economic system from the point of view 
of an evolutionary science. 
The term ‘neoclassical economics’ was first coined by Thorstein Veblen as he sought to 
clarify the intellectual constraints that limited the thinking of some of his contemporaries. When 
Veblen used the term ‘neoclassical economics’ he sought to group the work of his 
contemporaries like Alfred Marshall, his followers and those in the Austrian school like Menger 
and others including Jevons. Whatever Veblen’s own intentions may have been when 
introducing the term, by the 1930s neo-classical economics had come to signify the perspective 




Veblen strongly believed that there was a distinction between his own work and that of 
neoclassical economists. Although the latter aspired to make economics an evolutionary science, 
he argued that for the most part their work was fundamentally pre-evolutionary (O’Kelley, 
2011). Veblen writes:  
[T]he work of the neoclassical economics might be compared, probably without 
offending any of its adepts, with that of the early generation of Darwinians… Economists 
of the present day are commonly evolutionists, in a general way. They commonly accept, 
as other men do, the general results of the evolutionary speculation in those directions in 
which the evolutionary method has made its way. But the habit of handling by 
evolutionist methods the facts with which their own science is concerned has made its 
way among the economists to but a very uncertain degree (Veblen (1900) in O’Kelley, 
2011: 1322). 
 
Veblen suggests that the neoclassical economics of his day was hopelessly backward and unable 
to adequately address the material it faces: 
                                                          
12
 Interestingly this usage continues today. For discussion of Veblen’s own use of the term see Tony 
Lawson 2013. For commentaries on Lawson’s discussion of Veblen’s account of neoclassical economics 
see the various contributions in Morgan, 2016. 
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“It may be taken as the consensus of those men who are doing the serious work of 
modern anthropology, ethnology and psychology, as well as those in the biological 
sciences proper, that economics is helplessly behind the times, and unable to handle its 
subject-matter in a way to entitle it to standing as a modern science” (Veblen, 1898a: 
373) 
A central element of Veblen’s critique of neoclassical economics concerns the 
assumptions it makes about the human agent. According to Veblen the human agent as 
conceived of by neoclassical economics is taken over from “the traditional psychology of the 
early nineteenth century hedonists”. Within conventional economics the human agent is 
conceived of as being farsighted and rational, concerned only with maximizing his pleasure and 
minimizing his pain. However, according to Veblen, neoclassical economists fail to recognize 
the human agent as a real actor in the sense of being a causative agent. Within neoclassical 
economics the human agent is not really an agent at all but rather a totally passive reactor to what 
the environment presents – a pleasure seeking machine: 
“The hedonistic conception of man is that of a lightening calculator of pleasures and 
pains, who oscillates like a homogenous globule of desire of happiness under the impulse 
of stimuli that shift him about the area, but leave him intact. He has neither antecedent 
nor consequent. He is an isolated, definitive human datum, in stable equilibrium except 
for the buffets of the impinging forces that displace him in one direction or another … 
When the force of the impact is spent, he comes to rest, a self-contained globule of desire 
as before. Spiritually, the hedonistic man is not a prime mover. He is not the seat of a 
process of living, except in the sense that he is subject to a series of permutations 
enforced upon him by circumstances external and alien to him” (Veblen, 1898a: 389). 
According to Veblen if any kind of progress is to be made within economics then it is 
necessary to move beyond this atomistic conception of the human agent. It was Veblen’s belief 
that human activity was very much an evolutionary process. He viewed the way an individual 
acted on any given day as being a product of his habits of thought or circumstances of 
temperament. In the case of evolutionary economics, the human actor was far from passive - 
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merely reacting to events and processes of economic life. Instead, he/she was actively involved 
in making decisions about his/her life.  
For Veblen it was vital that the human agent be recognized as being socially constituted 
in a fundamental sense. He writes: “Each move … is necessarily made by individuals immersed 
in the community and exposed to the discipline of group life as it runs in the community, since 
all life is necessarily group life. The phenomena of human life occur only in this form” (Veblen, 
1914: 103-4). Veblen argued that an individual’s action resulted from the interplay of the human 
actor and other facets around him. So the focus was not just about satisfying one’s “economic 
interest” i.e. material wants in life and acting rationally with the intent of utility maximisation. 
Instead it was about numerous other interests too such as aesthetic ones or sexual, humanitarian 
and devotional interests. All human activity took place adaptively and sequentially depending on 
the actions of others as fashioned by the institutions at that time. In emphasizing the socially 
constituted nature of human agents he is however careful to avoid any form of determinism. The 
human individual for Veblen is always a potentially creative element in the environment – “He is 
in an eminent sense an intelligent agent. By selective necessity he is endowed with a proclivity 
for purposeful action” (Veblen, 1964: 80). 13   
Another feature of classical and neoclassical economics that Veblen objects to is how  
institutions are treated as mere constraints within which agents conduct their optimizing 
behaviour. In the world of neoclassical economics, this reactor of a man is seen as living in a 
world where the major economic institutions affecting his life have been simplified to 
information points that are as lifeless and unchanging as the rational man himself. Key 
institutions, such as private property and ownership, are conceived of as being pre-existing fixed 
features of society that need not be and should not be explored. He writes: 
                                                          
13
 For further detailed discussion of Veblen’s treatment of the human agent see, Nabers, 1958. 
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“The cultural elements involved in the theoretical scheme, elements that are of the nature 
of institutions, human relations governed by use and wont in whatever kind and 
connection, are not subject to inquiry but are taken for granted as pre-existing in a 
finished, typical form and as making up a normal and definitive economic situation, 
under which and in terms of which human intercourse is necessarily carried on. This 
cultural situation comprises a few large and simple articles of institutional furniture, 
together with their logical implications or corollaries; but it includes nothing of the 
consequences or effects caused by these institutional elements. The cultural elements so 
tacitly postulated as immutable conditions precedent to economic life are ownership and 
free contract, together with such other features of the scheme of natural rights as are 
implied in the exercise of these. These cultural products are for the purposes of the 
theory, conceived to be given a priori in unmitigated force. They are part of the nature of 
things; so that there is no need of accounting for them or inquiring into them, as to how 
they have come to such as they are, or how and why they have changed and are changing, 
or what effect all this may have on the relations of men who live by or under this cultural 
situation” (Veblen, 1909: 623). 
In contrast to all of this Veblen insists that economics must focus on history, process and 
change. For Veblen it becomes important to trace through where for example the principles of 
ownership and private property have come from. An evolutionary science would inquire as to 
why the things described were as they were, and how such circumstances were to change in the 
future; nothing was preordained, everything was contestable and thereafter contested. Veblen 
argued that although the focus is often on human action, we must not lose sight of the connection 
between human action, habits of thought and social institutions and the affect each has on the 
other.  
Both habits of thought and institutions are fundamental to understanding Veblen’s ideas. 
In Limitations of Marginal Utility Veblen describes institutions as “settled habits of thought 
common to the generality of men,” (Veblen, 1909: 626). We can understand habits of thought to 
be the ways and means of thinking and processing information. It provides a means for 
individuals to make sense of the world around them and act accordingly in appropriate situations 




“Like all human culture this material civilization is a scheme of institutions – institutional 
fabric and institutional growth. But institutions are an outgrowth of habit” (Veblen, 1909: 
628) 
 
Essentially, the habits that comprise an institution must be common to people generally and 
relatively enduring. They must provide accepted grounds for forms of behaviour or activity in 
particular situations. So an individual cannot create an institution just for him or herself. Veblen 
observed: 
“The growth of culture is a cumulative sequence of habituation, and the ways and means 
of it are the habitual response of human nature to exigencies that vary incontinently, 
cumulatively, but with something of a consistent sequence in the cumulative variations 
that so go forward” (Veblen, 1909: 628). 
 
Veblen believed “any science, such as economics, which has to do with human conduct, 
becomes a genetic inquiry into the human scheme of life” (Veblen, 1909: 627 – 628). With new 
situations – and dramatic ones like the industrial revolution – new habits of thought will arise, 
thereby giving rise to new institutions. In this way, Veblen always adopted the position that the 
social world was forever in process, continuously evolving and so the nature of important social 
institutions such as the corporation was also evolutionary - “rooted in the past but changing 
along with the fortunes of men and nations” (O’Kelley, 2013: 1002).  
Veblen did not believe that any theory put forward at one point in time would necessarily 
still hold true a decade or two later. He illustrates this point in Absentee Ownership and Business 
Enterprise in Recent Times when discussing the concepts put forward by Adam Smith. Veblen 
points to the “luminous record of the state of things economic in his time” but “he stood at the 
critical point of transition to a new order in industry and in ownership, and what was ‘natural’ in 
his view of things, therefore, ceased to be the common run of things from and after the date at 
which his luminous formulation of economic laws was drawn up” (Veblen, 1924: 57).  
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This same concern also applies to his own contemporaries. Veblen was profoundly 
dissatisfied with the way in which the business enterprise was typically characterized by 
neoclassical economic theory. Within the conventional theory of the time the economy was seen 
as being composed in large part of numerous small firms purchasing factors in essentially 
competitive factor markets and accepting the prevailing prices in the corresponding product 
markets. Successful firms were understood as temporarily obtaining a premium and hence 
achieving above normal profits through better management and innovation. Within the 
conventional view it was superior management and the introduction of new productive 
techniques that allowed increased margins at given prices to be enjoyed in the short term. The 
profits were recognised as being short term because any advantage will be copied by 
competitors. Thus in due course the full advantages will accrue to consumers in the form of a 
greater quantity of the product being produced at a lower price. Veblen argued that neoclassical 
economics took as its basic model the stage of economic development characteristic of an earlier 
period where the entrepreneur–manager, the small firm, competitively organized markets and so 
on were the core elements. Veblen argued that this kind of economic context had been radically 
transformed, he insisted that we should be exploring the nature of an economic system where 
corporations were dominant and were able to engage in wide ranging, often deeply manipulative, 
activities. 
We can now see the very significant methodological similarities between Berle and 
Veblen. Berle believed human activity, even when it came to economic activity, was an 
evolutionary process. He, like Veblen, believed that in order to understand the nature of the 
entity that was the modern corporation it was vital that we approached it from the point of view 
of its evolutionary process. Towards the latter part of The Modern Corporation and Public 
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Property, in a chapter with the very telling heading “The Inadequacy of Traditional Theory” he 
too raises the illustration of economic life as depicted by Adam Smith. He observed: 
“Private property, private enterprise, individual initiative, the profit motive, wealth, 
competition, - these are the concepts which he [Adam Smith] employed in describing the 
economy of his time… Most writers of the Nineteenth Century built on these logical 
foundations, and current economic literature is, in large measure, cast in such terms.  
Yet these terms have ceased to be accurate, and therefore tend to mislead in describing 
modern enterprise as carried on by the great corporations. Though both the terms and the 
concepts remain, they are inapplicable to a dominant area in American economic 
organisation” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 303). 
In the remaining part of the chapter Berle proceeded to explain in detail how each of the 
concepts of private property, wealth, private enterprise, individual initiative, competition and the 
profit motive have all come to mean very different things compared to the time when Smith was 
writing.  
These thoughts are reiterated many years later in his paper, The Impact of the 
Corporation on Classical Economic Theory. Berle (1965) has no qualms openly discussing the 
inadequacy of neoclassical economics and opens the paper by stating boldly: “In 1932, the thesis 
was presented by myself and Gardiner C. Means that the growth and functioning of large 
corporations introduced certain elements not adequately taken into account by classical 
economic theory” (Berle, 1965: 25). Over the course of this paper, Berle draws our attention to 
the “factual results of the flood-tide of institutional development which carries the bulk of the 
burgeoning industrial evolution” (Berle, 1965: 26) which have caused the nature of the 
corporation to shift tremendously and rather dramatically. He argues that the neoclassical 
economists seem unfazed by these changes and don’t take them into consideration. He adds, “the 
neoclassical school of economic thought rejects the idea that any change in theory is required by 
current phenomena… For neoclassical economists, business remains as usual… I think they are 
wrong” (Berle, 1965: 26 – 27). Berle argues that capitalism as a system is continuously evolving. 
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So we cannot assume that some of the economic terms have a stable referent. He states that it 
would be “as relevant as to assume that a modern motorcar is essentially the same as a fringed 
surrey because both have four wheels and transport passengers” (Berle, 1965: 26). Looking at a 
significant volume of factual and statistical evidence, Berle refutes the proposition “that 
‘capitalism’ as classically understood has not evolved” (Berle, 1965: 26). He also argues that the 
shift in ownership away from “from an aggregate of small-scale individual family-or-ownership-
directed enterprise” to “nearly one-third of all personally-owned property… representing 
ownership of the corporate system,” (Berle, 1965: 28) would require changes being made to 
fundamental concepts regarding industrial organisation. If the underlying features of the system 
have changed then we can no longer assume the theories will still hold true (Berle, 1965: 30).  
 Continuing in this line of thinking, Berle considers how even where the ultimate purposes 
of an organisation remain stable what that means in practice can vary significantly as the 
institutional context changes. Thus he writes with regard profit maximisation: 
“Maximisation of profit, it is said, is the prime driving force of corporations now as always in 
the case of business. Agreed.  
Classic (and neoclassical) theory assumes that this fact excludes possibility of significant use 
of the corporate assets and mechanism for social purposes. Both indeed add that such use not 
only cannot but should not be made. The corporation’s significance is thus limited to that of a 
profit-seeking unit, having the same motivations and acting in the same way as the classical 
entrepreneur-business-man. Fundamentally a good deal of this is true. Inaccuracy… in using 
the general concept as guide to assumed motivations and behaviour of the corporation arises 
from the changed state of fact. Maximisation of profit in the case of giant corporations not 
only may, but usually does, mean acting quite differently from the small-scale firm; thus the 
content of the phrase has changed. 
Ably-run corporations think of themselves as perpetual, as dependent on maintaining long-
range position and as responsible for meeting market demands (which they hope to increase) 
for an unlimited future. Their policies thus require and include long-range planning, for 
periods of five to twenty years ahead. At any given moment, they will sacrifice a portion of 
immediate profit for long-range position. This takes many forms: tying up capital to assure 
future source of supply, foregoing immediate profit for better position in any given market; 
hazarding resources in experimental operations (some of great size) whose profit potential is 
undemonstrated, campaigning for a changed tax-position – to take only a few. Of course, 
they hope the policies adopted will eventually ‘pay off’ in revenue dollars, or in added 
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percentage of market, or otherwise, but the time dimension is changed…. Though the profit 
motive is regnant, it is modified in application, timing and direction by all manner of 
companion considerations” (Berle, 1965: 33 - 34). 
 
 At a methodological level then there does seem to be some very significant 
correspondences between Berle and Veblen, in the next sub section I maintain that there are also 
substantial correspondences at the level of some of their main substantive themes. 
 
(ii) Veblen’s Absentee Ownership and Berle’s Dissolution of the Atom of Property 
 
Veblen viewed absentee ownership as one of the most dominant institutions at the time of 
his writing. Its importance to the functioning of society operated at two levels. First, on a micro-
level to individual men, Veblen observed: “In recent times absentee ownership has come to be 
the main and immediate controlling interest in the life of civilised men” (Veblen, 1924: 3). 
Secondly, absentee ownership was of significance on a macro-level as well: “[Absentee 
ownership] has now plainly come to be the prime institutional factor that underlies and governs 
the established order of society. At the same time and in the same degree it has, as a matter of 
course, become the chief concern of the constituted authorities in all the civilised nations to 
safeguard the security and gainfulness of absentee ownership” (Veblen, 1924: 4). 
In Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times: The Case of America, 
one of his most renowned works, Veblen (1924) sought to document the radical transformations 
taking place in the modern industrial system. He critically observed the way in which certain 
material conditions of life had changed with the coming of the Industrial Revolution, resulting in 
its disjointedness with prevailing habits of thought. He endeavoured to provide us with an 
understanding of how the system of ownership and control developed originally and how it later 
changed to a system of absentee ownership and control. In order to accomplish this task Veblen 
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(1924) explored the major social institutions that played central roles in creating the world of the 
1920s: the Masterless Man, the Handicraft Industry, the Captain of Industry, the Technicians and 
finally the Engineers.  
In order to understand any aspect of Veblen’s analysis of the business enterprise including 
his discussion of the rise of absentee ownership it is useful to situate it in the context of his 
broader analysis of institutional change.
 14
 Veblen considers four basic stages of social history – 
savagery, the barbarian era, the era of handicraft industry and the era of machine production. 
According to Veblen the era of savagery was the initial and longest lasting period of 
human history. In this stage every individual in a community had to engage in productive labour 
because the primitive state of industrial knowledge prevented the society from producing an 
economic surplus that could feed non-producers. The constraints within savage society were 
such that each and every individual had to cooperate in the distribution of economic supplies so 
that everyone would get enough resources to maintain his or her capacity for work. There were 
no class distinctions in this savage era and industry was organized on the basis of workmanship 
alone. The picture Veblen paints of savagery is one of considerable solidarity between 
community members. Although the savages did engage in mythological speculations about the 
spiritual agents they took to be controlling their natural environment, their mythologies were 
simply an attempt to satisfy their idle curiosity and had little economic significance. 
Veblen maintains that there is a fundamental transition from this classless state of society 
to the barbarian stage of culture in which a leisure class first emerges and in which interpersonal 
conflict becomes far more pronounced. He writes “the character of the struggle for existence 
                                                          
14
 It is possible to only give here the briefest sketch of Veblen’s treatment of institutional change. For 
more detailed discussions see Wenzler, 1998 and Barone, 2015.  
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changed in some degree from a struggle of the group against a non-human environment to a 
struggle against a human environment. This change was accompanied by an increasing 
antagonism and a consciousness between individual members of the group” (Veblen, 
2009[1899]: 220). Veblen argues that this transition would have been impossible before society 
became productive enough to produce a significant surplus. 
Force and fraud were, according to Veblen, the primary mechanisms by which the 
emerging leisure class of a barbarian society came to control the economic surplus. Warrior 
classes absented themselves from the vulgar requirements of industrial labour by directly 
appropriating the excess production of other community members through force. Priestly classes 
promoted themselves in less direct and more subtle ways in what, according to Veblen, 
amounted to fraud. They effectively turned primitive mythologies into economic assets by 
trading the intangible threats and promises of nonhuman spiritual agents for the  tangible 
economic goods of others. As warriors and priests began to dominate the human environment the 
barbarian society was divided into two classes - the industrial class and the leisure class. 
While the leisure class successfully freed itself from industrial labour it also constructed a 
complex system of cultural values that promoted the moral superiority of leisure class activities. 
At the heart of barbarian culture, according to Veblen, was a core and highly invidious 
distinction between exploit and drudgery. Exploit was linked to the ability to transform other 
essentially teleological (i.e. human) agents into nothing more than means rather than ends in 
themselves. Drudgery related to the industrial act of making new things out of inert material. 
Eventually industrial labour which had been satisfying to the savage because he possessed a 
native instinct for workmanship came to be experienced by the barbarian as fundamentally 
irksome. Labour came to be associated with the vulgar, ignoble and base and Veblen argued that 
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it remained so as modern civilization developed. Meanwhile the leisure class expresses its 
celebration of exploit and disdain for labour through various forms of conspicuous waste. 
According to Veblen private property originated in the barbarian era and continued to 
promote the predatory values of the leisure class. Veblen sees ownership as a social institution 
and not a natural fact. Within the barbarian era Veblen traces ownership to the social institutions 
in which master/servant relations had originated – slavery and patriarchal marriage. The 
institution of ownership began for Veblen as a relationship between a human master and a 
human servant, rather than a relationship between people and things. Once this way of thinking 
about human relationships had become firmly established it could be and was, according to 
Veblen, transposed across to thinking about relationships with inanimate objects. In time the fact 
that a man possessed many objects became a symbolic demonstration of his prowess even if it 
was not clear that he had obtained his wealth through the domination of other community 
members. Soon owning and consuming products of labour stood in a metaphorical way for 
owning and exploiting other human agents. For Veblen the contrast between the modern 
businessman and the barbarian related merely to the fact that businessmen typically obtained 
their property and prestige via pecuniary exploits in the marketplace rather than physical exploits 
of military combat. This kind of analysis of the motives of accumulation explained why the quest 
for wealth seemed to be so insatiable even in a modern industrial society that had vastly 
increased its productive potentialities. On this perspective since the desire for wealth was 
inherently competitive no absolute amount of physical property would deliver satisfaction. 
According to Veblen’s account European handicraft production starts when Masterless 
Men escape from the control of their feudal lords in the late medieval period and move into 
protected cities. As they establish themselves as craftsmen selling their products in the petty 
39 
 
markets that emerged in this era the Masterless Men achieve a degree of economic 
independence. In order to succeed the handicraft worker had to combine a capacity for 
workmanship with a capacity for salesmanship. Over time, these congregated Masterless Men 
developed new habits of thought consistent with their new masterless status. This was a life 
without absentee landlords and one where they had total claim on the fruits of their labour: it 
belonged to them and no one else. Workmanship was of high value and the resultant products 
were their own to keep and do with as they saw fit. Through this process, Veblen observed this 
new experience in workmanship to give rise to “the common-sense notion that ownership was a 
‘natural right’; in the sense that what a man has made, whatsoever ‘he hath mixed his labour 
with’ that has thereby become his own, to do with it as he will” (Veblen, 1924: 48). Hence in the 
realm of ideas the natural rights social philosophy corresponded to this feature of handicraft 
labour. The preconceptions of natural rights eliminated all of the privileges, rights and invidious 
distinctions of the feudal class system except the rights of property. From the perspective of the 
handicraft worker the privileges of property, unlike other aristocratic privileges, appeared 
necessary and natural as they seemed to arise directly from man’s relationship to nature and not 
from his relationship to other men. For Veblen this kind of perspective was incoherent.  
Veblen described the “natural” right of property as that which has been “grounded in the 
workmanship of the man who ‘hath mixed his labour with’ the materials out of which a valuable 
article has been created” (Veblen, 1924: 50). By this right of ownership the owner holds the 
power to care for his property as he sees fit and if he so wishes “dispose of his property by 
bargain and sale”. The Masterless Men, however, also had the natural right to “turn their 
workmanship to account for a valuable consideration in working up materials owned by another, 
without becoming owners of the resulting product” (Veblen, 1924: 50). This brought about a 
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further variant of absentee ownership and it was along the lines of credit and hired labour that 
absentee ownership integrated itself into the industrial system and came to dominate the 
organisations of industry within the system.  
Initially a typical business enterprise during the period of free competition was owned as 
well as managed by a sole proprietor or occasionally by a small partnership. This unification of 
ownership and industry was no longer representative of industrial communities by the third 
quarter of the nineteenth century. Veblen traces through the transformations involved in some 
detail - starting with trade. At first the petty trader was only engaged in small barter-like 
interactions. But the flow of goods grew greater in scale and volume, taking on a role more like 
“business” (Veblen, 1924: 54) wherein a new need surfaced: the management of contracts, 
bargaining and accounts became an occupation in itself separate from the physical handling and 
care of the finished goods bought and sold in the market-place. And gradually the petty trader 
became: 
“an enterprising absentee investor who took care of the business; while agents, super-
cargoes, factors took over the handling, carriage, and even the buying and selling of the 
goods, which so passed under the merchant’s ownership without passing under his hand” 
(Veblen, 1924: 54). 
 
Soon the now-congregated Masterless Men underwent a change too – a minority of them 
became absentee owners while the majority became wage labourers thus surrendering ownership 
and control. Initially, absentee ownership had a significant presence owing to the craftsman’s 
“natural right grounded in his workmanship” (Veblen, 1924: 55). But absentee ownership in the 
way of business enterprise was viewed by Veblen as “commercial investment” (Veblen, 1924: 
55). And the modern world became accustomed to the practice of investment for a profit when it 
was in this form of commercial enterprise. Appreciation for business principles and value for the 
investor and his work grew from here. When the handicraft era drew to a close and the transition 
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to the machine industry and the factory system had begun, investment in the way of business 
enterprise was already a customary fact.  
The rapid increase in mechanization was linked with the extended scale and scope of 
factory operations. Slowly but surely, the habits of thought from the handicraft era made way for 
new patterns of thoughts. New relationships of ownership and control formed and the nature of 
work changed once again. This change was facilitated by, as well as promoted the rise of, a new 
institution. Veblen writes: 
“…[F]rom this time on [the owner] became, in the typical case, an absentee manager with 
a funded interest in the works as a going business concern. The visible relation between 
the owner and the works shifted from a personal footing of workmanship to an 
impersonal footing of absentee ownership resting on an investment of funds. Under the 
new dispensation the owner’s guiding interest centered on the earnings of the concern 
rather than on the workmen and their work” (Veblen, 1924: 59). 
 
For Veblen the Captain of Industry is an entirely mythological character but was 
nevertheless “one of the major institutions of the nineteenth century” (Veblen, 1924: 101). It was 
especially important as it embodied the spirit of initiative and adventure in the new industrial age 
that had emerged. Veblen notes: 
“The prototype rather than the origin of the captain of industry is to be seen in the 
Merchant Adventurer of an earlier age, or as he would be called after he had grown to 
larger dimensions and become altogether sessile, the Merchant Prince. In the beginning 
the captain was an adventurer in industrial enterprise – hence the name given him… He 
was a person of insight – perhaps chiefly industrial insight – and of initiative and 
energy… He was a captain of workmanship at the same time that he was a business man; 
but he was a good deal of a pioneer in both respects, inasmuch as he was on new ground 
in both respects. In the typical case, he was business manager of the venture as well as 
foreman of the works, and not infrequently he was the designer and master-builder of the 
equipment, of which he was also the responsible owner” (Veblen 1924: 102 - 103). 
As the volume of industry grew increasingly larger, extending the volume of transactions, 
employing larger numbers of workmen and larger equipment, business concerns increased along 
with it. Personal supervision of the work by the owners no longer seemed practical and business 
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interaction became increasingly detached. Impersonal wage contracts replaced personal contact 
and personal arrangements between the employer-owner and his workmen. The employer-owner 
shifted more and more to a “footing of accountancy in its relations with the industrial plant and 
its personnel,” and work was overseen by “technical experts” (Veblen, 1924: 105). The function 
of the captain of industry then broke into a two-fold division of labour, “between the business 
manager and the office work on the one side and the technician and industrial work on the other 
side” (Veblen, 1924: 106). Through this division, the captain of industry became the captain of 
business or ‘captain of finance’  and “that part of his occupation which had given him title to his 
name and rank as captain of ‘industry’ passed into alien hands” (Veblen, 1924: 106). This shift 
was especially significant for Veblen in terms of his positive evaluation of the engineers. 
Veblen pointed out that there was a split between industry and business in that the 
employer-owner shifted further away from the business enterprise as absentee owners even 
though they still governed the volume of production and the conditions of life for the workmen, 
all based on the principle of net gain. The practical control of much of the work fell under the 
management of a new group: the technicians. However, Veblen believed that the shift was so 
gradual that even though it had started in the eighteenth century the process had still not worked 
itself out by the close of the nineteenth (Veblen, 1924: 107). Veblen argued that the 
disintegration of the captain of industry was due to the advance of industrial arts. The 
advancement occurred with such a high degree of specialisation and complexity that it was 
impossible for any industrial enterprise to be competently managed by one individual. He 
observed: 
“So the interval since the middle of the nineteenth century stands in contrast to what went 
before, as more or less sharply defined period of special growth in the industrial arts, 
during which the mechanical industry has progressively shifted to a footing of 
mechanical science, and during which also the immediate designing and conduct of the 
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work has progressively been taken over by the technicians. At the same time and by force 
of the same drift of circumstance the captain of industry, the owner-employer, business 
manager, has progressively been shifted to one side, - to the business side, the “financial 
end” (Veblen, 1924: 259). 
 
Now we can identify a significant connection between Veblen’s discussion of absentee 
ownership and Berle’s discussion regarding the separation of ownership and control. Like 
Veblen, Berle showed a particular interest in the shifting relationships of property. Berle’s 
discussion of ownership and property can be seen as developed very much in the spirit of 
Veblen’s previous research. The business enterprise had transformed dramatically and “ceased to 
be merely legal devices through which the private business transactions of individuals may be 
carried on” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 3). Instead the corporate form had acquired a larger 
significance, one where it was viewed both as a means of holding property and a way of 
organizing economic life. The divorce of ownership from control is one of the most enduring 
themes of The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Moore and Reberioux, 2010). 
For Berle, the biggest shift took place within the realms of ownership of private property. 
Up until the early nineteenth century, most writers came to denote private property as a unity 
involving possession and ownership (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]). It was assumed that 
ownership and control was combined. But in light of the modern corporation, this traditional 
concept of private property was quickly transforming into something very different.  
In Book IV, Chapter 1, where Berle raises the question for whose benefit does the 
corporation operate, he critically analyses the effect of the changes on traditional economic 
concepts. The traditional logic of property is one such concept he reviews. In the past, ownership 
of business enterprise involved two attributes: 
“…first the risking of previously collected wealth in profit-seeking enterprise; and, 
second, the ultimate management of and responsibility for that enterprise. But in the 
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modern corporation, these two attributes of ownership no longer attach to the same 
individual or group” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 297). 
Berle believed that the stockholder, having “surrendered control over his wealth,” had now 
become “a supplier of capital, a risk-taker pure and simple” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 297). 
Ultimate responsibility, authority and control were attached to directors (Berle and Means, 
1991[1932]: 297). Many parallels can be drawn to Veblen’s concept of absentee ownership here. 
 Berle identified the significant role property, and the organisation of it, played in the 
balance of powers that “make up the life of any era” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 3). The new 
shift in the function of ownership, the “mobilisation of property interests” moved the corporate 
system forward as “the principal factor in economic organisation” (Berle and Means, 
1991[1932]: 4). In this new light, the corporation became an avenue whereby the wealth of 
innumerable individuals was concentrated into massive aggregates and whereby control over 
these aggregates was “surrendered to a unified direction” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 4). Just 
as Veblen makes a reference to the rise of ‘merchant princes,’ Berle refers to the ‘princes of 
industry, whose position in the community is yet to be defined” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 
4).  
 Further similarities can be drawn between Veblen and Berle by considering Berle’s own 
attempt to describe the evolution of the business enterprise. He describes the enterprise as it was 
first envisaged and created in the nineteenth century and then maps out its transformation in the 
decades that followed. He wrote: 
“The typical business unit of the nineteenth century was owned by individuals or small 
groups; was managed by them or their appointees; and was, in the main, limited in size 
by the personal wealth of the individuals in control. These units have been supplanted in 
ever greater measure by great aggregations in which tens and even hundreds of thousands 
of workers and property worth hundreds of millions of dollars, belonging to tens or even 
hundreds of thousands of individuals are combined through the corporate mechanism into 
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a single producing organisation under unified control and management” (Berle and 
Means, 1991[1932]: 5). 
Berle refers to the American Telephone and Telegraph Company as an advanced example of this 
new kind of social institution. Holding assets worth almost five billion dollars, managing over 
450,000 employees, and stockholders to the tune of 567,694, this enterprise could almost be 
termed ”an economic empire” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 5). And it was not limited by any 
geographical boundaries but held together by centralized control. It was estimated that one 
hundred other companies existed of this size, controlling much of the American economy. If 
there was no duplication of shareholders then it could also be owned by nearly every family in 
the country (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 5). 
Much like Veblen, Berle observed the changes brought about by the industrial 
transformations of the previous one hundred years. He focusses on two developments in 
particular as aiding the emerging corporate organisation of economic activity.  First, the factory 
system, which formed the foundation of the industrial revolution, provided a platform whereby 
an incredibly large number of workers were able to be brought together under a single 
management. Second, the modern corporation placed the wealth of countless individuals under 
the same central control (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 4 – 9). Through these two changes the 
power of those in control was massively enhanced, further extending the area under unified 
control and thereby radically changing the status of all those involved whether they were a 
worker or property owner. Berle observed: 
“The independent worker who entered the factory became a wage labourer surrendering 
the direction of his labour to his industrial master. The property owner who invests in a 
modern corporation so far surrenders his wealth to those in control of the corporation that 
he has exchanged the position of independent owner for one in which he may become 




Furthermore, there was a deeper, more personal loss which seems to echo Veblen’s privileging 
of the instinct of workmanship. There was now very little enjoyment derived from owning the 
company in the new form: 
“The spiritual values that formerly went with ownership have been separated from it. 
Physical property capable of being shaped by its owner could bring to him direct 
satisfaction apart from the income it yielded in more concrete form. It represented an 
extension of his own personality. With the corporate revolution, this quality has been lost 
to the property owner much as it has been lost to the worker through the industrial 
revolution” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 65). 
 
Berle did not believe that in and of itself, the corporate device would not have brought 
about the monumental change that gave rise to massive units such as the American Telephone 
and Telegraph Company mentioned above. It had been long since possible for owners to 
incorporate their business in the nineteenth century even though it represented his own activities, 
his own investment and his own business transactions; the creation of an “alter ego” of sorts “by 
setting up a corporation as the nominal vehicle” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 5).  Berle noted 
that if this was all there was to it, then it would have only been noted as an interesting custom 
whereby individuals hoping to operate in business would have to abide by certain legal 
requirements. This would not have involved any kind of radical shift in economic activity or the 
potential creation of a whole new system.  
The “corporate system” appeared when this type of private corporation gave way to a 
completely new form, namely “the quasi-public corporation: a corporation in which a large 
measure of separation of ownership and control has taken place through the multiplication of 
owners” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 5). And emerging from this separation are two 
significant characteristics, size and the public market for its securities. Berle believed that this 
new form of separation of ownership and control had enabled massive aggregations of property.  
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Outwardly the changes seemed simple enough: men were unlikely to own any real 
physical instruments of production and instead were more likely to own pieces of paper. The 
position of ownership had changed from that of being an “active agent” to that of a “passive 
agent” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 64). Ownership once stood for the individual holding 
physical properties over which they exercised control and responsibility, the owner now held a 
piece of paper that represented a set of rights and expectations regarding a specific enterprise, 
that excluded any say in the functioning of the actual instruments of production and control of 
business operations – aspects of the enterprise that would significantly interest the owner. These 
pieces of paper were loosely known as stocks, bonds and other securities, which had become 
increasingly mobile as the public markets became more sophisticated. This indicated the 
existence of a more fundamental shift that was of great significance to Berle. He writes: 
“Physical control over the instruments of production has been surrendered in ever 
growing degree to centralized groups… Control of physical assets has passed from the 
individual owner to those who direct the quasi-public institutions, while the owner retains 
an interest in their product and increase… There has resulted the dissolution of the old 
atom of ownership into its component parts, control and beneficial ownership” (Berle and 
Means, 1991[1932]: 8). 
 
Berle believed that this dissolution of the atom of property destroyed the very 
foundations that the economic order of the previous three centuries had rested upon. Private 
enterprise, which had helped shape economic life since the end of middle ages, up until then had 
been rooted in the institution of private property. Under the feudal system, which preceded it, 
economic organization had grown out of mutual obligations and privileges between various 
individuals from their relation to property which none of them actually owned. Private 
enterprise, its polar opposite, “assumed an owner of the instruments of production with complete 
property rights over those instruments” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 9). Furthermore, the 
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system of private enterprise relied upon the property owner’s self-interest as the best guarantee 
of economic efficiency: 
“It has been assumed that, if the individual is protected in the right both to use his own 
property as he sees fit and to receive the full fruits of its use, his desire for personal gain, 
for profits, can be relied upon as an effective incentive to his efficient use of any 
industrial property he may possess” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 9). 
 
According to Berle, the dissolution of the atom of property more or less destroys the basis of this 
assumption because the owner is no longer in control. And so, Berle believed, that a new picture 
of economic life was emerging which required “a re-examination of basic concepts,” (Berle and 
Means, 1991[1932]: 64). Berle observed:  
“It has often been said that the owner of a horse is responsible. If the horse lives he must 
feed it. If the horse dies he must bury it. No such responsibility attaches to a share of 
stock. The owner is practically powerless through his own efforts to affect the underlying 
property” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 64). 
 
 
(iii) Veblen’s Industrial Experts and Berle’s Conscientious Managers 
According to Veblen, in a very short period of time, estimated to be from 1850 to 1875, 
the material conditions of industry transformed rather dramatically (O’Kelley, 2011). There was 
almost a feverish introduction of new inventions and by 1875, electricity, petroleum, rubber, 
structural iron and steel (which had little or no part in the industry at the start of the century) 
began to “edge their way into the everyday scheme of organized workmanship and become 
incorporated into the industrial system,” (Veblen, 1924: 74). With this sort of shift, new factories 
and forms of equipment were created and constructed. This opened up a new wave in demand for 
raw materials in addition to the old staples, thus providing a new source of unearned income and 
wealth to the absentee owners of these resources. Additionally there was new demand for returns 
on financial investments as financial institutions developed. In order to keep up production rates, 
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industrial plants and processes were becoming highly mechanised and more complex. This gave 
rise to new key social groups - namely the technicians and engineers. Veblen observed: 
“It was an advance in the scale and complication of equipment and work, in 
specialization and standardization, in applied mechanics and chemistry, which entailed 
the substitution of technical precision in the place of rule-of-thumb; and along with this… 
there was a similarly exacting growth in the business to be done, an increasing volume 
and an increasing nicety and multiplicity of details. Out of this increasing recourse to 
detailed, exact, objective knowledge there arose the industrial experts, engineers, 
technicians, who progressively took over the industrial functions of the captain of 
industry and left him free to devote his attention to business alone” (Veblen, 1924: 258). 
 
Furthermore, he noted: 
“In effect, the technicians has come up and grown great as a factor in productive industry, 
has grown to be one of the major institutions in modern life…So the interval since the 
middle of the nineteenth century stands in contrast to what went before, as a more or less 
sharply defined period of special growth in the industrial art” (Veblen, 1924:  256 - 259). 
 
He notes that eventually “while the tangible performance of so much work as the absentee 
owners considered to be wise, fell increasingly under the management of that line of technicians 
out of which there grew in time the engineering profession… It was a gradual shift and division, 
of course” (Veblen, 1924, 106). 
It is of no surprise to anyone who is familiar with Veblen’s work that he held the 
engineers in high esteem. He did not just think they were beneficial to the economy but he also 
believed that they could help solve the problems brought about through the pursuit of pecuniary 
gain. In 1921, Veblen published the book entitled The Engineers and the Price System which 
was made up of a set of essays that seriously discussed the possibility of a revolution led by the 
engineering profession. 
This work was viewed by some as something of an aberration on Veblen’s part because it 
seemed to be a severe departure from Veblen’s usual discussions. Some critics did not view it in 
a positive light. Layton (1962) stated that it was “one of the strangest predictions in the history of 
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social theory” (Layton, 1962 in Edgell, 2015: 64). Tilman (1972; 1973) described this book as a 
work of “utopian realism,” and not nearly as important as some of Veblen’s other works 
(Tilman, 1972: 313; 1973: 161). Meanwhile to Bell (1963) it seemed that “Veblen suddenly 
thought that he might become a prophet,” (Bell, 1963: 618). Others, however, have been more 
positive about this particular contribution. Malcolm Rutherford (1992a), for example, pointed out 
that perhaps we should view this work as “an attempt to point out and direct attention to [the 
engineers] opportunities,” (Rutherford, 1992a: 138). Similarly, Knoedler and May (1999) shed a 
different light on this work. They argued that Veblen had a longstanding interest in engineers 
throughout his career, believing they were prime candidates to remake the economy.  
It is possible to understand Veblen’s thoughts in Engineers and the Price System as 
merely a restatement of old Veblenian arguments and it should not be viewed as a strange 
departure. What’s most interesting for the purpose of this chapter is that, as we will see was true 
for Berle, Veblen had a group of individuals who he viewed as well placed to bring about 
progressive social change. They both identified problems with the business and corporate world 
and believed that there needed to be some serious transformations. For Veblen it was the 
engineers and for Berle it was ultimately managers who might yet guide the system in a positive 
direction. Of course, there is some irony here in that Veblen was strongly opposed to the very 
group that Berle eventually held high hopes for but this will be reviewed in a later section when I 
discuss the differences between the two authors. For now, I wish to review Veblen’s discussion 
regarding the importance of the role of engineers and show that it wasn’t in fact as significant a 
departure from his other work as some argue.   
In order to appreciate Veblen’s optimism with regard the role of engineers some further 
context is useful. According to Veblen extending from the late eighteenth to late into the 
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nineteenth century, production was not continually in danger of exceeding the capacity of the 
market. According to Veblen, industrial technique during this period, remained sufficiently 
primitive that businesses could push to maximum output and still maintain reasonably profitable 
price levels. Indeed competition in expanding markets forced firms to keep prices down. 
Shortage was embedded in the underdevelopment of material forms: populations were growing 
and simple human needs were both self-evident and forthcoming. Under these circumstances 
competitive market arrangements were a reasonable adaptation. But circumstances changed. 
Scientific and technological progress had by the close of the nineteenth century generated a 
remarkable but problematic productivity. More than enough industrial expertise was available so 
as to ensure popular wants for standardized staple products were satisfied at declining prices and 
was done so with less strain for the workers. For the underlying population of consumers and 
workers Veblen suggested this was unambiguously good news.  
From the corporate and financial perspective however the heightened productiveness was 
a dangerous development. Excessive output threatened to radically lower prices and profits. 
Expanding production could flood consumer markets satisfying popular needs at prices too low 
to meet the accelerating financial expectations of investors. For financial and corporate groups 
industrial progress was therefore highly ambiguous, it could dramatically increase productivity 
but it could also undermine key pieces of the material and ideological foundations of the 
corporate capitalist system.  
According to Veblen the corporations had to adopt aggressive advertising strategies so as 
to effectively artificially perpetuate scarcity. Business needed consumers with unsatisfied wants. 
Scarcity was also crucial in terms of upholding the legitimacy and rationality of the price system 
itself. It was also a powerful stimulus to keep workers sufficiently motivated. If plentiful and 
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cheap staple goods satisfied consumers, their habits of conspicuous consumption and industrial 
submission might fade away. Scarcity was at the core of a whole series of justifications and 
legitimations of social hierarchy. As technology developed this framework was threatened 
according to Veblen and advertising did much to shore it up. Advertising worked to fashion a 
new form of socially constructed and commercially functional scarcity. Advertising for Veblen 
involves a complex set of methods that corporations use to subvert economic common sense and 
direct the energies, desires and purposes of ordinary people away from preoccupations with 
material need and inexpensive items of use towards goods of invidious distinction, emulation and 
conspicuous consumption. Advertising helped to preserve the gap between human beings and 
their prospects for liberation from scarcity and the labour it extracted. This was what Veblen 
meant by describing advertising as involving an essential misdirection of effort (see Plotkin, 
2014, for detailed discussion). Advertising illustrated for Veblen the extraordinary power of 
corporations to control the agenda of economic possibilities - to control what would and would 
not be done with the remarkable technology now available. The essential economic function of 
prices is to efficiently communicate information about the uneven availability of goods and 
services. Advertisers induced consumers to think of needs and wants not in terms of impersonal 
usefulness but in terms of invidious comparison. The added expense of advertising and 
salesmanship was Veblen argued just an additional crucial business advantage. At a time when 
technology lowered production costs at an ever faster rate raising sales costs helped to counteract 
such effects by supplying new justifications for higher prices.
15
 
                                                          
15
 For a particularly detailed and interesting account of Veblen’s analysis of the role of advertising within 
the modern corporate system, see Plotkin, 2014. 
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For Veblen the whole industrial system was being sabotaged just at the time when (with 
the aid of the engineers) it could satisfy human need on a substantially extended scale and was 
characterised by ever increasing levels of waste: 
“So the business men who have controlled industry…have increasingly been content to 
let well enough alone and to get along with an ever increasing overhead charge of 
inefficiency, so long as they have lost nothing by it. The result has been an ever 
increasing volume of waste and misdirection in the use of equipment, resources, and man 
power throughout the industrial system” (Veblen, 1921: 43). 
It is also useful to provide some context regarding the engineering profession at the time 
of Veblen’s writings. By the early 1900s the profession had witnessed a dramatic increase in 
numbers. In 1880, there was a total of 7,000 engineers in American industry which increased to 
38,000 in 1900. By 1920 this figure had grown to 136,000 before ascending to 230,000 in 1930 
(Knoedler and May, 1999). This was “a rate of increase a hundred times greater than that for the 
growth of the labor force as a whole” (Knoedler and May, 1999: 258). Veblen clearly identified 
this shift. He observed that “industrial experts, engineers, chemists… technicians of all kinds, 
have been drifting into more responsible positions in the industrial system and have been 
growing up and multiplying within the system, because the system will no longer work without 
them” (Veblen, 1921: 44). It was a group growing tremendously in terms of numbers due to their 
importance in the industrial system. This was not the first time Veblen noted this and so his focus 
on the engineers cannot be considered a strange departure from his other works as argued by 
some critics. 
Along with noting the increase in the role of the engineer Veblen also highlighted that 
businessmen seemed unaware of the increased technological needs. In The Instinct of 
Workmanship, Veblen wrote of the “trained inability of the businessmen in control to 
appreciate… the visible technological requirements of the industries” (Veblen, 1914: 193). It was 
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Veblen’s belief that “Twentieth-century technology has outgrown the eighteenth-century system 
of vested interests” and the managing of industry through “business methods has become highly 
inefficient and wasteful” (Veblen, 1921: 100). The captains of industry were preoccupied with 
the “purposes of business” for “the sake of private gain,” and not “for purposes of industry” 
(Veblen, 1921: 112). Veblen writes:  
“… the control of the requisite running balance of sabotage, have been reduced to a 
routine governed by … suitably trained experts in corporation finance… the business men 
are increasingly out of touch with that manner of thinking and those elements of 
knowledge that go to make up the logic and the relevant facts of the mechanical 
technology. Addiction to a strict and unremitting valuation of all things in terms of price 
and profit leaves them… unfit to appreciate those technological facts and values that can 
be formulated only in terms of tangible mechanical performance… they are by training 
and interest, captains of finance” (Veblen, 1921: 38 - 39).  
 
It would only be a matter of time before the “underlying population come to realize that 
all this wasteful traffic of salesmanship is using up their productive forces, with nothing better to 
show for it than an increased cost of living” (Veblen, 1921: 112). But for the time being, it 
seemed the underlying population would “put up with what they are so well used to… so long as 
they are not in the habit of thinking about these things at all” (Veblen, 1921: 117).  
It was clear to Veblen that the emerging industrial system was one where the welfare of 
all depended upon the vast technology manned by these highly trained and experienced 
technicians and engineers. The “captains have no technological value” (Veblen, 1921: 133). So it 
seemed logical to Veblen that a possible revolutionary overturn of Vested Interests in the 
business world would be carried out by the technicians. And it seemed that Veblen had hoped 
this would be the case. He observed that it was “the industrial experts… who have finally begun 
to criticize this business like mismanagement and neglect of the ways and means of industry” 
(Veblen, 1921: 44). This made sense to him since the “Captains of Finance/financiers/Guardians 
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of Vested Interest… speak for the Vested Interests” while the technicians, “speak for the 
industrial system” (Veblen, 1921: 133). This is especially significant to understanding Veblen’s 
discussion of the rise of the engineers. It was not the case that Veblen believed the engineers 
would rise against the managers owing to dissatisfaction regarding their own incomes, status and 
the like. It was not about their position in the industrial hierarchy. Veblen believed they were the 
right group for the task and in turn, believed in them owing to their direct involvement in the 
work. It gave them a different perspective, one that was detached and devoid of the pursuit of 
pecuniary gain. He observed that “the mechanical technology is impersonal and dispassionate, 
and its end is very simply to serve human needs, without fear or favour or respect of persons, 
prerogatives, or politics” (Veblen, 1921: 132). Veblen was of the strong belief that industrial 
policy decisions should be made by the “general staff of production engineers” who would be 
“driven by no commercial bias” (Veblen, 1921: 55). 
As previously mentioned, these were not new ideas or concepts. In 1900, Veblen wrote 
Industrial and Pecuniary Employment where he discussed the problem of sabotage and the 
possibility of “highly trained technological experts and engineers as well as the highly skilled 
mechanics” coming to work together to help end it (Veblen, 1901: 317 in Knoedler and Mayhew, 
1999).  
Initially, the businessmen of small firms engaged in both industrial and managerial 
activities. But as firms grew massively in scale as well as scope, the same business men came to 
shift their focus on pecuniary issues alone. The investment bankers were dominant in 1920, but 
to Veblen, they seemed to lack any real knowledge of the industrial process.  Engineers, on the 
other hand, were free “from the constraint of [the] conventional norm of truth and validity 
[regarding property and ownership]” (Veblen, 1901: 317 in Knoedler and Mayhew, 1999).  Over 
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the course of this paper, Veblen challenged the old system of classification under the three-fold 
division of the factors of production, namely land, labour and capital arguing that they were 
inadequate (Veblen, 1990: 279). Veblen argued the division in the title of this paper (“Industrial 
versus Pecuniary Employment”) was far more significant than the older division.  
It seemed to him that restructuring would come about when the engineers/technological 
experts all grouped together in order to take control of the management of the economy’s 
industrial system. And just as Veblen believed that positive change would occur through the 
actions of one group in particular, Berle, too, believed this to be the case albeit with a different 
profession.   
As previously mentioned Berle was greatly concerned regarding the separation of 
ownership and control. He believed that the corporation now needed to be closely analysed not 
just in terms of business enterprise but also social organization. It raised the “question of the 
motive force back of industry, and the ends for which the modern corporation can be or will be 
run” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 9).  Berle came to hold a strong belief that corporations 
could be kept in check and positively influenced through public opinion and a sort of ‘corporate 
consciousness’.  For this reason, he was of the view that corporations could operate in the 
interests of the control group, namely the managers and yet at the same time operate in the 
interests of the whole community. He wrote: 
“For the fact seems to be that the really great corporation managements have reached a 
position for the first time in their history in which they must consciously take account of 
philosophical considerations. They must consider the kind of community in which they 
have faith, and which they will serve, and which they intend to help to construct and 
maintain. In a word, they must consider… how their operations in the community can be 
adapted to affording or fostering it… explicitly or implicitly, the premises are there” 
(Berle, 1954: 135). 
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Berle believed in what he termed the “public consensus” i.e. public opinion to which 
management would respond to. In his paper, Limitations on Corporate Activity, he observed: 
“… there are pressures not yet hardened into any form of law, but solidly based on    
wants and expectations of the community. To violate these settled expectations entails 
immediate controversy, leading to political action… Many industries, some concentrated 
and some frankly monopolistic, have avoided serious impact with the state because of the 
care with which they have anticipated these community expectations and the fidelity with 
which they have fulfilled them” (Berle, 1952: 945). 
Like Veblen, Berle also believed that there was a group well positioned to guide the system in a 
way that would benefit the wider community or the underlying population but ironically for 
Berle this group, namely business or corporate managers, were one constituent member of the 




2.3  Veblen and Berle’s Conceptual Differences and Opposing Orientations to Policy 
 Up until now, I have highlighted important similarities between Berle and Veblen starting 
with their views on neoclassical economics and methodology and moving onto  shared ideas and 
themes in their substantive contributions. However, as much as a clear link can be drawn 
between the two scholars there are also marked differences between them and these will be 
considered in this section.  
 
(i) Veblen’s Concerns over Pecuniary Culture  
The period from 1900 to 1923 witnessed a steady increase in the America’s overall 
wealth and corporations continued to take actions that maximised the value of corporate 
                                                          
16
 I will be exploring the notion of corporate consciousness in more detail in chapters 3 and 4 of this 
dissertation. It is worth also clarifying that Berle’s optimistic attitude toward managers developed only 
gradually and with changing political and economic circumstances. Initially in the 1920’s he had grave 




securities – values based on the premise of capitalizing the corporation’s expected earnings. Net 
gain had become the underlying principle of business. This resulted in everything else, including 
production, having no choice but to yield to its demands. Veblen observed: 
“The business man’s place in the economy of nature is to “make money,” not to produce 
goods. The production of goods is a mechanical process, incidental to the making of 
money; whereas the making of money is a pecuniary operation, carried on by bargain and 
sale” (Veblen, 1919: 92) 
Of the principle of net profit he wrote: 
“This principle has come to be formally recognised and accepted as good and final ever 
since the corporation came into general use as the standard form of business concern… 
[S]ince the dominant interest of the civilised nations has shifted from production for a 
livelihood to investment for a profit… this principle of net gain has come to stand out 
naked and unashamed, as the sound and honest rule that should govern and limit the 
production of goods for human use. And the corporation incorporates this underlying 
principle of business enterprise more singly and adequately than any form of organisation 
that had gone before” (Veblen, 1924: 85 - 86) 
Over the course of his work Veblen developed a powerful critical framework for 
understanding the business enterprise. Having observed that the group which seemed to reap the 
most benefits were the absentee owners, Veblen noted that the rest of the population fell behind 
and did so rapidly.  Veblen (1899) first discusses this disparity in The Theory of the Leisure 
Class. As noted previously differentiates a leisure class from a labouring class (Veblen, 1899). 
The leisure class was seen as a relatively small and extremely wealthy class. They often 
exploited other groups and were not productive of their own accord. The labouring class, on the 
other hand, were fully engaged in the production process as well as manufacturing and services. 
What concerned Veblen was that the labouring class represented the majority of the population 
while the leisure class represented a very small percentage. Veblen viewed the leisure class as 
holding a sort of pecuniary link to the overall economic process (Veblen, 1899). Veblen (1904) 
discusses these themes further in his work, The Theory of the Business Enterprise. In 1901, when 
Veblen mentioned these two groups in Industrial and Pecuniary Employments, as the title would 
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indicate, he referred to them as “pecuniary employment” versus “industrial employment,” 
(Veblen, 1901: 214). In a later work, Vested Interests and the Common Man, Veblen (1919) 
takes up these discussions again describing the division as a cleavage running through the 
advanced industrialised societies. He observed that a new order had been brought into being with 
“machine industry, corporation finance, big business, and the world market” (Veblen, 1919: 
160). Under this new order, business controlled industry and invested wealth in large holdings 
controlled the country’s industrial system. Control was exercised either “directly by ownership 
of the plant, as in the mechanical industries, or indirectly through the market, as in farming” 
(Veblen, 1919: 160). Once again Veblen observed that this divided the population in two main 
classes: those with wealth attributed to investments in large holdings and “vested interests” 
(Veblen, 1919: 160) and those who did not hold sufficiently large holdings. A vested interest is 
defined as a “legitimate right to get something for nothing” (Veblen, 1919: 162) and Veblen 
identifies this wealthy group with vested interests as the ones “who thereby control the 
conditions of life for the rest” (Veblen, 1919: 160). Those who did not hold adequately large 
holdings, ‘the common man’ (Veblen, 1919: 161) were controlled by those individuals in the 
former group and faced a great deal of uncertainty and insecurity. 
 Veblen describes this division as one that is “not between those who have something and 
those who have nothing… but between those who own wealth enough to make it count, and 
those who do not” (Veblen, 1919: 161). He further states: 
“But the gravest significance of this cleavage that so runs through the population of the 
advanced industrial countries lies in the fact that it is a division between the vested 
interests and the common man. It is a division between those who control the conditions 
of work and the rate and volume of output and to whom the net output of industry goes as 
free income, on the one hand, and those others who have the work to do and to whom a 
livelihood is allowed by these persons in control, on the other hand” (Veblen, 1919: 161) 
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The ever increasing pervasiveness of the pecuniary culture was also highlighted in 1914, in 
Veblen’s The Instinct of Workmanship and the State of the Industrial Arts. Veblen, noted with 
concern, that the acquisition of wealth was equated with economic efficiency as opposed to 
technological mastery or productive effort. 
 Business enterprise, it seemed to Veblen, was absolutely preoccupied with pecuniary gain 
and seeped into the activities of the businessmen. And once again vested interests lay at the heart 
of it all. Veblen writes: 
“The business men make use of the mechanical appliances and powers of the industrial 
system, but they make a pecuniary use of them. And in point of fact the less use a 
business man can make of the mechanical appliances and powers under his charge, and 
the smaller a product he can contrive to turn out for a given return in terms of price, the 
better it suits his purpose” (Veblen, 1919: 92). 
 Veblen observed that these attributes associated with a competitive market were 
constraining the ‘good working efficiency of the industrial system’ (Veblen, 1919: 88). He 
believed that the “loose corrective control which is exercised by a competitive market” was “too 
slow, at the best, and too disjointed” (Veblen, 1919: 87). Additionally, it brought about a clear 
division amongst the population as previously explained. He argued that the “industrial system is 
now a wide-reaching organisation of mechanical processes which work together on a 
comprehensive interlocking plan of give and take, in which no section, group, or individual unit 
is free to work out its own industrial salvation” and it all seemed “a more or less delicately 
balanced affair” (Veblen, 1919: 87). 
Previously, we discussed the reign of the Masterless Men. Their era shifted to one of the 
absentee owner over a brief period of time, roughly between 1775 and 1850 (see O’Kelley, 
2011). It was during this era that the need for capital exceeded the capacity of the Masterless 
Men for the very first time. It was truly the time of free competition. The business-like 
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management of industry primarily focused on net earnings and endeavoured to provide a reliable 
means of income for the creditor (by that time credit had become an established attribute of the 
industrial business).  
By the end of the nineteenth century it seemed that the modern corporation had become 
the most dominant institution of civilised life. It would seem that through its sheer size and 
resultant change in form it became conducive to facilitate absentee ownership owing to the 
complete separation of ownership and control. The corporation seemed to hold a new purpose 
that being one of profit maximisation for its absentee owners. Veblen believed that this 
combined with the increasing role of corporate finance prevented the country’s industrial system 
from being utilised effectively. He observed that the corporation had become a means of making 
money as opposed to one of producing goods. And it was during this era that a new staple 
manner of ownership and control was established in civil law and custom: investment for a profit 
(O’Kelley, 2011). Veblen observed: 
“[T]he corporation is always a business concern, not an industrial appliance… The 
production of goods or services, wherever that sort of thing is included among the 
corporation’s affairs, is incidental to the making of money and is carried only so far as 
will yield the largest net gain in terms of money – all according to the principal of “what 
the traffic will bear,” or of “balanced return,” which underlies all sound business, and 
more particularly all corporation business” (Veblen, 1924: 85). 
 Veblen was also concerned with the growing influence exerted by the business enterprise 
not only over industry as a whole but also over social life and representative democracy. 
Moreover, it seemed that it was extremely well protected (Veblen, 1904) with the constitutional 
government increasingly a “business government… guided by the advice of business men”.  
 Veblen’s relentless critique draws a sharp contrast to the tone Berle often adopts. 
Although he voiced concerns over the corporation, there was a part of him that seemed almost 
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enthralled and fascinated by the changes and possibilities this form of the business enterprise 
brought with it. In the opening chapter of The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle 
wrote: “Though the American law makes no distinction between the private corporation and the 
quasi-public, the quasi-public corporation may fairly be said to work a revolution” (Berle and 
Means, 1991[1932]: 7). Then, later, in the opening paragraph of The Twentieth Century 
Capitalist Revolution, Berle observed: 
“This is a study of one aspect of the revolutionary capitalism of the mid-twentieth 
century… This singular organisation [the modern corporation] has succeeded in being at 
once legal institution, economic institution, and agency and chief heir of the explosion of 
technical progress which is the outstanding achievement of our generation” (Berle, 1954: 
1). 
 
Berle provides further positive commentary in the paper, Corporations and the Modern 
State stating that the large corporation “has become a unique institution,” and “malleable” 
(Berle, 1950: 38). Owing to chief judgements and rules being made internally by the various 
governing groups, as opposed to rules imposed by law, a change in thinking could alter a 
corporation’s entire persona and function. This, Berle believed, was extremely beneficial.  
 A further contrast lies in the fact that Berle did not think that the managers’ personal 
goals would get in the way all the time. Interestingly, he refers to the term, ‘vested interests’ and 
it would almost seem like he is making a reference to Veblen’s discussions here. He states: 
“The men who manage large corporations usually do not have a “vested interest” in the 
ordinary sense of property motivation. (There are, of course, notable exceptions – they 
are exceptions and not norms)” (Berle, 1950: 38). 
 
Berle believed there was a difference in the management groups’ motivations compared to 
individual owners of the small business enterprise. Whereas the latter would be motivated by 
property, the former represented more “political interests, in the wide sense of the term” (Berle, 
1950: 39). For example, the United States Steel Corporation was the largest single producer of 
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steel at the time of writing. Considering that the net value of the corporation’s assets amounted to 
roughly two hundred dollars per share (Berle, 1950) it would have been advantageous to the 
board of directors (who represented the stockholders) to close down the plants and distribute its 
profits to the shareholders, in cash. Nothing could prevent it from doing so, legally. But, Berle 
argued, “no sane board of directors would entertain such a proposition for a moment. Because 
continued production of steel is essential to the life of the country… The legal and economic 
theory that an enterprise can go out of business, as it suits the owner, exists only on paper, when 
the community depends on its products” (Berle, 1950: 45).  
 Veblen believed that financial management was only interested in pecuniary gain and so 
corporations would only be involved in activities that further enabled the attainment of this goal. 
He believed that they could not be monitored or controlled and a complete overhaul was the only 
way towards progressive change. Berle, although he noted the influence of the profit motive, he 
did not, however, believe that managers would act out of purely selfish reasons. The political 
community, the public and their opinion now held pivotal roles when management groups 
decided on a corporation’s operations and these, Berle argued, meant that managers would be 
mindful and so corporations could change in a positive way if need be. No dramatic overhaul 
was required a more gradual evolution could be expected. He observed: 
“… they [management] are rather dependent on the point of view of men around them, of 
the political community, and so much of public opinion as influences the group on whose 
approval they depend to hold office. The modern corporation is an institution capable of 
change, in much the same sense that a city or a political party is capable of change” 
(Berle, 1950: 40).  
 
 On the whole, Berle believed that changes to the capitalist system brought about by the 
arrival of the corporation were massive and he had no doubt they would change further, “but the 




(ii) Veblen’s Quietism vs Berle’s Activism  
“The common man does not know himself as such, at least not yet, and the sections of the 
population which go to make up the common lot… have not yet learned to make common 
cause” (Veblen, 1919: 174 – 175). 
Upon reading quotations such as the one above one might be encouraged to characterise 
Veblen as being quite negative regarding the prospects for meaningful progressive change. 
Critics have noted Veblen’s overall sardonic tone in his writings especially when discussing 
“imbecile institutions” “parasitic industries” (Veblen, 1914) the “vested interests” of the wealthy 
controlling the livelihood of the “common man” (Veblen, 1919: 160).  
Some critics have described Veblen as being bitterly critical, cynical (O’Kelley, 2013) and 
sceptical of political action and see him as consciously avoiding direct political engagement 
altogether, leading the life of a “political quietist” (Plotkin, 2010: 80). Some have stated that 
Veblen “never fantacised that human beings were born free,” (Dugger, 1984: 981) but instead 
recognised they were born into an existing institutional structure that they could not escape from. 
They were accustomed to being ruled by others and trapped in archaic habits of mind.  
The distance Veblen maintained from direct political action is very significantly different 
from the approach that Berle chose to adopt. Unlike Berle, Veblen felt no compulsion to adopt a 
political position on questions or issues regarding political strategic action. Veblen 
systematically challenged institutions in his work but did not typically map out detailed ways in 
which they could be changed. And for some critics, this showed a sense of despair in Veblen’s 
work. Plotkin states Veblen “never lets us forget the raw violent, outright seizure and harsh 
coercions that social institutions enable and mask” (Plotkin, 2010: 90) and suggests he might be 
understood as a “tragic writer” (Plotkin, 2010: 81). Veblen seemed to depict human beings as 
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“creatures frustrated by blind evolutionary change, confused by the unsuitability of their 
cherished habits to altered conditions, and manipulated by propaganda and salesmanship” 
(Plotkin, 2010: 94). 
In some early writings like Some Neglected Points in the Theory of Socialism (Veblen, 1891) 
Veblen displayed some hope that constitutional democracy might be able to constrain power 
politics. But his contempt for politics seemed all encompassing in later works: 
“The commonwealth in such a case would no longer be a political engine to be turned to 
account for political traffic by the politicians. It would be nothing to bluster and give off 
fumes about; nothing better, in fact, than an unsanctified workday arrangement for the 
common use of industrial ways and means” (Veblen, 1924: 28). 
Like Berle, power was an issue that was of great interest to Veblen. He provides us with 
much insight into the hegemonic as well as disciplinary aspects of power both on a microsocial 
and macrosocial level. However, unlike Berle, Veblen refuses to provide detailed plans for 
processes of state action. Veblen focused on the issue of power but seemed to downplay the 
mediating impact of the state on economic power. He also seemed to ignore the potential for 
change through a positive democratic government which could discipline, monitor and control 
corporate power (Diggins, 1999 in Plotkin, 2010). 
It is important to note the context within which Veblen made his observations. The 
second wave of the industrial revolution took place on a colossal scale. The average industrial 
plant size had increased massively as well as the organisational scale of its operations. The 
proportion of Americans living in towns and cities was growing at an increasingly rapid rate. The 
overall economic growth of the country was also on the increase along with an increase in capital 
accumulation. With these changes, however, there was also other new factors that didn’t seem 
altogether beneficial for the economy or the population at large. For example, there was a larger 
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disproportionate appropriation by a capitalist class and with it the presence of ostentatious 
displays of wealth and an increase in conspicuous consumption. It was a period that gave us a 
group of tycoons such as J.D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie and J.P. Morgan. By 1890, the 
richest 9% of the population owned approximately 71% of personal wealth in the United States 
(Smart, 2015). Between 1893 – 1897, however, the United States saw one of its very first serious 
economic depressions; banks and businesses closed down and millions were left unemployed.  
The country and economy underwent such tremendous transformations that perhaps 
Veblen felt a critical stance was most fitting at the time. Writing in 1899, in response to John 
Cummings’ critique of his work, The Theory of the Leisure Class, Veblen pointed out that he had 
not “had the fortune to reach a conclusion, or to attempt one” (Veblen, 2009[1899]: 110). 
Although he did not argue for state intervention or propose detailed plans for strategic 
economic action, he was not as pessimistic as some critics claim him to be. When discussing the 
system of industrial competition, for example, he observed: 
“[We cannot deny] that the system of industrial competition, based on private property, 
has brought about… the most rapid advance in average wealth and industrial efficiency 
that the world has seen. Especially can it fairly be claimed that the result of the last few 
decades of our industrial development has been to increase greatly the creature comforts 
within the reach of the average human being… The claim that the system of competition 
has proved itself an engine for making the rich richer and the poor poorer has the 
fascination of epigram; but if its meaning is that the lot of the average, of the masses of 
humanity in civilised life, is worse to-day, as measured in the means of livelihood, that it 
was twenty, or fifty, or a hundred years ago, then it is farcical” (Veblen, 1891: 60 – 61).  
As much as Veblen steered away from political action, Berle was at the heart of it. He 
became a member of the Brain Trust, the group of political advisors aiding President F. 
Roosevelt through the crisis of the 1930s.  
Berle was of the view that the corporations needed to be and could be brought under 
control. Berle states: 
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“Such a great concentration of power and such a diversity of interest raise the long-fought 
issue of power and its regulation – of interest and its protection… Observable throughout 
the world, and in varying degrees of intensity, is this insistence that power in economic 
organization shall be subjected to the same tests of public benefit which have been 
applied in their turn to power otherwise located… In the strictly capitalist countries, and 
particularly in time of depression, demands are constantly put forward that the men 
controlling the great economic organisms be made to accept responsibility for the well-
being of those who are subject to the organization, whether workers, investors, or 
consumers… How will this demand be made effective?” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 
309 -310). 
Berle argued for a more dynamic partnership between the state and the modern corporation. In 
the decade following World War I – commonly referred to as the Roaring Twenties – the 
American economy witnessed “a period of unprecedented wealth creation” (Berle and Means, 
1991[1932]: 1023) unlike any other. It was not to last however. First came the stock market crash 
of October 1929 and then the descent into the Great Depression. In the years preceding the crash 
there came about a massive shift in the control of U.S. productive assets and the dominant U.S. 
business enterprises.  
The stock market crash and the Great Depression that ensued was an immense shock to 
the American psyche. At first, business leaders and government assumed that there would be a 
natural turnaround with only very mild government intervention necessary. But soon it became 
clear that this depression would be very different to the ones experienced in the last three 
decades of the nineteenth century. Various policy makers flirted with the idea of a new 
relationship between government and the modern corporation which would serve the nation 
better. Herbert Hoover intended to continue to maintain the status quo as opposed to creating a 
new model of corporate capitalism (O’Kelley, 2013). Franklin Roosevelt opted for a more 
assertive role for government, albeit cautiously, with particular focus on its relationship with the 
modern corporation.  
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In 1932, drawn by Berle’s visionary work on the modern corporation, Roosevelt invited 
him to be a part of his campaign team. Though Roosevelt was not an intellectual himself, he 
understood the need for a positive far reaching framework within which the necessary changes 
could be articulated and Berle seemed to offer an intellectually robust but practical vision. He 
and a small group of other public intellectuals and leaders fought to create a new vision that 
would form the framework for Roosevelt’s first administration.  
Berle once believed that the distance of the shareholders and the growing control of the 
managers would grant the corporation a sort of ‘unownedness’ that would free it to pursue a 
corporate governance model which would ensure that the ‘paramount interests of the 
community’ were met (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 311). He suggested that the 
“depersonalisation of ownership, the objectification of enterprise, the detachment of property 
from the possessor, leads to a point where the enterprise becomes transformed into an institution 
which resembles the state in character” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 311). The crash of 1929 
and its aftermath made it evident to Berle that this would not necessarily be a natural outcome 
and state regulation was the only way to bring about a satisfactory outcome.   
Berle wished to bring an end to laissez-faire individualism and wanted Roosevelt to 
develop a new understanding, one where the individual could not succeed unless the modern 
corporation was reined in (O’Kelley, 2013). One of Berle’s primary goals whilst aiding to set up 
the above New Deal framework was to increase management accountability. During the New 
Deal period financial markets became more closely regulated, by law and stock-exchange 
regulation it became a requirement for management to file and publish annual accounts as well 
as quarterly interim progress reports (Berle, 1962). Furthermore they had to make general 
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disclosures of their operations (this was in fact a recommendation made by Berle in The Modern 
Corporation & Private Property).  
Berle’s governance strategy was a broad one, designed to increase managerial 
accountability but also to promote progressive social outcomes by empowering other actors 
within the corporation to act. The setting up of institutions such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, other various regulatory commissions, the passage of the Securities Act 1933 
(which helped to ensure an informed market of investment) and the Securities Exchange Act 
1934 (which was aimed at correcting trade abuses) all aided in this. The provision of the two 
latter Acts in particular enabled the openness of information which was viewed as key to regulate 
competition.  
Berle now believed that an interventionist state was the only way in which shareholder 
passivity could be made to be consistent with progressive social developments. He was uncertain 
whether management would always consider wider societal interests and sought to reduce their 
abuse of power. With the rise of general Incorporation Acts corporations had become private, 
unregulated entities. Berle argued that this was made apparent by court decisions:  by the end of 
the century, a director’s position was interpreted as one which gave him total control and 
complete discretion over managerial activities. Additionally, according to Berle, it seemed that 
shareholder power could be passed on a more or less permanent basis to management and this 
was seen by Berle as a regressive step. Berle’s solution was to reregulate corporate activity with 
the help of corporate law and a wider set of social reforms – fair wages, job security, sound 
products and general business stability. Berle strongly believed that these kinds of reforms could 
encourage management to pursue a more progressive governance path which would be in the 
interests of the community as a whole.   
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Berle also encouraged the introduction of certain New Deal policies which sought to 
promote a somewhat more balanced bargaining position between groups. These reforms sought 
to empower those who had become powerless in the modern corporate era. In such policies as 
the radical National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) 1933, the New Deal sought to empower the 
labour unions. This act gave a substantial amount of power to labour’s representative institutions 
by providing them with the right to organise themselves as unions and to engage in collective 
bargaining when need be. Supporting unions in this way, the Act and the government helped to 
characterise union membership as an act of patriotism and no longer ‘un-American’.  
Furthermore in his later writings Berle came to the view that the corporate world was 
moving into a sphere where public opinion had a growing influence on the actions of managers 
and business-managers now operated under this perpetual glare of public scrutiny. Misconduct 
could trigger state intervention:  
“Whereas in the past public opinion had little influence on the conduct of corporate 
managements, today it is crucial, and every management knows it… Within the past few 
years the heads of two of the nation’s largest life insurance companies resigned because 
they were thought to have transgressed, albeit without breach of law, standards of ethics 
to which public opinion held them accountable. The executive head of the country’s 
largest electronics corporation demoted himself from direct executive power because 
some of his associates had indulged in criminal bid-rigging and pleaded guilty thereto; as 
he was commanding officer, public opinion held him accountable. The preventive effect 
of a public consensus on standards of conduct cannot be precisely measured. Undeniably 
it is great” (Berle, 1962: 440). 
 
2.4  Concluding Remarks 
The similarities between the work of Veblen and Berle are very substantial. They both 
adopt a critical stance toward neoclassical economics and go to some trouble to highlight its 
inadequacies. They view neoclassical economics as being at best only relevant for an industrial 
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context that has in fact long been displaced by the development of the corporation. They both 
argue that any theory regarding the corporation must adopt an approach that is highly historically 
sensitive and see neoclassical economics as transparently failing this test.  
 Dugger once wrote: 
“Inherent to the process of evolutionary theory-building is the drive to make human 
beings a part of nature by demystifying our view of ourselves so that we become products 
of evolution rather than products of wishful thinking…” (Dugger, 1984: 972) 
Evidently both Berle and Veblen recognize the significance of this. They are both keen to 
explore how things have evolved over time as opposed to presupposing that the social world is 
fixed. This comes across very clearly where Berle and Veblen each insist that central social 
institutions such as property and ownership ought not to be understood as fixed but rather must 
be historically examined with careful explanations being provided for how they emerge and are 
transformed. A further similarity relates to a shared optimism regarding the possibilities of 
specific groups being the agents for progressive change.  
There are also significant differences that need to be acknowledged. Veblen often viewed 
corporations as being out of control and perhaps uncontrollable. The corporations were captured 
by narrow sectional groups interested in pecuniary gains. Furthermore, as long as the business 
enterprise functioned under the rule of managers pursuing pecuniary gain, Veblen saw only 
limited positive benefits arising from its operations and argued that corporations would primarily 
serve to exploit those who had little or no say in the economy. He strongly believed that the 
industrial experts, the engineers, were best suited to run the industrial enterprises in the interests 
of the underlying population. 
 Berle, on the other hand, did not ultimately see management in such a negative light. He 
came to the view that through corporate consciousness and state regulation corporations could be 
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kept in check. Berle increasingly put forward the notion that corporations could respond to wider 
social interests and act for the benefit of the community as a whole.  
 This leads us to a further difference that concerns the engagement with policy of the two 
men. Veblen has been viewed by many as a pessimist in terms of politics. But here, following 
Plotkin, it has been argued that the most appropriate term to describe him would be that of a 
‘quietist’. For whatever reason he may have had, Veblen did not feel the need to engage in a 
sustained fashion in politics. This, of course, stands in sharp contrast to Berle who not only 
viewed state intervention as a way to keep corporations in check but personally became heavily 





3.  THE NATURE OF THE CORPORATION: COMMUNITY, 
POSITIONING AND CONTROL 
 
 
3.1     Introduction 
The aim of the present chapter is to compare the community based account of the firm and 
the corporation recently outlined by Tony Lawson with relevant aspects of Adolf Berle’s account 
of the modern corporation. Lawson’s discussion of the corporation is part of a much broader 
project in social ontology. Lawson suggests that the problems associated with mainstream 
economics stem in large part from a profound neglect of ontological issues that has characterized 
the discipline for some considerable time.
17
 The implicit ontological presuppositions of atomism 
and isolationism implied by the methods that mainstream economists insist upon are highly 
problematic and are shown by Lawson to be unsustainable. He outlines and defends a particular 
structured and relational account of the nature of the social realm
18
 and has recently sought to 
draw on this general social ontology in order to develop particular accounts of the nature of 
certain key social categories such as gender systems, money and the corporation.
19
   
                                                          
17
 For Lawson’s critique of mainstream economics see Lawson, 1997 and 2003. 
 
18
 For Lawson’s account of the social realm see Lawson, 2003 and 2012. 
 
19
 For Lawson’s discussion of gender systems see Lawson 2014, for his analysis of money see Lawson 
2016 and for his account of the firm and the corporation see 2015a and 2015b. Lawson’s argument is that 
more compelling accounts of these key social categories can be developed if an explicit ontological 
orientation is adopted. When it comes to developing a satisfactory account of the nature of the corporation 
Lawson is not alone in emphasising the importance of ontology. Orts, 2016, for example, emphasises that 
when forwarding arguments about the nature of the corporation it is especially important to revisit issues 
in legal and social ontology. Orts notes: “To ignore organizational ontology is actually to adopt one or 
another ontological view unconsciously, ignorantly or manipulatively” (2016: 562). 
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In this chapter I argue that at a basic ontological level there are interesting and significant 
similarities between Lawson’s recently elaborated and ontologically sophisticated account of the 
corporation and the account of the corporation that Berle provides. These similarities include a 
shared emphasis on social positioning, a common recognition that the corporation is both 
economically and legally constituted and a parallel focus on the historically contested nature of 
the purposes of the corporation
20
. While highlighting the significant similarities between the two 
accounts of the corporation I also note that the two authors develop very different understandings 
of the extent to which the corporation can be controlled in a way that ensures that the public 
interest is effectively served. 
I first set out in some detail the key elements of Lawson’s account of the firm and the 
corporation, I then turn to similarities between the community based account of the corporation 
developed by Lawson and various commentaries Berle’s provides on the nature of the 
corporation. A particular point of reference here is Berle’s 1947 paper “The Theory of Enterprise 
Entity” within which I argue one can find a partial recognition of the importance of the process 
of social positioning. Differences between Berle and Lawson are considered in the fourth section 
of the chapter where it is noted that while Lawson sees the modern corporation as a mechanism 
that is largely out of control Berle ultimately comes to view the corporation as a social institution 
that can be directed so as to serve broader social interests. Concluding remarks then follow. 
    
3.2.     The Community Based theory of the Firm and the Corporation 
                                                          
20
 To the extent that correspondences can be drawn between the kind of ontological commitments implicit 
in Berle’s writings and the ontological position that Lawson explicitly elaborates and defends then this 
also serves to highlight the distance between Berle and contemporary orthodox economics. Appreciating 
these differences is important when making any assessment of how Berle’s work relates to current 
positions prominent within the corporate governance literature.  
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An important initial point that Lawson makes when setting out his community based account 
of the firm and the corporation is that even those economists who have seemingly sought to 
address fundamental questions like what is the nature of the firm have done so in highly partial 
ways. So with regard to Coase (1937) Lawson notes that despite the title of the famous 1937 
paper “The Nature of the Firm” Coase in fact does not very directly address the question of the 
essential nature of the firm. Rather Coase’s main concern relates to the issue of why firms exist 
in a context where contemporary conventional economics indicate that they ought not to from an 
efficiency point of view. Coase is interested in the question why we have firms when we could 
have markets which are seen as preeminently efficient institutions? Coase in fact provides only 
the briefest sketch of the essential nature of the firm. Those who have followed in his wake or 
attempted to respond to Coase’s main arguments have not shed much light on the nature of the 
firm either.  Lawson finds this unsatisfactory and seeks to address the issue of the essential 
nature of the firm and the corporation in a much more direct manner drawing on an elaborate and 
sophisticated position in social ontology as he does so.   
By adopting an explicitly ontological perspective Lawson argues that a robust account of 
both the nature of the firm and the peculiarities of the corporation can be developed one that 
helps to clarify and resolve certain outstanding puzzles. Prominent and pressing questions 
include: whether and in what sense the corporation represents a real entity, in what sense are the 
firm and the corporation legally constituted and fundamentally legal in nature, what is the actual 
meaning of the process of incorporation and what are the significance of legal fictions and legal 
personhood in understanding the essential nature of the corporation? The ontologically informed 
account of the corporation that Lawson develops not only helps clear up these kinds of puzzles 
but also provides a perspective from which to appreciate more fully the sense in which the 
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contemporary corporation is out of control. Many well informed commentators criticize 
multinational corporations noting that almost everywhere they seem to operate beyond the 
control of various regulators and tax authorities. Some even express concern that modern 
corporations are seemingly beyond control as well as ‘out of control’ (Drutman and Cray, 2004 
and Bakan, 2004) and the framework that Lawson sets out is one that helps to ground such 
commentaries in a broader system of analysis.  
Within Lawson’s approach both the firm and the corporation are argued to be best 
understood as particular communities that are positioned in specific ways. Some of Lawson’s 
terms need extended introduction. Lawson (2015a and 2015b) argues that all social phenomena 
involve the coming into being of distinct totalities
21
 and their structures and he sees a particularly 
common form of totality as being the community. Essentially Lawson focusses on two general 
types of emerging social totalities: the first he refers to as artefacts and the second as 
communities. The former consist mostly of organizations of physical components. This is a sharp 
contrast to the latter group, namely communities, which are constituted by organized sets of 
human individuals and artefacts. Communities typically include smaller or nested communities 
as components. Communities are viewed as pervasive within the social realm. Communities for 
Lawson are structured social entities that emerge from human interaction and include human 
individuals amongst their components. He writes: “All social ‘organisational forms’, indeed all 
social entities that include human beings as components, are forms/examples of communities” 
(Lawson 2015b: 7). He adds, “rarely, if ever, is a community self-standing anymore. Typically it 
is contained or nested within others (like a village [community] within a nation [community])” 
(Lawson 2015b: 4).  
                                                          
21
 A totality, for Lawson, is a system of organized elements that reveals a coherence/integrity at the 
system level.  
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It is positions and associated rights, obligations and collective practices that form the 
structure of communities and relationally organize the human components. Ultimately for 
Lawson all communities are organized through relations of rights and obligations that rest on the 
exercise of human capacities of trusting and being trustworthy. He writes:  “A fundamental, 
indeed integral and constitutive, if often barely recognized, feature of all social life is a 
pervasive, if always changing, structure of social positions with various associated properties” 
(Lawson, 2015a: 211). Lawson further argues that another equally fundamental, and often 
unrecognized, aspect of the social realm,
22
 are processes where these social positions and their 
properties are created, reproduced, transformed and allocated. It is believed that this latter feature 
is at the core of many mechanisms of social development, including those of large scale social 
change.   
Elaborating on this account of social reality Lawson writes: 
“… it is the matching of specific rights of some to the obligations of others that constitute 
social relations. It is the sets of positions, and associated positional social relations and 
collective practices that form the structure of human groups, systems or communities. 
The cement of such groupings consists especially in the human capacities for trusting and 
being trustworthy. If, typically, individuals either could not be, or were never, trusted to 
fulfill their positional obligations, society as we know it would fall apart”  (Lawson, 
2015b: 4). 
 
Lawson’s basic argument is that both the firm and the corporation are fundamentally 
forms of community. He argues that certain communities take on the identities of a firm or a 
corporation by being appropriately positioned. Crucial to Lawson’s whole analysis is the 
recognition that social positioning is central to the constitution of the firm and the corporation. It 
is the focus on social positioning that is particularly novel in Lawson’s account and this is a 
                                                          
22
 Note that Lawson takes the social realm to refer to the set of all phenomena whose existence essentially 
depends upon human interaction (Lawson, 2015b). 
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feature of many social processes that he suggests go largely unnoticed in most social theorizing. 
According to Lawson a community can first be positioned as a firm and then further positioned 
as a community. He suggests that this process of multiple positioning is complex. In order to 
understand his analysis fully it is useful to consider first how on his account artefacts acquire 
identities by being positioned and then explore how he sees human individuals acquiring 
identities by being positioned. This is important because Lawson argues that the corporation is a 
community that goes through a complex process of hybrid social positioning. Initially a 
community obtains an identity as a business firm in a process that parallels the way an artifact 
obtains an identity and then it goes through a further round of positioning to acquire the identity 
of a corporation where it is treated somewhat like a human being and acquires rights and 
obligations. 
According to Lawson when an artefact is positioned as, for example, a paperweight the 
object acquires its identity through certain of its capacities becoming interpreted within the 
relevant community as its positional functions:  
“… when an artefact is positioned as, for example a paperweight, traffic beacon, door, or 
identity card, certain of its causal capacities become interpreted as its (positional) 
functions. The latter are interpreted as functions within and relative to the system in 
which it is positioned” (Lawson, 2015b: 9). 
 
More extensively he writes: 
“… objects become positioned as say tables, seats, eating and drinking and serving 
utensils, etc. Over different times, places and cultures, the objects so positioned will vary 
in shape, size, form and material content (just as, in any point in time and space, there are 
very often entirely different inanimate objects that could have been successfully 
positioned in place of each). But in all cases, positioned objects of the sort listed facilitate 
the needs of a system of human beings participating in collective practices bound up with 
sharing food together. And the set of powers of each of the objects that contributes to this 
end is seen as its set of functions. In turn of course the meal itself may be a component of 
a wider system, functioning perhaps to facilitate regular family or tribal gatherings, or in 
79 
 
specific cases perhaps to celebrate a family members’ birthday or mark another occasion” 
(Lawson, 2012: 376). 
 
Human individuals acquire identities in an analogous but slightly different process. 
Lawson suggests that when a human individual is positioned as, for example, a judge or teacher, 
it is not the case that capacities possessed are interpreted as functions, but rather that the 
individual becomes the bearer  or agent of novel positional powers and specifically rights and 
obligations. Positions and positional rights and obligations are he suggests typically in place in 
order that certain perceived needs of the system can be met by appropriately allocated occupants. 
So Lawson suggests the positioning of human beings is typically also functional but in the case 
of the positioned human individual it is rights and obligations that are acquired. 
So for Lawson in the case of communities, individuals are bound together through their 
occupation of a potential multitude of positions formed within the community. These positions 
are then linked via (possibly multiple) various sets of rights and obligations that are associated 
with these particular positions. For example, if we take roles such as University Lecturer, 
Bishop, Bus Driver, Employee, etc. these Lawson describes as positions that individuals enter – 
or statuses they acquire – and through occupying them individuals acquire the social identities 
associated with the relevant positions. Being positioned in this way, individuals gain positional 
identities and are able to access certain rights and obligations associated with the positions they 
have entered. By coming to occupy the position of University Lecturer within a UK community 
an individual acquires the identity of university lecturer and is permitted to follow various 
practices as they are the bearer of the associated (positional) rights to use libraries  and work in 
offices in the university, etc. Additionally, the rights that can be accessed through the position of 
University Lecturer are matched by obligations shouldered by other parties – so those in charge 
of the university administration have the obligation to keep rooms maintained and libraries 
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stocked and so on. The university lecturer also has certain obligations they must meet - he/she is 
also expected to follow various practices such as giving lectures, setting and assessing student 
work, etc. On Lawson’s view the obligations associated with one position facilitate the rights 
enjoyed by others.  
Lawson (2015b) further states that the rights and obligations that relate to the various 
social positions can be seen as positional powers. They can be viewed as powers in the sense that 
the agents who hold the rights have the causal capacity to intentionally get other agents ‘to do 
something whether the latter want to do that something or not’ (Lawson, 2015b: 6). Obligations 
give cause for action and such power will exist so long as the subject in question is willing (and 
able) to fulfill their obligations. Lawson believes that all social relations that exist within 
matched positional rights and obligations in this way are power relations.  
The social identities of various human beings depend on the very unique sets of positions 
occupied. A given individual may take on the social identity of a university lecturer as mentioned 
before, a UK citizen, doctor, ballerina, mother, charity worker and so on if appropriately 
positioned. According to Lawson it is normally the case that the process of positioning will take 
into account the characteristics/traits of the individuals concerned so that appropriate positions 
will often be found. However ultimately it is all a matter of community agreement so it is quite 
possible that a person may be positioned as a member of choir even if they have no singing 
ability whatsoever, if the community accept it then the individual will acquire the relevant 
identity, but often such situations will be avoided.  
Thus according to Lawson both human beings and artefacts can be positioned and by 
being so positioned they come to acquire social identities. Going further, Lawson (2015a) argues 
that communities can be socially positioned too and in fact this is fundamental to understanding 
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both the nature of the firm and the nature of the corporation. More specifically in acquiring the 
social identity of a firm Lawson suggests that a community goes through a process of social 
positioning analogous to the process whereby an object acquires the social identity of a specific 
kind of social artefact. That is to say a particular capacity that the community already possesses 
is picked out within the relevant community as constituting its positional function. So just as the 
capacity of the pebble to weight down papers is picked out as the positional function when it 
becomes incorporated into the household as a paperweight, when a community is positioned 
within a relevant community as a firm it is its ability to provide goods and services for a profit 
that is picked out as the communities positional function.     
 In a little more detail Lawson notes that generally recognized examples of firms in the 
UK include sole trader, business partnership and limited company. He argues that conditions that 
need to be in place in order for a community to become a member of a particular firm type are 
that: (i) it has to be appropriately legally positioned or registered, (ii) it has to possess a legal 
structure associated with the relevant position and (iii) all such legal structures presuppose a 
conception of the set of capacities of the community that any would be firm must possess and 
which, on positioning, are to constitute the community’s characteristic function. This kind of 
analysis leads Lawson to provide the following provisional definition of the firm: 
“The (modern) firm is simply a specific community, currently legally positioned, that 
is formally registered, within the wider, typically national (or international) 
community, as an emergent sub-community of the latter, oriented to the collectively 
coordinated production of goods and/or services to be sold to others, in a way that is 
intended to be advantageous to (at least some of) the community members. It is 
normally the case that (at least some of) that advantage is interpreted as ‘profit’” 
(Lawson, 2015b: 15). 
 
For Lawson the notion of social positioning not only helps us to gain a better 
understanding of the nature of the firm but it also allows us to see how firms and corporations are 
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differentiated from one another. According to Lawson any community that is initially positioned 
as a firm can actually be further positioned through the process known as incorporation. 
However, crucially for Lawson, when this occurs, the relevant positioning process parallels not 
that of an artefact (as was the case with respect to the establishment of the firm) but that of a 
human individual. For in this instance, Lawson suggests that what is going on is that the 
community acquires a set of rights and obligations. This process requires further analysis and in 
order to help with this, Lawson elaborates three ontological notions: multiple (vertical) 
positioning, legal fiction and legal person. 
As the name suggests, multiple positioning occurs when multiple positions are occupied 
by the same occupant simultaneously (Lawson 2015b: 9). Both artefacts and people can be 
positioned in various systems. Lawson writes:  
“Very often it is the case that certain items can be and are positioned in two or more 
different systems simultaneously and so possess two or more sets of functions, one for 
each system just as a human individual can simultaneously serve as say a parent and a 
grocer. Thus an item of clothing may serve both as part of a system providing protection 
from the elements for a particular human being in winter, say, and also by identifying the 
wearer of the clothing as a police person, members of a specific football team or a bride 
or a priest, as part of an additional more collective system. A house or painting or 
ornament may function according to the specific uses made of it in servicing say as 
family home, but share in a common a power to retain, and so function as a store of value 
in another system. Similarly, of course, those powers or properties interpreted as 
functions can change as objects are repositioned. An item for sale in a shop is identified 
as a commodity and has the function of being tradable for credit at a given price. But 
from the perspective of a different system and once purchased it can be inserted into a 
system where its function is in line with its more specific uses (as a hammer, 
screwdriver)” (Lawson, 2012: 376). 
Thus on Lawson’s account a human individual may simultaneously be positioned as an 
employee of Company X, an organizer of the local dance community, a marriage partner, an 
aunt, and so on. “Multiple vertical positioning occurs when the positions occupied are effectively 
nested in (or nesting of) each other. Thus an individual may be positioned as a UK citizen, a 
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member of university X, a member of the local social ontology group (XSOG), the secretary of 
XSOG, and so on” (Lawson, 2015a: 9). Similarly, an artefact may be multiply positioned. So 
Lawson provides the example of a computer that may function simultaneously as a time keeping 
system, a system of emailing, a music system. Artefacts can also be multiply vertically 
positioned here Lawson’s example is that of a table in an Oxford College’s dining room that is 
positioned not only as a table but as the ‘high table’.  
According to Lawson, it is obvious that when an artefact is allocated to more than one 
position that is nested within those already occupied, an additional set of causal powers is added 
to the list of its characteristic functions. Similarly when a human being is allocated to an 
additional position – also nested within those already occupied – a further set of rights and 
obligations is obtained. For Lawson the corporation represents a particularly interesting and 
unusual form of social positioning. It is an odd case in that the incorporation of a community 
involves a hybrid form of positioning. First, when positioned as an unincorporated business, a set 
of causal properties is identified as the characteristic function set; but when it is given a new 
position through the process of incorporation, the community acquires a set of rights and 
obligations analogous to what happens when human individuals are positioned. Thus by 
becoming incorporated a community obtains certain rights such as the right to own property and 
the right to sue in a legal system.  
In order to understand the nature of the corporation and appreciate its status as a real 
social entity Lawson suggests that certain other terms need to be clarified most especially those 
of legal fiction and legal person. According to Lawson: 
“A legal fiction is usually interpreted as something like a ‘fact’ assumed or created by 
courts or other regulatory body to enable a legal rule to be applied in a manner for which 
it was not designed or intended. Mostly, as far as I can determine, the term is used where 
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the outcome is somewhat more specific in that some person or entity is allowed 
occupancy of a position in order to achieve access to a set of rights or obligations that 
were never intended for such a person or entity. Certainly this is a dominant case” 
(Lawson 2015a: 217). 
Lawson refers to the case of adopted child as an example of a legal fiction whereby because the 
community wished to extend the rights and obligations associated with the relation between 
natural biological parent and child to certain other cases a new position was created which 
allowed the rights and obligations to be extended in certain specific circumstances. It is not the 
case that an adopted child is a natural child of a parent but through the mechanism of a legal 
fiction the community is able to treat them as if they were.
23
  
The term Legal Person is a position such that the occupant acquires the right to hold 
various other rights and obligations that exist within a wider community, the latter typically 
being a national community (Lawson, 2015a: 218). Lawson states:  
“Although sets of rights and obligations were originally intended only for human beings, 
they came in due course to be extended to specific communities through the legal fiction 
of their being positioned legally as (legal) persons. The reason for adopting this particular 
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 Lawson also draws on a further example to illustrate the principles involved. He notes that in the UK, 
any member of parliament who sits in the House of Commons is technically forbidden to resign. There is 
of course some considerable historical background to this. Some centuries ago, MPs were given a trust to 
represent their constituencies but many considered being an MP an onerous undertaking and resignations 
were frequent. Consequently a law was passed in 1624 that removed the right of MPs to resign. In the 
contemporary period, resignations are not too problematic but remain technically forbidden. In order to 
make a resignation possible a legal fiction is employed. At the time of introducing the new law that 
forbade resignations, and indeed for some time afterwards, considerable tensions existed between the 
Crown and Parliament. As a result of these strained relations anyone in an office of profit under the 
Crown was not trusted by the parliamentarians. On occasion, however, such offices came to be occupied 
by a few MPs themselves. Due to any such simultaneous adoption of roles being considered likely to 
compromise the MPs in question an exception was then made to the previous law regarding resignations. 
More specifically, with the help of a provision of an Act of Settlement 1701, an exception was created to 
the restrictions on resignation. In fact, MPs who accepted an office of profit in an office of the Crown 
were actually obliged to resign from the parliament. Furthermore they were forced to seek re-election if 
they wished to stay an MP. This has remained the sole exception allowed to the rule forbidding 
resignations from parliament. The legal fiction was invented whereby any MP who held a desire to resign 




legal fiction has seemingly always been to achieve, in the first instance at least, a 
separation between those rights and obligations widely considered desirable as 
acquisitions for specific individual members of any particular community and others 
considered desirable as acquisitions for that same community as a whole, that latter 




Lawson suggests that it is via the mechanism of the legal fiction and being positioned as a legal 
person that the modern corporation comes to be an agent of rights and obligations usually 
assigned to human beings. These rights include the owning of assets such as buildings, shares, 
etc. and also the acts of contracting, suing, being sued, and so on. Lawson argues that key 
advantages of incorporation include that it enables both the firm and individual members to be 
considered separately from one another and to be protected from each other in circumstances 
where misdemeanours, financial failures occur. Such divisions and safeguards are of course 
especially useful once we recognize the fact that humans die and are liable to pay death duties 
whereas corporations/companies might last for centuries.
25
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 An early example of a community being positioned as a legal person that Lawson refers to is that 
associated with Pope Innocent IV (1195-7) who used the device of Legal Person as a means of separating 
the rights and obligations obtained by monks from those allocated to the monastery. In the case of monks, 
they could own nothing, but could be sued for legal wrong doings. Whereas in the case of the latter, 
through becoming a legal person, the monastery could formally own assets but, due to it lacking a soul, 
could not be considered negligent or be excommunicated.  
 
25
 Lawson recognizes that a company/corporation can take many forms.  He notes that the most common 
form of company is a private company limited by shares. This is an (incorporated) corporation where, in 
the instance of financial difficulty, the shareholders’ liability is limited to the original value of the shares. 
In a company, shareholders, directors and officers are typically not liable for much of the company’s 
debts and obligations. Any debts that are accrued by the firm are interpreted as the property of the 
company instead of the shareholders. Consequently such enterprises tend to be referred to as a company 
with limited liability. The company is effectively distanced and safeguarded from the transgressions of 
individual members of that particular community and specifically the shareholders. Where a shareholder 
is involved in say bankruptcy a creditor of such a shareholder cannot seize the assets of the firm. This 
stands in sharp contrast to the example of an ordinary (unincorporated) business partnership, where the 




Lawson is careful to note that the initial reasoning for the construction of legal fictions 
may have had nothing to do with corporations but nevertheless in modern times this he suggests 
seems to be one of its dominant applications. 
Lawson takes particular care to consider the history of the modern corporation (Lawson, 
2015a and 2015b). In the contemporary environment it is of course very much taken for granted 
that a profit seeking community can be incorporated as a limited company. However, Lawson 
emphasizes that even after the introduction of the idea of legal personhood into the UK the route 
leading to the current situation has been a particularly long and highly contested one. There has 
been an enormous amount of debate over various issues ranging from the types of communities 
that could be positioned as legal persons to the specific rights and obligations acquired by those 
so positioned. Lawson demonstrates that one issue that has been continuously contested is the 
idea of granting legal-person status to profit-seeking communities. Lawson in fact considers such 
issues to be of such importance as to deserve specific and extended treatment which I can only 
very briefly summarize here.  
Before the seventeenth century, Lawson reports, it was only not-for-profit entities such as 
charities that were positioned as legal persons. Eventually municipal councils were also included 
in this group. These enterprises held various rights – they could own buildings, land, etc. Each 
possessed constitutions that were drafted and approved by the crown or the government. These 
constitutions set out the incorporated community’s rights and obligations as well as the 
objectives it sought to achieve. In cases where a corporation acted inconsistently with its 
constitution, that is acted ultra vires, the courts held the power to declare the offensive actions 
void and unlawful. During this period, it was clearly unacceptable for any charitable community 
to undertake commercial activities in order to seek a profit.   
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Lawson notes that the (English) East India Company was the UK’s first profit seeking 
corporation to obtain a status of a corporation in the early seventeenth century but emphasizes 
that it did so in a rather questionable (and possibly illegal) way. The East India Company’s 
actions went unchallenged in the courts and elsewhere even though it was clear that the 
corporation was acting in an ultra vires manner. In fact, upon viewing the successes of the 
company, the crown granted charters to other up and coming enterprises encouraging them to 
trade as commercial corporations.
26
 Eventually, new commercial corporations were set up by 
both royal charters and acts of Parliament in order to develop new patents and domestic trade. By 
this time, they were also seeking outside investors to provide the finance.  
However the new arrangements gave rise to numerous difficulties - Lawson suggests it 
was not the most stable of circumstances. By the start of the eighteenth century extremely 
suspicious corporations were discovered where individuals were merely pretending to operate as 
commercial corporations. They were fraudulently seeking out funding from investors. 
Additionally, financial scandals such as the South Sea Bubble and others that occurred at that 
time were the cause of further losses to ‘investors’ and generated considerable public concern. 
Now that the responsibility had passed on from the shareholder to the corporations it was not 
easy for the victims to receive compensation. To make matters worse the courts could not 
penalize the corporations either as technically they could not be imprisoned. Things did not 
change or get better until the government introduced the Bubble Act of 1720. This Act legislated 
“that all commercial undertakings (not just in corporations) would be illegal that tended ‘to the 
common grievance, prejudice and inconvenience of His Majesty’s subjects’. The law also 
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banned speculative buying and selling of shares; they could be bought only by persons genuinely 
taking over a role in running a firm” (Lawson, 2015b: 14). 
Lawson explores how circumstances were further transformed during the period between 
1825 and 1856. A series of Acts of Parliament relaxed the controls existing on the creation of 
commercial corporations. It was during this period that ‘limited liability’ became established. 
The Bubble Act was repealed in 1825 after which shares were freely traded. Nearly twenty years 
later, the president of the Board of Trade at the time, William Gladstone pushed through the Joint 
Stock Companies Act. Companies would no longer need a special charter. Instead they could be 
incorporated by a single act of registration alone. It did not however include the right of 
automatic limited liability for shareholders. The idea of limited liability was greatly opposed by 
many liberals during this period. Limited liability only came about a decade later. After a series 
of intense debates the Limited Liability Act of 1855 was instituted. There were, however, 
reasons for the massive change during this period, the main one being the building of canals, 
railways and similar projects that required substantial agglomerations of capital. For example, in 
1840, 2000 miles of railway track had been laid out (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2003 in 
Lawson, 2015a: 14). It was argued that the best way to attain this would be through chartered 
joint stock companies.  
Notwithstanding these developments the courts remained reluctant to give shareholders 
full benefits of limited liability or to even fully recognize that profit seeking corporations had a 
separate legal identity. All the way through the nineteenth century they made it clear that in their 
view it was the courts that controlled corporate behavior. Yet at the same time court rulings were 
often successfully challenged. Lawson notes that it was the enactment of the Companies Act 
1989 that finally put an end to courts periodic attempts to constrain how the commercial 
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corporation pursued its activities. The Act simply required commercial corporations to include a 
statement of their objectives in the constitution. Under  Section 3A, corporations were permitted 
to (a) simply state that it was a “general commercial company” and (b) that the corporation held 
“power to do all such things as are incidental or conducive to the carrying on of any trade or 
business by it”.  Going further, in section 35(1) of the same Act the law was changed so that “the 
validity of an act done by a company shall not be called into question on the ground of lack of 
capacity by reason of anything in the company’s [object clause]”.  
Lawson highlights how the debate over whether profit-seeking communities should be 
granted corporate status lasted nearly 400 years. He outlines how the state initially opposed the 
idea and imposed many mechanisms designed to restrict corporate activity in cases where the 
latter was seen to be at odds with the public interest. He traces through how these restrictions 
ultimately came to be abandoned. Lawson concludes:  
“If the idea of a for-profit company or corporation is currently taken-for-granted, as a 
familiar component of the modern social landscape, such a strange entity has not been 
widely well-received at all for the most part of the its own history”(Lawson, 2015a: 223). 
 
3.3. Berle and Lawson on the Nature of the Corporation  
Although Berle doesn’t explicitly use the term ‘positioning’ in his work it can be seen as 
being implicit in at least some of his contributions and I wish to argue more generally that there 
are some interesting commonalities between Lawson and Berle on the issue of the nature of the 
corporation. For example, Berle (1947) in his famous paper The Theory of Enterprise Entity, in 
arguing that there was a pressing need for systematization in the field of corporation law so as to 
bring consistency to the various rules governing so called ‘de facto’ corporations and cases 
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requiring ‘piercing the corporate veil’, seems himself to draw on something very like the idea of 
social positioning. 
In The Theory of Enterprise Entity Berle argued that there were a steady and growing 
number of disputes coming before the American courts for which the traditional concept of 
corporate personality was unable to provide satisfactory solutions because it failed to recognize 
the underlying factual relationships obtaining between the corporate economic entity and both its 
shareholders and its employees and creditors. In such cases the courts Berle suggested were 
forced to fashion rather ad hoc solutions by either recognizing the existence of corporate 
personality before it had been formally granted by the state (the ‘de facto’  corporation cases) or 
alternatively disregarding corporate personality altogether (the veil piercing cases). Berle in the 
paper reflects on these kinds of case and suggests the courts were increasingly beginning to 
regard the corporation as “an enterprise bounded by economics, rather than mystic personality 
bounded by forms of words in charter, minute book and books of account” (Berle, 1947: 345). 
Berle here appears to be dealing with a series of cases where the legal recognition of the 
corporation has become detached from the underlying economic realities. He considers for 
example cases where all concerned believed themselves to be engaged in a corporate entity but 
because of some administrative error they did not in fact have the associated legal status:  
“Here a group of individuals have agreed with each other that they will carry on an 
enterprise as a unit, limiting their liability to stated contributions of capital. So far as 
entity could be created by agreement, and liability limited by agreement, they did it. The 
group thus created embarked on the intended enterprise. Outsiders accepted this 
enterprise fact and dealt with it. So far as economics and agreement between the parties 
was concerned, the unit was complete. Unhappily, for the failure to conform to some 
condition, the state did not sanctify the union. In effect we have something like a 
common-law marriage. The union is not contrary to any policy of the state; the 
‘colorable’ compliance, and the fact that (if the associates had been more careful) they 
could have had the state’s blessing sufficiently indicate that. In consequence the acts of 
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the entity have the same result and effects as the corporate acts – subject of course to 
possible attack by the state, but not otherwise” (Berle, 1947: 347). 
According to Berle the courts seek to bring the legal status into line with the underlying 
economic realities. He writes:  
“the general rule is stated as being that where the component individuals have 
endeavoured to form a corporation, have, in good faith, believed that they were such a 
legal entity, and have colorably complied with the incorporation law, they will be 
protected from individual liability; and, equally, they have lost their power to enforce 
liabilities against outsiders in favor of themselves as individuals.  
Various arguments are used to reach this result, and most of them are highly persuasive 
of the proposition that the dealings of this enterprise, though defectively incorporated, 
should produce the same results in the respective cases as though it were well, fully and 
truly incorporated” (Berle, 1947: 346 - 347). 
 
Berle is also interested in those cases where the boundaries of independent corporations 
become unclear and how such ambiguous situations are cleared up by the courts. He writes: 
“In effect what happens is that the court, for sufficient reason, has determined that though 
there are two or more personalities, there is but one enterprise; and that this enterprise has 
been so handled that it should respond, as a whole, for the debts of certain component 
elements of it. The court thus has constructed for purposes of imposing liability an entity 
unknown to any secretary of state comprising assets and liabilities of two or more legal 
personalities; endowed that entity with the assets of both, and charged it with the 
liabilities of one or both. The facts which induce the courts to do this are precisely the 
facts that most persuasively demonstrate that, though nominally there were supposed to 
be two or more enterprises, in fact, there was but one. The economic fact pushes through 
the paper differentiations embodied in the corporate certificates; and liabilities are dealt 
with in accord with business, instead of the fact of corporate entity” (Berle, 1947: 350). 
In such cases Berle once again suggests that the courts are increasingly carefully considering the 
underlying economic realities and seek to bring legal status into line with those basic facts. He 
argues: 
“If it be shown that the enterprise is not reflected and comprehended by the corporate 
papers, books and operation, the court may reconstruct the actual enterprise, giving entity 
to it, based on the economic facts. Thus one corporation may be shown to be in fact only 
an ‘instrumentality’ of a larger enterprise, or to be so intermingled with the operations of 
such larger enterprises as to have lost its own identity. On such reconstruction of the true 
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entity, the court may assign liabilities of the paper fragment to the economic whole” 
(Berle, 1947: 354). 
He acknowledges that the picture can be complicated: 
“this is not at all to say that in a case in which one corporation owns a controlling stock 
interest in another it has by that fact alone made a single enterprise out of two different 
ones. The controlling corporation has a choice. It can, if it chooses, elect to permit, or 
perhaps require, its subsidiary to manage its own affairs, make its own decisions, and 
operate as a separate enterprise, the parent retaining only an investors interest. Or it can 
integrate the operations of the subsidiary with its own, in whole or in part, thereby 
bringing the two operations together into a single enterprise entity. There is no 
compulsion on it to adopt or refrain from either course; but the legal consequences vary 
with the choice. Where in these cases the separate entity of the enterprises as well as their 
separate corporate personality has been preserved, there is no need of departing from the 
paper organization – if the paper organization corresponds to the fact” (Berle, 1947: 357). 
In all of this there appears to be strong correspondences with Lawson’s community based 
view of the firm and the corporation. In particular there appears to be a recognition of some 
process of multiple positioning associated with the constitution of the corporation whereby an 
underlying economic entity or community is then positioned so as to obtain the status of legal 
personhood - “below the corporation papers there is always an enterprise” (Berle, 1947: 354). 
Berle and Lawson each seem to highlight how the corporation is both economically and legally 
constituted. Lawson is especially interested in the normal cases where the firm as a business 
enterprise is positioned as a corporation and thereby acquires certain rights. Berle is interested in 
his 1947 paper particularly in cases where the positioning of the underlying economic entity as a 
corporation with rights hits up against problems and is concerned to explore how the courts 
respond to such cases.  
If an emphasis on multiple positioning and a recognition on the economic and legal 
constitution of the corporation are two commonalities between Berle and Lawson then an 
emphasis on the need to carefully consider the historical evolution of the corporation is a third 
common theme. Berle, like Lawson, believed that in order to understand the nature of the 
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corporation it was vital that we understood how it came into existence and explore its evolution 
over the years. This was one of the core ideas behind the 1932 opus, The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property. What Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means (1991) [1932] set out to do in that 
book was precisely to document the evolution of this new economic phenomenon, otherwise 
known as the public corporation.
27
 
Many of the themes touched on in Lawson’s sketch of the historical emergence of the 
modern profit seeking corporation are treated in depth by Berle in his various contributions. In 
his 1952 paper Constitutional Limitations on Corporate Activity Berle wrote that corporations in 
early English law were formed ‘in fact, and in legal cognizance a device by which the political 
state got something done. They were far more like the bodies corporate we call “public 
authorities” today. A ferry had to be run; a harbor needed wharves; a colony needed to be 
developed; a particular line of industry needed encouragement” (Berle, 1952: 944). Berle notes 
that a royal charter was granted often with the intention of attracting capital. The charter granted 
more or less defined privileges but for the most part the state retained residual control over the 
operations. Berle argues that few people in the seventeenth or eighteenth centuries would have 
disputed the idea that a corporation in fact was an agency of the state. It wasn’t until the early 
nineteenth century when this began to change in England or the United States (Berle, 1952).  
In another contribution this time from 1950 Berle was especially concerned with tracing 
through the gradual decline in the ultra vires doctrine in America during the nineteenth century. 
He writes: 
“Courts from having been astute to assure limitation of corporations in the early part of 
the Nineteenth Century, became almost equally astute to find ways of eluding galling and 
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frequently obsolete restrictions. Either the right of any person to assert that a corporation 
had acted beyond its power was cut off in some fashion … or the corporate powers were 
constructed as including power to do all acts ‘incidental’ to the main purpose. Of the 
‘incidents’ of an enterprise there is no end. A Florida railroad was permitted to engage in 
the hotel and winter resort business, since this ‘incidentally’ provided traffic for its line; 
and so on ad infinitum depending on the commercial views of the Courts. Only where the 
limitation coincided with some pretty clear policy of the state was it given teeth and 
vigor. From a business point of view this was as it should be. The corporate clothing of 
the early Nineteenth Century did not fit the burgeoning industry of the second half; and 
the community, perhaps wisely, decided that it would rather have economic growth than 
social control” (Berle, 1950: 12). 
Lawson, we have seen, is acutely aware of the need to avoid any assumption that the current 
profit oriented corporation has always been a feature of the social landscape. He insists that a 
careful analysis is required of exactly how it came to be accepted within the community that 
profit oriented entities could be positioned as corporations with special rights. We can now see 
that Berle both in The Modern Corporation and Private Property and in later contributions was 
equally aware of the need to situate the modern corporation in the context of a broader analysis 
of its historical development. 
 
3.4. Prospects for Meaningfully Controlling the Modern Corporation  
As much as there are similarities between Berle and Lawson there are sharp contrasts too. 
This is especially true when it comes to their respective views on the prospects for effectively 
governing the corporation so that it might serve broader community interests.  
To a great extent, Berle, like Lawson, voiced concerns of the potential power exuded by 
the controlling groups. Power was a central theme in all his work and The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property was in itself a book that questioned existing power systems. (Berle, 196). 
Berle observed: 
“It is amusing to recall that, in 1932, The Modern Corporation and Private Property was 
thought so dangerous as to be almost worth suppressing. It was in fact first brought out 
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by a law publishing house then affiliated with the corporation trust company. Discovering 
the viper they had nourished in their corporate bosom, publications was promptly 
suspended after a few copies had been sold… Shortly after, the book was reissued by 
Macmillan and circulated under their imprimatur ever since. This is somewhat more than 
a romantic incident. Books questioning power systems – as did The Modern Corporation 
– often do have initial rough handling by the power system whose rationale and bases are 
analyzed” (Berle, 1962: 434). 
      In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle cautioned against the growing reach 
of the “new princes of industry” (Berle and Means, 1991 [1932]: 69), created by the new 
corporate form. He observed: 
“The rise of the modern corporation has brought a concentration of economic power 
which can compete on equal terms with the modern state – economic power versus 
political power, each strong in its own field. The future may see the economic organism, 
now typified by the corporation, not only on an equal plane with the state, but possibly 
even superseding it as the dominant form of social organization” (Berle and Means, 1991 
[1932]: 313). 
    But the similarities on the matter end there. Berle came to be far more optimistic than Lawson 
on this issue. Although the 1930s recession that hit the American economy may have shaken his 
beliefs and made Berle very aware of the disastrous socio-political consequences arising from 
leaving the corporate managers effectively unconstrained, Berle still remained very positive. He 
identified a new group of stakeholders that was growing in its influence on the corporation, 
namely the community.  
In the final chapter of The Modern Corporation and Private Property he wrote: 
“Observable throughout the world, and in varying degrees of intensity, is this insistence 
that power in economic organization shall be subjected to the same tests of public benefit 
which have been applied in their turn to power otherwise located” (Berle and Means, 
1991 [1932]: 310). 
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Berle also added that “when a convincing system of community obligations is worked out and is 
generally accepted, in that moment the passive property right of today must yield before the 
larger interests of society” (Berle and Means, 1991 [1932]: 312).  
These ideas, although written at the very end of The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property did not fall on the intellectual wayside. It led Berle to believe that the corporation could 
be a benevolent economic entity and its leaders could act in a socially responsible manner. Berle 
continued to voice these views in his later works. In his paper, Limitations on Corporate Activity 
(1952) Berle wrote: 
“… there are pressures not yet hardened into any form of law, but solidly based on  wants 
and expectations of the community. To violate these settled expectations entails 
immediate controversy, leading to political action… Many industries, some concentrated 
and some frankly monopolistic, have avoided serious impact with the state because of the 
care with which they have anticipated these community expectations and the fidelity with 
which they have fulfilled them” (Berle, 1952: 941). 
With regard the specific example of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company he 
observed: 
One of the largest corporations in the United States is the American Telephone & 
Telegraph Company; it has held a substantial monopoly over a vital community service 
for many decades; yet its standards of performance have so well satisfied the community 
that impacts between it and the state have been singularly slight as industrial history 
goes” (Berle, 1952: 941). 
 
A few years later Berle (1954) reiterated these ideas in his book The Twentieth Century 
Revolution. He discussed what he saw as significant limitations on corporate activity. He stated 
that there was a very clear desire for the production required by the community to be made 
available to them on terms which they recognized as being substantially fair (Berle, 1954).  The 
kind of influence the public could have carried certain disadvantages as ‘movements of public 
opinion tend to be sluggish in commencing, and extreme once they start’ (1954: 42). 
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Furthermore Berle suggested that a situation had to be seriously out of hand before public 
pressure would begin to assert itself, and in the instance that it did, passions would run high. But 
on the whole, Berle believed public opinion to be a very effective tool to keep the great 
corporates in check. The community standards could assert themselves and corporations were 
capable of adhering to them and often endevoured to do so. In fact, he suggested most of the 
proceedings brought by the Department of Justice at the time were a testament to this as they 
stemmed directly from one form of public movement or another (Berle, 1954). 
 In The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution Berle suggests that the time had come 
when corporate management could no longer ignore the impact of their decisions, so great was 
their power and control. He writes:  
 “For the fact seems to be that the really great corporation managements have reached a 
position for the first time in their history in which they must consciously take account of 
philosophical considerations. They must consider the kind of community in which they 
have faith, and which they will serve, and which they intend to help to construct and 
maintain” (Berle, 1954: 135). 
 
Berle recognizes that many businessmen in senior management positions were not accustomed to 
this sort of thinking. Most corporate executives believed that this kind of foresight was extremely 
difficult. However, according to Berle the ‘greatest leaders in the corporate field take a contrary 
view’ (Berle, 1954, 136). They put forward the argument that corporations were always citizens 
of the community in which they operated. These same men he reports stated that it simply was 
not possible for corporate management to separate the enterprise and its operations from the 
main context of American life because if they did so, government must then step in. This was not 
something people wanted. As a result, corporations were urged to share the burdens and provide 
support to various non-governmental philanthropic endeavours. Berle notes that some senior 
executives were speaking out about the role corporations needed to take on. The then Chairman 
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of the Board of Directors of U.S. Steel Company as well as the Chairman of the Board of 
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey Berle notes both insisted corporations must contribute to 
the country’s educational facilities such as universities and graduate schools. Both corporations 
made substantial gifts to liberal arts colleges, emphasizing their acceptance of this role at this 
time (Berle, 1954). Berle also states that at the time of writing twenty-nine states had already 
passed statutes whereby corporations were authorized by the state ‘to withhold from their 
shareholders a portion of their profits, channeling it to schools, colleges, hospitals, research, and 
other good causes’ (Berle, 1954: 137). 
Berle seemed to believe that large corporations were starting, albeit hesitatingly, to 
recognize how much power they had accumulated and appreciate the impact their organizations 
had on community development. An enterprise could choose a certain locality, develop its 
operations over time thereby generating growth within that locality or it may choose to withdraw 
from a community as quickly as it had entered, leaving it a ghost-town. With increasing 
international trade, profit-making opportunities were being created on a continuous basis and 
with it brought disadvantages for the areas companies chose to leave behind. Growing 
consciousness of this power created a considerable discussion in the corporate world especially 
among the directors of the largest and most responsible companies (Berle, 1954). They were 
acutely aware of the issues it would raise and there seemed to exist a division of opinion. One 
group believed that it was their responsibility to pick up the load and deal with the emerging 
issues while others felt it was too much of a burden and that they were not adequately equipped 
to engage. After all, it was argued, a board of directors is chosen with the primary task of 
running a certain business. Could it possibly be prepared to deal with a whole series of 
extraneous problems that covered methods of administering individual justice to the 
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development and organisation of local communities. Some believed that it was for others to 
confront these issues. 
At the moment when Berle was writing in the 1950’s he believed that corporations still 
had some kind of choice – either to take on the additional responsibility or not – but he also 
believed the choice was probably less free than it would appear. He wrote: 
 “Power has laws of its own. One of them is that when one group having power declines 
or abdicate it, some other directing group immediately picks it up; and this appears 
constantly throughout history. The choice of corporate managements is not whether so 
great a power shall cease to serve as the nuclei of its organization or pass it over to 
someone else, probably the modern state. The present current of thinking and insistence 
that private rather than governmental decisions are soundest for the community are 
clearly forcing the largest corporations towards a greater rather than a lesser acceptance 
of the responsibility that goes with power”(Berle, 1954: 140). 
 
Many corporations, Berle suggested, realized this – they recognized that the decisions 
they were making in the second half of the twentieth century would play a role in shaping the 
framework of the American community in the twenty-first. To a large extent Berle seems to have 
believed that corporations could be kept in check and positively influenced through public 
consensus and a sort of corporate consciousness. He strongly believed managers could act 
conscientiously, guided by a personal sense of responsibility to society.  
Berle was so optimistic that he believed in the possibility of the creation of an economic 
Utopia: “… in broadest outline we are plotting the course by which the twentieth century in 
America is expected to produce an evolving economic Utopia, and, apparently, the potential 
actually exists, bringing that dangerous and thrilling adventure within human reach for the first 
time in recorded history” (Berle, 1954: 142).  
It was evident to Berle that the corporation had been ‘compelled to assume in appreciable 
part the role of conscience-carrier of twentieth-century American society’ (1954: 148). But 
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interestingly, unlike other great groups that actually intended to be involved in such a task, it 
seemed that leaders of modern corporations had acquired the role without such intent to 
dominate. Additionally there was no clearly defined doctrine or instructions for them to follow. 
Considering the tremendous power and influence they held over a community, this was a rather 
serious issue. However, Berle adopted a positive stance even to this.  
This concept whereby Berle believed corporations could be kept in check and positively 
influenced through obligations to the community manifested itself in his book Power without 
Property. He strongly believed managers could act conscientiously, guided by a personal sense 
of responsibility to society. Berle discussed the idea of a “Public Consensus” or “Corporate 
Conscience” (Berle, 1959: 90). He defined it as: 
“… the existence of a set of ideas, widely held by the community, and often by the 
organization itself and the men who direct it, that certain uses of power are ‘wrong’ that 
is, contrary to the established interest and value system of the community. Indulgence of 
these ideas as limitation on economic power, and regard for them by the managers of 
great corporations, is sometimes called… the ‘corporate conscience’” (Berle, 1959: 90 – 
91). 
 Berle argued that while the former property owner no longer held the same importance in 
terms of carrying on economic initiative through private property, he was “increasingly 
becoming important as a consumer and as a political factor through his opinions and through his 
vote” (Berle, 1959: 117). And Berle remained optimistic when he discussed this new power of 
the consumer: 
“The ultimate power which the individual thus has is the fact of his independent political 
existence... In terms of industrial property, the system has unquestionably reduced most 
owners to a passive-receptive role. But in terms of choice of life and choice of political 
expression, the citizen of American economic republic probably has as effective a means 
of control as individuals have ever achieved in a large country”(Berle, 1959: 138). 
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Berle described the public consensus as “indefinite, almost completely unorganized, and 
without traceable form, none the less is a hard-core fact,” (Berle, 1959: 111). Although it is 
unwritten and unsystematic, it cannot be “applied merely by the business community since that 
community is directly subject to it” (Berle, 1959: 113). Alternatively, it can be elicited by 
referring to “the conclusions of careful university professors, the reasoned opinions of 
specialists, the statements of responsible journalists, and at times the solid pronouncements of 
respected politicians” pointing out that “[t]hese, and men like them, are thus the real tribunal to 
which the American system is finally accountable” (Berle, 1959: 113). Furthermore, he 
observed: 
“Public consensus obviously is not a spontaneous fact in the minds of many individuals. 
It is the product of a body of thought and experience, sufficiently expressed in one form 
or another so that its principles are familiar to and have become accepted by those 
members of the community interested in the relevant field” (Berle, 1959: 111 – 112). 
 
        So Berle believed that through the informal enforcement of the public consensus and 
corporate conscience, managers would be encouraged to make decisions in the corporation for 
the betterment of the community at large.  
Berle also believed that management would uphold positive values as a whole. In another 
paper, The Modern Functions of the Corporate System, Berle noted: 
“The fact is that boards of directors or corporation executives are often faced with 
situations in which quite humanly and simply they consider that such and such is the 




It would seem that Lawson does not hold similar beliefs about the conscience of the 
corporate leaders encouraging them to adopt strategies that respond to the wider community 
interest. Lawson’s negative attitude towards the corporation is clear in much of his work and he 
does not see it as in any way representing a progressive force within the community. He openly 
discusses the idea that at the heart of capitalism itself lies an incessant drive for money and 
power so great that it has no space for considering the wellbeing of others. He writes:   
“Although is it possible to imagine forms of human society in which the structure of power 
relations is (as say in many households) designed with the aim of facilitating human 
flourishing… this is not the nature of capitalism. Rather the system is all about the pursuit of 
power over others where the flourishing of those others is very often barely a consideration. 
In this manner, changes in technology are harnessed by those in power in ways that 
transform the labour processes worldwide often resulting in untold damages to the lives of 
many that are involved” (Lawson, 2015b: 7). 
 
A significant difference distinguishing Berle and Lawson relates to their respective views on 
the corporation and its relationship to power. It is often the case that multinational corporations 
have come under much scrutiny for carrying out operations beyond the control of various local 
regulators and tax authorities. This is an issue that has occurred across almost all borders. For 
example in 2012, BBC NEWS Business broadcasted the spectacle of executives from Starbucks, 
Amazon and Google appearing before the UK Parliament’s Public Accounts Committee to 
explain why they appeared to make little profit despite their far-reaching operations in the UK. 
The point that Lawson makes is that the modern corporation is able to manipulate legal 
procedures in such a way that they avoid regulations and tax liabilities. Complex systems of 
subsidiaries and the relations between them allow the corporation to make the most of 
differences across regulatory regimes.  Moreover Lawson notes that to the extent that the 
ideology of shareholder primacy is taken for granted then the managers, whatever their personal 
values might be, are constrained to pursue these manipulative practices. Lawson describes 
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situations where many have expressed their concern that ‘modern corporations are not only 
frequently ‘beyond control’ (of local regulators and so forth) but also, on occasion at least, 
seemingly ‘out of control’” (Lawson, 2015a: 1).  
Lawson and Berle approach the issue of power in different ways. Although both are 
concerned by it these concerns don’t appear to stem from the same questions. In the case of 
Berle, for example, the question is whose interests the corporation should operate for and making 
it function in a way that makes it compatible with promoting community interests. In the case of 
Lawson, his concerns about power raise different questions. He states that although the 
mechanisms that underpin the functioning of a modern corporation are ‘dynamic, pervasive and 
consequential’ (Lawson, 2015a: 1) there is less agreement ‘as to the extent to which these 
mechanisms, or their effects, are especially desirable’ (Lawson, 2015a: 1). Lawson hopes that by 
studying and identifying certain aspects of the structuring of the corporation and its conditions of 
operation we can better understand what gives rise to this immense and tremendous source of 
power. Furthermore, through exploring the structural conditions of the corporation (in particular 
the multinational) we will understand that: 
“… any (generative) mechanism, at its most basic, is a property of some structured entity. A 
mechanism is a way of acting of that entity that is made possible by its organizing 
(relational) structure; and it is triggered under various conditions. Put differently, it is a 
causal power of a structured entity in play” (Lawson 2015a: 1).  
Lawson is particularly interested in considering the source of this power wielded by corporations 
that enables them to operate in the way that they do.  
Berle addresses this topic very differently. As noted previously in this section, he 
highlights that corporations hold a lot of power – albeit unintentionally or as a by-product of 
their long-term operations – and focuses on the responsibilities associated with such power. Of 
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particular significance is the idea that the corporation can no longer be viewed lightly, Berle sees 
the corporation as being very much like a political institution. He writes:  
“… it [corporate management] must tell the truth, and so conduct itself that it retains the 
confidence of its customers, its labour, its suppliers and the sector of the public with 
whom it deals. In the corporate situation this is the equivalent of the ‘just consent of the 
governed.’ The corporation is now, essentially, a non-statist political institution, and its 
directors are in the same boat with public office-holders. If ever corporate managers base 
their continued tenure on power and not on reason, the end is disaster” (Berle, 1954: 44). 
Berle is eager to explore how power manifests itself at the level of the corporation: He writes: 
I. Managers have the power to ‘give or deny employment and to affect wage 
standards of its competitors.’ 
II. A corporation management has power to ‘determine whether and how it will carry 
on operations.’ This in turn will determine the towns or areas that will be 
developed and become industrialized. 
III. Corporate managers can determine what kind of goods and services they will 
produce and sell – whether they ‘either meet a public desire or create it’ although 
the latter is difficult and expensive, the success of the American tobacco 
companies in making the United States a nation of cigarette smokers is indicative 
of the fact that it is possible.  
IV. Corporate management have power to ‘forward and pursue technical development 
within the general scope of their enterprises and determine the speed with which 
they will push that development.’ 
V. Finally they hold the power to ‘decide (within limits) the extent and rate of capital 
expansion… this power aggregated in, say, the 200 largest corporations may 
make the difference whether the national economy advances or retards (Berle 
(1954): 21 – 23). 
 
In this light, there would seem to be a newly formed power held by a new group called 
management. Managers could be seen as holding power that is absolute (Berle, 1954) and he was 
concerned about whether there was anything in place to keep this power in check. In doing so, he 
discussed the issue of the organization of power and the phenomenon of counterpoise. He used 
the example of the history of politics whereby it was noted that that absolute power in any 
organized form was commonly accompanied by the emergence of some form of countervailing 
power elsewhere. This opposing form of power would be present in the same organization but 
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usually in a very different form. Berle describes a situation where the two nuclei of power exist 
side by side albeit in opposition to form a balance. He notes “Creation of that balance indeed 
seems to be the fact which preserves the continuity of the power itself. Absolute power 
unbalanced is anarchic; it eventually destroys both its surroundings and itself. Wise 
statesmanship from earliest times has recognized and accepted this fact. The history of American 
common law affords a striking example” (Berle, 1954: 49). In the contemporary corporate 
context he believed that the courts had a role to play in counter-balancing the power of 
corporations. He writes:  
“Deep in human consciousness is embedded the assumption that somewhere, somehow, 
there is a higher law which imposes itself in time on princes and powers and institutions 
of this terrestrial globe… It is here suggested that a somewhat similar phenomenon is 
slowly looming up in the corporate field through the mists that hide from us the history of 
the next generation. There is beginning to be apparent a realization of a counter-force 
which checks, and remotely acts on, and in time may modify in certain areas the absolute 
power of business discretion. In our system it emerges in time as law; and good lawyers 
watch for it” (Berle, 1954: 53). 
 
It is interesting to note that this is again in sharp contrast to Lawson who believes that courts and 
legal systems are just as likely to be manipulated by corporations as controlled by them.  
What seemed to be more concerning to Berle was the fact that corporate leaders were 
missing ‘clearly defined doctrine’ that would help modern corporations to use their power 
effectively.  The modern corporation became so great a force that the aggregate of their day-to-
day decisions did indeed shape the life and development of the community. Previously 
organisations that had obtained such power tended to have clear objectives when it came to the 
community (Berle, 1954). No one, Berle pointed out, had made a blueprint of the kind of 
community desired by Standard Oil of New Jersey, by the Southern Pacific Railroad, or by Ohio 
Edison, leave alone the corporations themselves (Berle, 1954). Berle did not seem to be 
apprehensive or pessimistic about the possible effects of the corporation’s operations. It seems he 
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strongly believed that the corporate consciousness would hold out and work effectively to 
address all problems that arose. He believed that the decision-making machinery of the modern 
enterprise worked as a ‘collective soul’ (Berle, 1954: 149).   
 
3.5.     Concluding Remarks 
There are significant similarities between Lawson’s community based account of the firm 
and the corporation and the account of the corporation that Berle provides. Specifically both 
Berle and Lawson emphasise multiple social positioning when it comes to the constitution of the 
corporation. Both men also highlight the economic and legal nature of the corporation and spend 
a lot of time carefully considering the historical emergence of the modern corporation. There are 
of course important differences between the two accounts. Lawson’s account is very much 
embedded in a particular position in social ontology and his arguments about the importance of 
social positioning are far more developed. More generally Berle is much more optimistic 
compared to Lawson about the possibility of the corporation performing a progressive role in 
modern society. 
Even where there are similarities there are important differences of emphasis. For example 
Lawson and Berle argue that it is important to recognize that the corporation is both 
economically and legally constituted but it might be suggested that Berle prioritizes the 
economic over the legal. Lawson’s position is very much one where both aspects are of 
substantial significance. He recognizes both elements: the legal constitution of a corporation as 
well as the underlying economic entity that is positioned as the corporation. Lawson first 
discusses the idea of the community being situated as a firm and the latter going on to be situated 
as a corporation. Being situated as a firm is closely linked to its economic function whereby it 
generates profits but also involves being legally positioned and having the appropriate legal 
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structure. Being further situated as a corporation is closely linked to its legal constitution 
whereby it attains various rights and obligations. In the case of Berle’s work (1947), however 
there is a greater emphasis on the legal status of the corporation conforming to the outlines of the 
underlying economic entity.  
Lawson is interested in exploring the structural foundations behind corporations in order to 
better understand how we can improve their governance and reduce the extent to which they are 
‘out-of-control’. Berle views the modern corporation as an essentially political institution. He 
recognized that this was not an idea that corporate executives particularly warmed to. In fact, 
Berle pointed out, they belonged to one of the few groups in history whereby political power had 
arrived unsought, or as a sort of by-product of the main objective. The example of General 
Motors highlights this: 
“It is probable that when Mr. Harlow Curtice and Mr. Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., wrote in 
General Motors Report for 1953 that ‘with the elimination of controls and with the trend 
away from a centrally managed economy, industry is possessed of the opportunity to 
make its maximum contribution to the forward march of our country’ they did not think 
they were talking politics at all. Still less, perhaps, would they consider they had assumed 
in substantial measure the philosophical burden of judging what is and what should be the 
‘forward march’ of a very great country. But they had done just that” (Berle, 1954: 146). 
 
In considering the similarities and differences between the two accounts context is of 
course very important. Had Berle lived to see the kind of corporate landscape that exists today 








4. BERLE, THE FAIRYTALE OF SHAREHOLDER PRIMACY AND 




It cannot be denied that Berle did at times during his career adopt a supportive stance towards 
shareholder primacy principles. However those passages in his writings that point to such 
support have often been taken out of context and it has sometimes been assumed that his views 
on this issue remained constant and anticipated arguments only fully developed much later by 
others. This chapter provides a contextual understanding of Berle’s work and explores how his 
views on shareholder primacy developed over the years. Viewing his work in this manner 
provides a different way of understanding Berle’s ideas and discussions and avoids the overly 
selective reading of his work that has characterized much of the literature to date. Both Berle’s 
own theoretical perspective and the economic circumstances he encountered and was attempting 
to understand changed significantly from the 1920’s through to the late 1960’s. This section 
traces through the major shifts in Berle’s views on shareholder primacy and considers the 
contemporary relevance of his ideas.  
Berle’s contributions are often read through the lens of more recent arguments in favour of 
shareholder primacy. Even where Berle can be seen as supporting a shareholder primacy 
perspective it is crucial to appreciate the motivation he had for doing so and to understand that 
his arguments are different from those that underpin the shareholder primacy paradigm as it is 
constituted today.   By way of initial context I begin by reviewing some of the key arguments 
that have been advanced in support of the shareholder primacy view in the contemporary 
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corporate governance literature and explore their assumptions. Within this contemporary 
literature it is maintained that shareholders are the owners of the business and that therefore they 
are entitled to its profits while it is also often argued that creating and prioritizing shareholder 
value is the most effective way of promoting economic efficiency more generally. Reviewing 
these kinds of arguments is essential if we are to develop an accurate appreciation of Berle’s 
contributions as it will enable us to see the distance between Berle’s various positions and the 
shareholder primacy perspective as developed later.  
Drawing on recent contributions to the history of legal and economic thought I distinguish 
between various phases in the development of Berle’s thinking on the role of shareholders. I 
demonstrate that partitioning his arguments into ‘early’, ‘middle’ and ‘late’ phases enables us to 
understand his work in a more comprehensive manner and avoid an overly partial assessment. 
When considering the nature of Berle’s position in the early phase of his career I review some of 
Berle’s earliest papers from the 1920s in order to provide a better contextual understanding of his 
arguments. A middle phase commencing in the 1930’s and developed as he entered the national 
political arena is considered. In this section it will be shown that in response to the transformed 
political and economic context Berle significantly changed his views on the most effective model 
of corporate governance. Berle’s later writings where he discusses at length the role of the 
institutional investor and the significance of corporate culture will also be explored. Such an 
examination of the degree of continuity and change in Berle’s ideas allows us to see how 
mistaken it is to select one particular work or phase, for example Berle’s early views towards 
shareholder primacy, and reference this as definitive of his overall position.   
The argument that Berle ought not to be seen in any straightforward sense as a defender of 
the shareholder primacy view is taken further in section 4 where I show that many of the 
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criticisms that have been recently developed against the shareholder primacy perspective can 
actually be seen as having been anticipated by Berle.  For example, Berle expresses serious 
concerns over the growing role of institutional investors and the negative impact this can have on 
the corporation as well as the community. It is highlighted how Lynn Stout echoes these 
arguments in her recent work but among the several scholars referenced as supporting her views 
Berle is not present. The only mention of Berle is when she discusses shareholder primacy and 
those who have provided support for that perspective. In addition to Berle anticipating certain 
key criticisms of the shareholder primacy view in this section I also show that some of his ideas 
have been rediscovered, albeit without Berle’s contributions being acknowledged, by authors 
developing progressive approaches to corporate governance.  Throughout his later writings Berle 
voiced his support for enhancing corporate culture (as opposed to developing formal regulations) 
as part of efforts aimed at reigning in potentially out of control managers. He believed that the 
media and public consensus did have a significant role to play in keeping corporate executives in 
check as maintaining a positive public image was vital to their chances of retaining their 
positions. It will be shown that these sorts of arguments have been picked up by many 
contemporary scholars but there has been little mention of Berle.  
Berle initially wrote during the first era of financialisation. His later writings were authored 
in a period where the destabilizing impacts of processes of financialisation had seemingly been 
brought under regulatory control. It is often observed that we are currently living through a 
second era of financialisation. Can anything of contemporary relevance be drawn from Berle’s 
various contributions? The final section speculates on what form a progressive corporate 




4.2. Attempted Defences of the Doctrine of Shareholder Primacy 
The significant focus of corporations on shareholder value in the Anglo-Saxon economies of 
the United States and Britain is a relatively recent phenomenon, in the 1950’s and 1960’s 
shareholders were a seemingly largely passive group and corporate managers appeared to have 
very substantial autonomy. The prioritization of shareholder interests became a preoccupation in 
the 1980s during the Reaganite and Thatcherite revolutions (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). By 
the end of the century the shareholder primacy norm had become well entrenched and almost 
taken for granted. The following comment from Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) is 
representative: 
“The triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over its principal 
competitors is now assured… Logic alone did not establish the superiority of this 
standard model or of the prescriptive rules that it implies, which establish a strong 
corporate management with duties to serve the interests of shareholders alone, and strong 
minority shareholder protections. Rather, the standard model earned its position as the 
dominant model of the large corporation the hard way, by out-competing during the post-
World-War-II period the three alternative models of corporate governance: the 
managerialist model, the labor-oriented model, and the state-oriented model” (Hansmann 
and Kraakman, 2000: 32). 
Prior to the 2008 financial crisis, a decade-long boom enjoyed by the US and other stock markets 
tempted other nations to see the shareholder primacy norm as a principle for corporate 
governance that ought to be adopted. It became increasingly widely believed that the best means 
to pursue aggregate social welfare was to “make corporate managers strongly accountable to 
shareholder interests, and (at least in direct terms) only to those interests” (Hansmann and 
Kraakman, 2000: 9).  
Hansmann and Kraakman characterize the ‘Standard shareholder-oriented model’ as 
centrally involving the following propositions: 
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“That ultimate control over the corporation should rest with the shareholder class; the 
managers of the corporation should be charged with the obligation to manage the 
corporation in the interests of its shareholders; other corporate constituencies, such as 
creditors, employees, suppliers, and customers should have their interests protected by 
contractual and regulatory means rather than through participation in corporate 
governance; non-controlling shareholders should receive strong protection from 
exploitation at the hands of controlling shareholders; and the market value of the publicly 
traded corporation’s shares is the principal measure of its shareholders’ interests” 
(Hansmann and Kraakman, 2001: 440-1). 
In order to understand the rapid rise to dominance of the shareholder primacy principle in 
the US it is necessary to provide some context. The arguments supporting the prioritization of 
maximizing shareholder value took shape during a period in the United States where there was 
much concern regarding the extent of corporate control (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). The 
economy was seen as dominated by giant corporations, employing tens or even hundreds of 
thousands of people, generating massive revenues. These revenues were allocated according to a 
certain corporate governance principle termed “retain and reinvest” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 
2000: 14). These corporations tended to “retain both the money that they earned and the people 
whom they employed, and they reinvested in physical capital and complementary human 
resources” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000: 14). Retentions in this way helped build the 
financial foundation necessary for corporate growth while they were also able to invest in plant, 
equipment and the required personnel to succeed.  
In the 1960s and 1970s, however, the principle of retain and reinvest began raising some 
problems. One problem was to do with the growth of the corporation itself and the other 
concerned the increasing number of competitors. Due to tremendous internal growth and also 
through mergers and acquisitions, corporations were growing too large and there were too many 
divisions in too many different types of businesses. Additionally, the corporations weren’t 
handling the employees and their capabilities at all effectively: 
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“US companies tended to use their managerial organisations to develop and utilize 
technologies that would enable them to dispense with shop-floor skills so that ‘hourly’ 
production workers could not exercise control over the conditions of work and pay” 
 (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000: 15). 
This very real problem of excessive centralization gave rise to the development of an 
approach to corporate governance known as agency theory. It was drawn together by a group of 
American financial economists who were “ideologically predisposed against corporate – that is, 
managerial – control over the allocation of resources and returns in the economy” (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan, 2000: 15). They believed that managers had proven they would act opportunistically 
pursuing personal goals that may be contrary to the interests of shareholders.  
A particularly influential article was Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 contribution ‘Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure’. Jensen and Meckling 
argue that it is efficient and agency cost reducing for the large corporation to be organized such 
that managers should be exclusively accountable to shareholders. For Jensen and Meckling the 
shareholder oriented corporation will ensure that the value of the corporation is maximized and 
this will be of benefit to not only all those involved with the corporation but also the wider 
community. At root the argument builds on the idea that within the modern corporation 
shareholders constitute the ‘residual claimants’ whose participation in the surplus from 
production is entirely dependent on the business success of the firm. Others involved with the 
corporation have income rights defined in contracts that are to a large extent fixed. The returns to 
ordinary shareholders are variable depending on dividends and the market value of their 
transferable shares. Thus the returns to shareholders are tied to the profitability of the corporation 
and proportionate to it. Jensen and Meckling specifically argue that shareholders had the 
incentive and the means to monitor the performance of managers in a way which would ensure 
an efficient balance between effort and reward for all concerned. In this contractual model the 
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key governance issue is that of agency costs. These costs arise because managers (the agents) 
may frequently find themselves in a position where their contractual duty to their principals (the 
shareholders) comes into conflict with their own self-interest. The cost of making the agent and 
principal relationship functional involves management inducements such as performance related 
pay (bonding costs) and disciplinary measures such as those provided by the market for 
corporate control.  
A striking feature of Jensen and Meckling’s argument was that for them it was crucial to 
recognize “that most organizations are simply legal fictions which serve as a nexus for a set of 
contracting relationships among individuals” (1976: 310).  They further note that “by legal 
fiction we mean the artificial construct under the law which allows certain organizations to be 
treated as individuals” (1976: 310). It would seem that for Jensen and Meckling (1976) the 
corporation ought to be understood as an ontological as well as a legal fiction and that the only 
real entities existent in the social domain are individuals.
28
 It is worth noting here how Jensen’s 
and Meckling’s argument chimes with Milton Friedman’s earlier views expressed in The Social 
Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits (1970). In this short piece Friedman had also 
forwarded the idea that businesses cannot hold any responsibilities. He maintained that a 
corporation was “an artificial person and in this sense may have artificial responsibilities, but 
‘business’ as a whole cannot be said to have responsibilities … Only people have 
responsibilities” (Friedman, 1970: 1), and therefore shareholders must be given top priority 
especially considering the corporation’s money is theirs.  
                                                          
28
 For analysis of the category of legal fiction and its relevance in understanding the nature of the modern 
corporation see Lawson, 2015a and the discussion in chapter 3 of this dissertation. Lawson recognises the 
importance of legal fictions in understanding the nature of the corporation but insists that just because the 
corporation involves legal fictions this most definitely does not make the corporation itself an ontological 




Despite a variety of rather devastating critiques of Jensen and Meckling’s analysis29 this 
kind of contractual approach had a very significant practical impact. The reasons why the 
contractual approach became so influential and promoted the widespread adoption of a 
shareholder primacy norm are complex and involve various factors. One factor is related to the 
ever increasing importance of the institutional investor. The transfer of stockholding from 
individual households to institutions such as mutual funds, pension funds and life insurance 
companies seemed to “facilitate the takeovers advocated by agency theorists and gave 
shareholders much more collective power to influence the yields and market values of the 
corporate stocks they held” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000: 16). Whatever the exact reasons for 
its rise to prominence, the contractual approach has had massive implications for management 
pay and corporate governance. Corporate governance has promoted performance related pay as a 
mechanism to reduce agency costs and management pay has as a direct result of this approach 
increased exponentially in recent decades. It has come to be believed that the existence of 
efficient financial markets and specifically a takeover market would help discipline managers in 
situations where the company was performing poorly. The rate of return on corporate stock was 





4.3. Berle, Shareholder Primacy and the Public Interest Oriented Corporation 
 
                                                          
29
 For a powerful critique of Jensen and Meckling, see Ireland, 1999 and 2003. 
 
30
 For a detailed discussion of the rise of shareholder primacy views in America and Britain see 
Buchanan, Chai and Deakin, 2012, chapter 4. 
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Considering that so many scholars have cited Berle as an advocate of the shareholder-
oriented model of governance
31
 it is useful here to consider closely those of his contributions that 
can legitimately be seen as broadly in line with such a perspective but also clarify how these 
relate to his broader output. As previously mentioned, I do not dispute the fact that Berle did at 
times support the prioritization and protection of shareholder interests but, drawing on recent 
contributions to the history of legal and economic thought,
32
 I argue that  it is a mistake to take 
the parts of Berle’s work where such support can be found  out of context and suppose that he 
consistently maintained such a position over his career or assume that the kind of support offered 
anticipates the arguments that are developed by those supporting the modern day version of 
shareholder primacy. To cast him as the grandfather of shareholder primacy is in many ways I 
suggest mistaken. Such a characterization is an example of a failure to understand his work in its 
appropriate historical and intellectual context.  
In order to understand Berle’s arguments favouring shareholder primacy it’s important to 
provide some initial context. America at the beginning of the twentieth century experienced a 
period of turbulent labour relations (Stewart, 2011). The concentration of economic power in the 
hands of certain elite groups seemed a dangerous development to Berle who feared that 
escalating economic and class conflicts could significantly destabilize American society 
(Schwarz, 1987). The Berle of the 1920s outlines ways in which power relations might be 
rebalanced suggesting industrial arrangements that could place greater economic and corporate 
                                                          
31
  See, for examples, of this tendency to link Berle closely with shareholder primacy views in Coiffi, 
2011: 1081; Million, 1990: 220-1; Winkler, 2004: 115-6; Matheson and Olson, 1992: 1313; Fisch, 2006: 
647.   
 
32
 Bratton and Wachter (2008) and Stewart (2011) are legal scholars who have done much to situate 
Berle’s work in its historical context and trace through the complex development of Berle’s thinking and 
their work will be considered in detail in this section.   
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power in the hands of the middle and working classes and thereby give them a standing 
corresponding to that of bankers and managers. He published an early plan for how this transfer 
of power might come about in a short popular article titled How Labour Could Control (1921).  
In this paper, Berle (1921) sought to “examine the tools in the economic tool house,” 
pointing out that “the most effective of them are the great corporations” (Berle, 1921: 37). He 
defined them as “great” because they had “developed effective cooperation beyond any other 
known machinery” somehow enlisting “the financial cooperation of the general public through 
issues of various classes of securities” (Berle, 1921: 37). These ‘classes of securities’ have 
appealed to the public’s “saving instinct, the sporting instinct or the exploiting instinct as the 
case happens to be” (Berle, 1921: 37). This has resulted in “a huge group of investors whose 
combined power to achieve is infinite” (Berle, 1921: 37). Berle believed that for these reasons 
“corporations are worth studying and worth respecting” (Berle, 1921: 37). Over the course of the 
paper, Berle then proceeds to identify problematic  issues with the current corporate system and 
offers an alternative vision whereby the corporation could be used “as a tool for the 
redistribution of wealth and power” (Stewart, 2011: 1461) rather than as a means to exploit 
individuals.  
He begins to address the relevant issues by asking the following: 
“Who are the people who have a right to capitalize the hope of the plant’s earnings? Who 
are the people who can decently gamble on their output? Who are the people who have 
most right to ask for control of the plant?” (Berle, 1921: 38). 
Berle responds to these questions with the following answer: “the people who have most right to 
ask for control of the plant” were “obviously… the staff of the plant, including, of course, the 
chairman of the board, the directors, as well as the oilers and feeders and loom fixers” (Berle, 
1921: 38). Berle believed it vital for every member of staff – from the board at the top of the 
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hierarchy to the labourers – to have a say in the control of the business enterprise. He stated, 
“That the large majority of employees should have to spend their spare time devising means to 
fight the control of their own plant is simple foolishness” (Berle, 1921: 38). Berle, instead 
suggested a system whereby each worker would be given ownership and control of the 
corporation, proportionate to his/her contribution to the firm. He further added: 
“Questions of detail arise. How shall the stock be distributed? According to the fairest 
appraisal of the value of the employee-stockholder’s services. The general manager ought 
to have more stock than the unskilled worker. His vote at a stockholders’ meeting ought 
to be worth more. He has earned it. What about wages? Every employee ought to draw a 
regular base pay just as a partner in a firm is entitled to his drawing account; he must live. 
How about labour turnover? One hopes this scheme would lessen it; but men will always 
leave old jobs for new. When a man leaves his job he must leave his stock too – resell it 
to the corporation, to use the vocabulary of corporation law, - for a price. What price? 
The amount by which the value of the stock has been increased while that employee held 
it” (Berle, 1921: 38). 
Berle further suggested “well-managed” labour unions, could purchase or create 
corporations, and then could grant the shares of such corporations to the members. He does note 
that this system “sounds a little like romance” but he believed it to be “possible” and even 
“simple” (Berle, 1921: 38). He writes: 
“Suppose… the union decided to make yarn on its own behalf; it knows the processes, 
needs only management, which it would have to hire, and capital, which it would also 
have to hire in the open market. Thereupon it hires managers and borrows money, buys 
or rents a yarn factory, runs it on approved business lines, sells at a profit, sets aside part 
for depreciation, for repayment of its borrowings, for a wage reserve in bad years. No 
single process in the industry would have to be changed, but each man would be working 
for himself and his “wage slavery” would become merely an occupation in cooperative 
endeavor… This is the dream, and we seek for possibility of its realization” (Berle, 1921: 
38). 
Berle argued that this would give ownership and control to employees. The term ‘wage slavery’ 
gives us an indication of Berle’s opinion of the prevailing system of governance at the time. His 
opposition to the current state of affairs is also made evident when he specifically addresses the 
role of traditional shareholders in the corporation: 
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“All corporations are controlled by their common stockholders. These stockholders are, 
in many corporations, not true investors; they “took a chance”. They backed their 
knowledge of the industry and the stock market and business prospects, and they expect a 
large return through dividends and through growing value of the stock. They would not 
say so, but they looked for something for nothing; they bought the stock for a rise, and to 
collect large dividends if they can. This class is under attack as exploiters” (Berle, 1921: 
38). 
It is evident here in this early piece that Berle wanted to see shareholder control of the 
corporation but he wanted to see it in a context where those who constituted the shareholder class 
were radically reconfigured.  
Shortly after this paper in 1921, Berle witnessed greater dispersion of share ownership 
leaving the hands of business elites and making its way into the hands of the middle and working 
classes (Schwarz, 1987: 65 – 66). He viewed this development as a positive one, still believing 
his earlier devised scheme for redistributing economic power could be effectively realized. He 
anticipated that a shareholder class largely populated by the working- and middle-class would be 
more empowered to better manage the American corporations. As Schwarz (1987) observed: 
“Berle maintained that an ethical public interest could be attained and group conflict 
averted only by broadening wealth to expand the shareholding class; the middle and 
working classes should entrust their savings, through organisations such as savings banks 
or pension funds, to the security – rather than the risk – of the stock exchanges” 
(Schwarz, 1987: 65). 
Unfortunately, and to Berle’s disappointment, the legal community did not typically view the 
dispersal of share ownership as positively as he did. They compensated for the change in 
ownership by advocating that an increased level of managerial control and discretion be allowed 
for and that shareholder control be diluted (Stewart, 2011). Berle grew concerned that this kind 
of advocacy of managerialism would hinder the transfer of power from the business elites to the 
middle and working-class. In his more personal writings, Berle admitted that these concerns 
were what motivated him to promote shareholder primacy (Berle, 1973: 19). Understanding 
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these motivations and concerns helps us appreciate both Berle’s early emphasis on shareholder 
interests and his shift away from shareholder primacy later in his work. The emphasis on 
shareholder interests early on in his career arose in a very particular context, one in which 
promoting shareholder interests seemed the best way to guard against certain narrow sectional 
interests becoming dominant. Although he soon moved away from prioritizing shareholder 
interests he remained preoccupied with exploring ways in which economic power could be made 
more democratic.  
The papers that Berle produced in the mid 1920’s – i.e., ‘Non-Cumulative Preferred 
Stock’ (1923), ‘Problems of Non-Par Stock’ (1925), ‘Participating Preferred Stock’ (1926a) and 
‘Non-Voting Stock and “Bankers’ Control’, (1926b) - can be understood as in line with a 
position that prioritises the interests of shareholders in a context where major structural political 
transformations seemed unlikely and where share ownership was increasingly being dispersed. 
Berle stated in his personal diary: 
“The attempt I was then making was to assert the doctrine that corporate managements 
were virtually trustees for their stockholders, and that they could not therefore deal in the 
freewheeling manner in which directors and managers had dealt with the stock and other 
interests of their companies up to that time” (Berle, 1973: 19). 
Berle further added that these articles “led to the next stage of [his] career” (Berle, 1973: 19). 
Throughout these papers Berle emphasized shareholder rights. He argued that managers held 
preexisting obligations towards the shareholders and in formulating their actions they ought to 
keep this in mind. This was the way, in the specific circumstances of the time, to ensure some 
kind accountability on the part of management and minimize cases where managers might 
exploit their positions.  
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The first paper, Non-Cumulative Preferred Stock, published in 1923, pointed to the 
extensive powers granted to directors with regard to the distribution of dividends. Berle felt this 
could violate shareholder’s rights which required a more narrow interpretation of managerial 
power (Stewart, 2011). Keeping this in mind, Berle argued that a manager’s discretion was 
limited in that he had to respect the contracted procedure in place for the distribution of 
dividends. He developed this approach further in 1925 in Problems of Non-Par Stock. Berle in 
that paper focused on the introduction of non-par stock: 
“Until 1912 stock corporations were required to divide their capital into shares each 
having a stated par value. In that year New York passed a stature permitting such 
corporations to issue shares having no nominal or par value, since which time a majority 
of states have followed its example” (Berle, 1925: 43). 
Berle was worried by the issue of what rights, if any, “holders of non-par stock have against their 
corporation, its directors and other stockholders, upon issues of new shares” (1925: 43). Berle 
believed that the issue was a significant one because existing contractual arrangements could not 
have foreseen such financial innovations. He was concerned that these kinds of unforeseen 
developments potentially freed management to act without sufficient attention being paid to the 
interests of shareholders. So he further asserted that shareholders’ rights encompassed an 
obligation on the part of managers to manage the corporation in the best interest of shareholders 
whatever might be the exact contractual wording.  
In the latter two papers, both written in 1926, Berle explored the way in which 
management allocated dividends between different share classes of the corporation. 
Participating Preferred Stock (1926a) took the standpoint that equity guided managerial 
discretion beyond what was contractually agreed. So when contractual safeguards (put in place to 
protect the minority shareholders) failed, managers still held an equitable duty to defend those 
shareholders who were weaker against the more powerful ones – especially when the latter 
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exercised their influence over management in an aggressive manner for their personal gain but to 
the detriment of minority shareholders.  In Non-Voting Stock and “Bankers’ Control” (1926b) 
Berle took this argument further by showing that equity actually compensated for the imbalance 
of power that existed between all the shareholders. He argued that legally, management was 
required to treat all shareholders fairly. Berle viewed this as a sort of guarantee that the different 
interests of ownership would all be attended to (Stewart, 2011: 1465). 
If we take these papers at face value we could conclude that Berle whole-heartedly 
supported shareholder primacy. But when these articles are understood in the wider context of 
Berle’s interests and broader political orientation we gain a different picture altogether. Berle 
wished to see a change in the constitution of the shareholder class. He felt that the increasing 
dispersion of share ownership was a welcome development and in such a context ensuring that 
managers operated in the interests of shareholders would be a progressive move and help 
promote a greater degree of democratic control over the industrial system. 
It is worth noting that early on Berle was not overly optimistic about the prospects of 
judicial intervention and preferred a contractual approach. He noted the need for constraints on 
management discretion but wanted the problem to be primarily addressed by the “business men 
themselves” and supported self-regulatory reforms. In Studies in the Law of Corporate Finance, 
Berle observed:  
“[C]ourts cannot be expected to work out rules of conduct for the business community 
except with the guidance and assistance of business men themselves, and for this purpose 
business standards themselves must be made apparent” (Berle, 1928: 36). 
Berle had certain significant suggestions regarding how this could be achieved. He suggested: (1) 
that the stock exchanges refrain listing from enterprises whose managers abused their power and 
additionally demand disclosure of corporation information; (2) that investment bankers organize 
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themselves into an enforcement body so that they can help scrutinize firms making public 
securities offerings; and (3) that large institutional shareholders such as insurance companies 
position themselves in such a way in order to obtain accurate information about issuers and to 
protect shareholder rights (Berle, 1928: 37 – 39 and for commentary and discussion see Bratton 
and Wachter, 2008: 106). 
Berle’s attitude towards regulation was to soon change significantly. In 1927, Berle 
received a Rockefeller Foundation grant to carry out an interdisciplinary study of the corporation 
(Schwarz, 1987). This project lasted five years and resulted in The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property. The Rockefeller grant required the involvement of an economist which is what 
prompted the participation of Gardiner Means, Berle’s childhood friend (Bratton and Wachter, 
2008: 107). Means was an economics graduate student and he contributed the empirical studies 
of dispersed share ownership and corporate concentration to the book. Means’ projections 
highlighted the fact that economic power was concentrated in the hands of a group of corporate 
managers and it seemed to Berle that something had to be done regarding this ever growing 
corporate power – more so than what he had thought before. What he initially viewed as an issue 
that could be rectified contractually within the financial and business community, he seemed to 
now see as a case for judicial control in order to protect wider interests and not just shareholder 
interests. Berle began drafting The Modern Corporation and Private Property in 1927 and it was 
published in 1932. We now come to what seems a key pivotal moment in Berle’s writings. 
According to Bratton and Watcher The Modern Corporation and Private Property “captures 
Berle in the middle of his metamorphosis from friend of shareholders to advocate of the 
corporation as an instrument for furthering national social welfare policy. The book thus 
provides a window into the evolution of his thinking” (2008: 118).  
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It is useful to note at this point that the Berle of the 1920s was very suspicious of 
managerialism. He feared that if no safeguards were put in place managerialism would only 
further increase the already growing economic inequalities in American society. It is against this 
background that The Modern Corporation and Private Property was written. In the opening 
pages of the book, Berle observed: 
“Size alone tends to give these giant corporations a social significance not attached to the 
smaller units of private enterprise. By use of the open market for securities, each of these 
corporations assumes obligations towards the investing public which transform it from a 
legal method clothing the rule of a few individuals into an institution at least nominally 
serving investors who have embarked their funds in its enterprise… In creating these new 
relationships, the quasi-public corporation may fairly be said to work a revolution… This 
revolution forms the subject of the present study” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 7). 
Berle proposed the creation of a new corporation – one that focused especially on the 
interests of the community. He believed there was a dilemma in corporate governance: on the 
one hand, owing to the owners surrendering all control and responsibility over the active 
property, they had also “surrendered the right that the corporation should be operated in their 
sole interest – they have released the community from the obligation to protect them to the full 
extent implied in the doctrine of strict property rights” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 312). 
Additionally, “the controlling groups, by means of the extension of corporate powers, have in 
their own interest broken the bars of tradition which require that the corporation be operated 
solely for the benefit of the owners of passive property” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 312). 
Berle pointed out, however, that just because the sole interest of the passive owner was 
eliminated, it didn’t necessarily mean that there was now a basis for an alternative claim whereby 
new powers had passed on to the control group i.e. managers. Berle had mixed opinions with 
regard to managers and believed they had not presented “in acts or words, any acceptable 
defense of the proposition that these powers should be so used” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 
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312). He felt that recent developments pointed in quite a different direction. The controlling 
groups had cleared the way for a whole new group to stake their claims, a group far wider than 
either the owners or the managers: “They have placed the community in a position to demand 
that the modern corporation serve not alone the owners or the control but all society” (Berle and 
Means, 1991[1932]: 224 – 252). 
 This third alternative suggested to Berle, “a wholly new concept of corporate activity” 
(Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 312). The claims of the other two contending parties had been 
weakened by the developments reported on in the book and so he believed that there was a need 
for the claims of a new group to be clearly spelt out. He wrote: 
“Neither the claims of ownership nor those of control can stand against the paramount 
interests of the community… It remains only for the claims of the community to be put 
forward with clarity and force. Rigid enforcement of property rights as a temporary 
protection against plundering by control would not stand in the way of the modification 
of these rights in the interest of other groups. When a convincing system of community 
obligations is worked out and is generally accepted, in that moment the passive property 
right of today must yield before the larger interests of society” (Berle and Means, 
1991[1932]: 312). 
 
 It was essential that corporate leaders created a programme that comprised of fair wages, 
employee security, a reasonable service to the public and basic stabilization of the business 
environment – such a scheme was to Berle, “a logical and human solution of industrial 
difficulties” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 312). In turn, the judicial system would in due 
course be forced to recognize the result, justifying it by means of whatever legal theories they 
deem fit. Berle’s concluding remarks leave us with no doubt as to which stakeholder group he 
viewed as being of most important: 
“It is conceivable – indeed it seems almost essential if the corporate system is to survive 
– that the ‘control’ of the great corporations should develop into a purely neutral 
technology, balancing a variety of claims by various groups in the community and 
assigning to each a portion of the income stream on the basis of public policy rather than 




The kind of political framework presupposed by at least the famous last chapter of the 
Modern Corporation and Private Property is one in which government is in negotiation with 
other major groups in society and can reliably identify and articulate what is in the public 
interest. Once some agreement is reached regarding what is the public interest government calls 
for the various groups including corporate business interests to adapt their positions to support it. 
It follows that on this kind of view corporations are in a certain sense entities that are operating 
in part as instruments of the state. Corporations participate in a state facilitated set of 
negotiations where they engage with the state and other interest groups such as labour unions to 
determine the public interest. Once some accommodation has been reached between the parties, 
the calculus of corporate rights and duties must adjust and recognize that the public interest 
constitutes a constraint on managerial action. In the mid 1920’s Berle felt that an emphasis on 
shareholder interests represented the least damaging realistic alternative to unconstrained 
managerial control. By 1932 a rather different political and economic context had been 
established in which altogether more dramatic transformations could be realistically articulated.
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This consideration of how Berle’s thinking develops and is expressed in the The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property provides a useful vantage point from which to examine the 
famous Berle-Dodd debate which is often referenced when Berle is identified as an early and key 
supporter of the shareholder primacy doctrine. The debate began with the article Corporate 
Powers as Powers in Trust published in 1931 - where Berle clearly argued against the apparent 
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unlimited powers bestowed upon corporate management.
34
 These powers only seemed to 
increase with certain corporation statutes and charter provisions enacted at the time (Weiner, 
1964). Berle’s attitude towards the corporate climate at the time is made apparent very quickly in 
the opening paragraph of the paper: 
“It is the thesis of this essay that all powers granted to a corporation or to the 
management of a corporation, or to any group within the corporation, whether derived 
from statute or charter or both, are necessarily and at all times exercisable only for the 
ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their interest appears. That, in consequence, the 
use of the power is subject to equitable limitation when the power has been exercised to 
the detriment of such interest, however absolute the grant of power may be in terms, and 
however correct the technical exercise of it may have been. That many of the rules 
nominally regulating certain specific uses of corporate powers are only outgrowths of this 
fundamental equitable limitation, and are consequently subject to be modified, discarded, 
or strengthened, when necessary in order to achieve such benefit and protect such 
interest; and that entirely new remedies may be worked out in substitution for or 
supplemental to existing remedies. And that, in every case, corporate action must be 
twice tested: first, by the technical rules having to do with the existence and proper 
exercise of the power; second, by equitable rules somewhat analogous to those which 
apply in favour of a cestui que trust to the trustee’s exercise of wide powers granted to 
him in the instrument making him a fiduciary” (Berle, 1931: 1049). 
Berle opens a lengthy discussion of fiduciary duty in an attempt to address the problem, pointing 
out that managers are trustees of the shareholders and can only exercise their powers if it were 
for the benefit of the shareholder. He further asserts that “whenever a corporate power is 
exercised” its use must be “judged in relation to the existing facts with a view toward 
discovering whether under all the circumstances the result fairly protects the interests of the 
shareholders” (Berle, 1931: 1074). Berle argues in favour of the active role of the judicial 
system: “New remedies may be worked out and applied by the courts in each case, depending on 
the circumstances” so that in this way the “powers of courts of equity… are as broad as may be 
necessary to adjust and maintain the relative participations of the various classes of 
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shareholders” (Berle, 1931: 1074). But Berle seems to hesitate in asserting that this 
understanding of the fiduciary duty of management could eventually evolve into another branch 
of trust law. For the remainder of the paper, Berle examines five different scenarios in which 
management was granted wide discretion over corporate conduct by shareholders, for example, 
the power to declare or withhold dividends, and the power to issue additional stock. In each 
instance, irrespective of how absolute the discretion appeared,  he argued that such powers held 
by management had to be exercised in line with equitable limitation (Berle, 1931). Berle 
consistently argued that all powers given to management were solely for the benefit of 
shareholders. Given the discussion of The Modern Corporation and Private Property we can 
take it that in this contribution Berle was focusing on the currently prevailing political situation 
rather than the one he hoped would soon be ushered in. 
In May 1932, Professor E. Merrick Dodd published an article entitled, For Whom Are 
Corporate Managers Trustees? challenging Berle’s key arguments. The paper begins on a 
sympathetic note as Dodd seems to appreciate Berle’s desire to constrain managers from 
transferring the assets of the corporation to their own pocket: “The present writer is thoroughly 
in sympathy with Mr Berle’s efforts to establish a legal control which will more effectually 
prevent corporate managers from diverting profit into their pockets from those of stockholders, 
and agrees with many of the specific rules which the latter deduces from his trusteeship 
principle” (Dodd, 1932: 1147). But Dodd’s tone quickly changes, stating that Berle’s shareholder 
trustee view was problematic because “it is undesirable, even with the laudable purpose of giving 
stockholders much-needed protection against self-seeking managers, to give increased emphasis 
at the present time to the view that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making 
profits for their stockholders” (Dodd, 1932: 1147 -1148). Dodd adds that he believed: 
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“public opinion, which ultimately makes law, has made and is today making substantial 
strides in the direction of a view of the business corporation as an economic institution 
which has a social service as well as a profit-making function, that this view has already 
had some effect upon legal theory, and that it is likely to have a greatly increased effect 
upon the latter in the near future” (Dodd, 1932: 1148). 
Dodd argued that historically, when business enterprises were “small affairs involving the 
activities of men rather than the employment of capital” common law adopted the position that 
business was “a public profession” as opposed to a “purely private matter” (Dodd, 1932: 1148). 
This view had been limited to business enterprises that were considered to be affected with a 
public interest. Dodd believed that business activity would become a public issue and companies 
would need to act in line with what was best for the wider community. He referred to the “duty 
of one engaged in business activities toward the public who are his customers” and the “public 
duty of one who has devoted his property to public use, the conception being that property 
employed in certain kinds of business is devoted to public use” (Dodd, 1932: 1149). Interestingly 
– and ironically – Dodd then brings in a line of thinking that is extremely similar to what Berle 
raised in his first paper How Labour Could Control and which he later developed in The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property: 
“Our present economic system, under which our more important business enterprises are 
owned by investors who take no part in carrying them on – absentee owners who in many 
cases have not even seen the property from which they derive their profits – alters the 
situation materially. That stockholders who have no contact with business other than to 
derive dividends from it should become imbued with a professional spirit of public service is 
hardly thinkable” (Dodd, 1932: 1153). 
Dodd believed that if “incorporated business” was to “become professionalized” we should look 
to the managers “not to the owners” to help accomplish this result. He further added that “there is 
in fact a growing feeling not only that business has responsibilities to the community but that our 
corporate managers who control business should voluntarily and without waiting for legal 
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compulsion manage it in such a way as to fulfill those responsibilities” (Dodd, 1932: 1153 – 
1154). 
Berle’s response was prompt stating in the opening pages that Professor Dodd had 
communicated “a point of view which cannot be ignored,” (Berle, 1932: 1366). He goes on to 
state that “Professor Dodd’s argument is not only sound but familiar” and that there was an 
element of truth to it. Berle agreed that the scale of production corporations operated on requires 
a tremendous degree of financial concentration in the shape of the corporate enterprise. In turn, 
this level of financial concentration has caused a shift to occur in the roles of industrial managers 
and corporate executives, or the “control” group (Berle, 1932, pp. 1366). They no longer 
function as “promoters” or “merchants” but more as “princes” and “ministers” (Berle, 1932: 
1366 – 1367). However, Berle is quick to point out: 
“But it is theory, not practice. The industrial ‘control’ does not now think of himself as a 
prince; he does not now assume responsibilities to the community; his bankers do not 
now undertake to recognize social claims; his lawyers do not advise him in terms of 
social responsibility” (Berle, 1932: 1367). 
Berle continued his argument going on to write the following lines unaware that they would be 
some of the most referenced out of all his work: 
“Now I submit that you cannot abandon emphasis on “the view that business corporations 
exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their stockholders” until such time as you 
are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of responsibilities to 
someone else” (Berle, 1932: 1367). 
Many scholars cite this paragraph whenever they source Berle as a precursor for shareholder 
primacy. But what is often missed out or ignored is what he wrote in the paragraphs that 
immediately follow: 
“Roughly speaking, there are between five and eight million stockholders in the country 
(the estimates vary); to which must be added a very large group of bondholders and many 
millions of individuals who have an interest in corporate securities through the medium 
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of life insurance companies and savings banks. This group, expanded to include their 
families and dependents, must directly affect not less than half of the population of the 
country, to say nothing of indirect results. When the fund and income stream upon which 
this group rely are irresponsibly dealt with a large portion of the group merely devolves 
on the community; and there is presented a staggering bill for relief, old age pensions, 
sickness-aid, and the like. Nothing is accomplished, either as a matter of law or of 
economics, merely by saying that the claim of this group ought not to be ‘emphasised.’ 
Either you have a system based on individual ownership of property or you do not. If not 
– and there are at the moment plenty of reasons why capitalism does not seem ideal – it 
becomes necessary to present a system (none has been presented) of law or government, 
or both, by which responsibility for control of national wealth and income is so 
apportioned and enforced that the community as a whole, or at least the great bulk of it, is 
properly taken care of. Otherwise the economic power now mobilized and massed under 
the corporate form, in the hands of a few thousand directors, and the few hundred 
individuals holding ‘control’ is simply handed over, weakly, to the present administrators 




As mentioned previously, The Modern Corporation and Private Property was published 
in 1932 and it can be seen as marking a transition in Berle’s thinking from an early phase to a 
middle phase. The publication of the book coincided with Berle’s entrance into the world of 
politics. In 1932, Governor Franklin Roosevelt “reached out to academics for assistance with 
policy positions early in his 1932 presidential campaign” and Berle was one of those recruited 
for “expertise on credit and corporations” (Bratton and Wachter, 2008: 109). Along with 
Raymond Moley, a government professor at Columbia, and Rexford Tugwell, an economics 
professor also from Columbia, they made up the core of what would be called Roosevelt’s 
‘Brains Trust’ (Schwarz, 1987: 70 – 73). 
Berle seemed to have sketched out his position even before he joined the group. In an 
open letter to Louis Brandeis, a prominent ‘New Freedom’ progressive at the time (Bratton and 
Wachter, 2008: 110) Berle advised: 
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“If the next phase is to be virtually a non-political economic government by mass 
industrial forces, possibly something can be done to make such government responsible, 
sensitive and actuated primarily by the necessity of serving the millions of little people 
whose lives it employs, whose savings it takes in guard, and whose materials of life it 
apparently has to provide” (Berle in Schwarz, 1987: 74). 
When Berle joined the Brain Trust the American economy was entering the Great Depression. 
Prior to that it had experienced “a period of unprecedented wealth creation” (Berle and Means, 
1991[1932]: 1023) unlike any other. In the decade following World War I – commonly referred 
to as the Roaring Twenties – the modern corporation had taken over the product and labour 
markets in all possible ways and its managers – termed by Berle as ‘Princes of Industry’ – had 
conquered the market for corporate control (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 1366 - 1367). As the 
1920s came to a close, it was fair to say that the modern U.S. corporation and its managers were 
seated at the summit of the most powerful economy in the world: “Through the decade, profits 
rose over 80 percent as a whole, or twice as much as productivity” (Schlesinger, 1957: 66). In 
two generations since the Civil War, the great business magnates of the United States and their 
successors had created the modern corporation and this modern corporation had conquered the 
entire market. The U.S. President at the time, Herbert Hoover, was running the country on strong 
business principles being a self-made man and a wealthy former engineer and entrepreneur 
himself (Schlesinger, 1957).  
An extremely large portion of America’s industrial assets were owned completely by 
these few hundred corporations and their reign was ever-growing. Additionally, an increasing 
dispersal of voting control moving into the hands of the public who invested was another 
noteworthy trend. This trend was clear and appeared non reversible until everything came to a 
crashing halt with the fall of the stock market in October 1929 followed by the Great Depression. 
At first, business leaders and government assumed that there would be a natural turnaround with 
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only very mild government intervention. But soon it became clear that this depression would be 
very different to the ones experienced in the last three decades of the nineteenth century.  
Roosevelt delivered a campaign speech drafted by Berle and edited by his wife, Beatrice 
Berle, at the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco in September, 1932 (Bratton and Wachter, 
2008). The speech represented a “philosophical statement of the candidate’s economic policy” 
and was not received well, but has since received a great deal of attention among political 
scientists, even making it into a list of the one hundred most important political speeches in 
American history (Bratton and Wachter, 2008: 110).  The speech was titled New Individualism 
and the ‘new individuals’ referred to in the speech were ordinary citizens. It called for their 
rights to be protected – and Berle had in mind specifically their economic rights such as the right 
to make a living and the right to own property. The parties seen to be infringing on these rights 
were corporate managers, the “princes of property” (Berle, 1973: 69). Now it seemed that Berle 
was not as concerned about the shareholders – indicated in his paper, Corporate Powers as 
Powers in Trust – as much as he was about the rest of the public, reverting back to original 
points of discussion raised in his paper in 1921, How Labour Could Control.  
The speech also called for a more dynamic partnership between the state and the modern 
corporation. He believed that corporate power had passed above and beyond the realm of the 
small private enterprise of the nineteenth century. It was time for corporate managers to become 
accountable and additionally assume responsibility for the public good. They needed to come 
together as industrial groups and work together towards a common end. And if any group failed 
to do so, the government would need to intervene with consequences (Berle, 1973: 69). The 
corporation could serve the people in this way. As long as the United States continued with its 
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laissez-fair policies, the Princes of Industry would be the sole determinants of how industry gains 
were to be distributed. Berle viewed this as a limitation on individualism: 
“When nearly seventy per cent of American industry is concentrated in the hands of six 
hundred corporations; when not more than four or five thousand directors dominate this 
same block; when more than half of the population of the industrial east live or starve, 
depending on what this group does; when their lives, while they are working, are 
dominated by this group; when more than half the savings of the country are dominated 
by this same group; and when the flow of capital within the system is largely directed by 
not more than twenty great banks and banking houses – the individual man or woman 
has, in cold statistics, less than no chance at all” (Berle in Schwarz, 1987: 77). 
At a time when the economic crisis seemed to call for new ways of thinking Berle was a “most 
persuasive thinker” articulating novel schemes for economic planning which he set out with the 
“technical vocabulary of corporation and public finance as well as historical precedents others 
had forgotten”. He came to be viewed as the Brain Trust’s “crafty lawyer, financial genius, and 
historian par excellence” (Schwarz, 1987: 73). 
Now one of the reasons Berle came to question the shareholder primacy view was due to 
the separation of ownership and control. He believed that the stockholder, having “surrendered 
control over his wealth” had now become “a supplier of capital, a risk-taker pure and simple” 
(Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 297). Ultimate responsibility and authority were attached to 
directors and those in “control” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 297).  It seemed to Berle that the 
new owners, i.e. shareholders, seemed to have exchanged control for liquidity. Here Berle takes 
liquidity to represent the compensation for the loss of effective corporate control. This kind of 
increased liquidity also brought with it corresponding changes. The dominance of a stock-
market-based system gave rise to an ever increasing role for financial motives, financial actors 
and financial institutions. The latter was of great concern to Berle as it shone a light on the rising 
significance of the institutional investor. He viewed institutional investors as being very distant 
from industrial activities and divorced from any sense of responsibility towards the corporation. 
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Although Berle’s observations regarding the separation of ownership and control have been 
widely referenced and discussed, lesser known are his remarks on the separation of ownership 
and responsibility. This is an important point because many scholars citing Berle for his 
discussions around managers possibly abusing their position of control argue that he was 
therefore consistently arguing for greater shareholder control. But Berle came to be very 
skeptical of shareholder control owing to the fact that outside shareholders had no responsibility 
for the enterprise itself. In The Modern Corporation and Private Property Berle observed: 
“In place of actual physical properties over which the owner could exercise direction and 
for which he was responsible, the owner now holds a piece of paper representing a set of 
rights and expectations with respect to an enterprise” (Berle, 1991[1932]: 5). 
 
Turning from middle Berle to his later writings, late Berle seemed to increasingly realize 
the theory of property rights no longer held the same position it had decades before. He returned 
to this point of absent responsibility on the part of outside shareholders in his later papers. For 
example, in Modern Functions of the Corporate System, he writes: 
 
“For the fact is that purely passive property – that is property divorced from any 
responsibilities of ownership, whose values grows or diminishes in the owner’s hands 
without any relationship to his risk-taking, work or effort-has outlived most of the 
economic justification that gave it birth. It must seek new philosophical as well as 
economic bases” (Berle, 1962: 448). 
 
Upon concluding that “traditional theories of property no longer applied” to “the relation of 
stockholders in large corporations to the underlying production and wealth” Berle called for a 
new way of thinking with regard to ownership and passive property (Berle, 1962: 449). He 
further voiced his concerns, stating: “I find this failure to redescribe and rethink passive property 
frightening” (Berle, 1962: 449). Berle argues that stockholders of a corporation do not undertake 
any kind of risk equivalent to that which had previously been associated with ownership rights. 
Instead, he describes the purchase of stock much like “a bet between outsiders on its success or 
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failure – when it is not a blind bet on the ‘market’” (Berle, 1962: 445).  He rehearses these ideas 
again in his 1965 paper Property, Production and Revolution where he writes: 
“The purchaser of stock does not contribute savings to an enterprise, thus enabling it to 
increase its plant or operations. He does not take the “risk” of a new or increased 
economic operation; he merely estimates the chance of the corporation’s shares 
increasing in value” (Berle, 1965b: 16). 
 
These concerns over the separation of ownership from responsibility only heightened when 
he observed the increasing concentration of stock ownership by institutional investors that began 
in the late 1960s. Berle noted that large numbers of shares were “not held by individuals, but by 
intermediate fiduciary institutions which in turn distribute the benefits of shareholding to 
participating individuals” (Berle, 1965b: 14). Berle identified that “shares nevertheless have 
become so desirable that they are now the dominant form of personal wealth-holding,” (Berle, 
1965b: 13) and referring to pension funds, mutual funds and life insurance policies, he predicted 
(rather accurately) that “this form of stockholding is likely to become dominant in future years” 
(Berle, 1965b: 14).  
Berle viewed the significance of this trend as being twofold: First, it greatly increased the 
“number of citizens who, to some degree, rely on the stockholding form of wealth” and second, 
it removed the “individual still further from connection with or impact on the management and 
administration of the productive corporations themselves” (Berle, 1965b: 14). In an interview in 
1968, Berle pointed out further concerns: 
“Surely the most spectacular development is the emergence of a new concentration of 
power countervailing that of corporate management. In recent years, stock has become 
more and more concentrated in the hands of institutional investors” (Dun’s Review, 1968 




Berle voiced concerns about the effect such a concentration of power would have on 
management’s long-term strategies: 
“It is a definite step backward… such a concentration of power is a very dangerous thing 
from the point of view both of the public and corporate management. Power is best 
exercised when it is close to reality. Corporate managements are much closer to reality 
than bank officers who sit in front of piles of paper with only figures to guide them. The 
banker owns even less of the corporation than the corporate official. He is merely acting 
as a fiduciary for other people’s money. The way things are going, we will soon have an 
economy dominated by fiduciaries, who not only do not own the corporations they 
dominate but have little knowledge of their day-to-day affairs” (Dun’s Review, 1968 in 
Margotta (2010): 65). 
 
He further notes: 
“Frankly, when it comes to doing right by the public, I have far more faith in 
management than I do in the institutions whose reputations are not dependent on the 
results of their work in a particular corporation. When institutions get into the 
management act, too often they are not wise enough to resist the temptation to make a 
fast stock market buck. Historically, banker control has not proven good either for a 
company or the economy” (Dun’s Review, 1968 in Margotta (2010): 66). 
It would seem then that to Berle the contribution made by a purchaser of stock to the 
enterprise was unclear. Continuing in this line of thinking Berle noted: 
“Why have stockholders? What contribution do they make, entitling them to heirship of 
half the profits of the industrial system… Stockholders toil not; neither do they spin, to 
earn that reward. They are beneficiaries by position only. Justification for their 
inheritance must be sought outside classic economic reasoning” (Berle, 1965b: 16). 
 
Most observers of the public corporation are likely to respond to Berle’s rhetorical question 
above with the seemingly obvious answer, that shareholders provide equity capital. Interestingly, 
Berle pre-empted this by saying that a mature corporation would rarely seek capital from 
shareholders. Instead, mature corporations are mainly financed through retained earnings, i.e. 
part of the company’s profits not distributed as dividends but re-invested into the company, but 




“Both in direction and effect, this preoccupation of the Securities and Exchange Acts 
recognizes a new economic fact: that stock markets are no longer places of “investment” 
as the word was used by classical economists. Save to a marginal degree, they no longer 
allocate capital. They are mechanisms for liquidity” (Berle, 1965b: 15). 
 
Berle had already raised this point in a previous paper, Modern Functions of the Corporate 
System, where he described the process of purchasing shares: 
“When I buy AT&T or General Motors, I do not remotely “invest in” either concern. I 
have bought from Nym, who bought from Bardolph, who bought from Pistol, who bought 
through ten thousand predecessors in title from Falstaff, who got the stock when 
originally issued… By folklore habit we say the buyer of stock of AT&T or General 
Motors has ‘invested in’ these companies; but this is pure fiction” (Berle, 1962: 446). 
  
Berle further pointed out that purchases and sales made on the New York and other stock 
exchanges “do not seriously affect the business operations of the companies whose shares are the 
subject of trading” (Berle, 1965b: 15) further adding that the “[I]mmense dollar values of stocks” 
bought and sold on a daily, monthly and yearly basis, “indeed hundreds of billions of dollars – 
do not, apparently, enter the stream of direct commercial or productive use” (Berle, 1965b: 15). 
It seemed to Berle that the sole contribution of the purchaser of stock was “the maintenance of 
liquidity for other shareholders who may wish to convert their holdings into cash” (Berle, 1965b: 
16). It also important to note that Berle had little faith in the idea that equity prices in any way 
reflected the functioning of an efficient market: “the market arrives at a purely romantic estimate 
of what a share of General Motors or General Electric is worth. It imports all sorts of 
considerations, which have little to do with the company itself” (Berle, 1963: 32). This all stands 
in sharp contrast to the image created by those who believe that Berle was a tenacious supporter 
of the shareholder primacy theory throughout his writings.  
In the later phase of his career Berle also continued to emphasize the potential value of the 
corporation to the community. Some critics may argue that Berle was merely toying with this 
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new concept in the final chapter of The Modern Corporation and Private Property. In truth, 
however, he carried this argument forward in to many of his later contributions. For example, 
writing in 1950, in a book titled, The Future of Democratic Capitalism he observed: 
“In America today, the corporation has reached a position in which its operations have 
become essential to the life of the national community. Although the corporation is not an 
instrument or a form of government, its existence and continued function are relied on by 
government” (Berle, Ernst, Garrison, Thurman and Zimmern, 1950: 36). 
 
Berle identified that the operations carried out by large corporations were often “essential to 
continued smooth functioning of economic life” and if anything were to negatively impact the 
corporation, “distress” at a general social level would follow (Berle et. al, 1950: 48). Going 
further in this book, Berle added: 
“The difference between the large private corporation and its predecessor, the smaller 
enterprise, is yet undefined, but it is important. The latter is controlled considerably, if 
not entirely, by the ordinary relations of property in a free economy. The former has, 
almost without exception, moved into a position where it is subjected to limitations and 
controls of an essentially political nature. This development arises from the companion 
fact that the large corporation, having apparently become essential to the community, is 
relied on and, with present techniques, it cannot be dispensed with” (Berle et. al, 1950: 
36). 
 
As much as early Berle was concerned about managerialism in his later writings he 
started to believe that circumstances had altered to such an extent that managers could be 
expected to oftentimes act in the public interest. Berle believed that managers had to some 
considerable extent become ‘enlightened’, that they had developed a broader perspective on how 
corporations should be run due to the development of a ‘corporate conscience’. The main form of 
control which could guide or limit the economic and social action of the enormously powerful 
mid- century American corporations was for Berle the real, though undefined and tacit, 
philosophy of the men who compose them. He believed “the men who comprised [the] 
organization” to be “far more conscious of the organization itself” than they were of “charters, 
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stockholders, or title deed” (Berle et. al, 1950: 38).  Owing to the fact that the main rules and 
decisions controlling a corporation’s actions were made internally, “that is, are made by the 
various governing groups of the corporation itself, rather than imposed by law” a simple change 
in thinking within these groups would be sufficient to alter the organisation’s nature and 
function” (Berle et. al, 1950: 38). Berle believed this could be an efficient way for the 
corporation to be effectively governed. In this sense the later Berle could be viewed as favouring 
attempts to enhance corporate culture  rather than impose more formal processes of regulation: 
“Corporations are composed of and managed by men. Each of the administrative 
group does have a conscience and thus consensus does influence corporate action… 
Managers have also absorbed the idea that corporations (for better or worse) are also 
held responsible by an appreciable sector of opinion for some at least of the social 
conditions proceeding from their operations – also that, if offensive, these conditions 
may bring into action the powerful machinery of the state” (Berle, 1965a: 36). 
 
Berle defined the ‘public consensus’ as “the existence of a set of ideas, widely held by 
the community, and often by the organization itself and the men who direct it, that certain uses of 
power are ‘wrong,’ that is, contrary to the established interest and value system of the 
community” (Berle, 1959: 90). This public consensus was essentially ‘enforced’ on managers by 
means of the corporate conscience. In his paper, Modern Functions of the Corporate System, 
Berle (1962) argued that although public opinion “had little influence on the conduct of 
corporate management” in the past, “today it is crucial, and every management knows it” (Berle, 
1962). He observed the following example: 
“Within the past few years the heads of two of the nation’s largest life insurance 
companies resigned because they were thought to have transgressed, albeit without 
breach of law, standards of ethics to which public opinion held them accountable… The 
preventative effect of a public consensus on standards of conduct cannot be precisely 
measured. Undeniably it is great” (Berle, 1962: 438). 
In an earlier paper, he noted: 
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“… they [management] are rather dependent on the point of view of men around them, of 
the political community, and on so much of public opinion as influences the group on 
whose approval they depend to hold office. The modern corporation is an institution 
capable of change, in much the same sense that a city or a political party is capable of 
change” (Berle et al, 1950: 40). 
 
Berle believed managers to hold a “vested interest” and this interest was less to do with 
“immediate financial return than that of retaining the prestige and power which goes with high 
corporate office” (Berle et al, 1950: 38 – 39). If, in any given circumstances, managers have to 
choose between sacrificing money or prestige, Berle strongly believed that it would very 
probably be the former that would be sacrificed. Berle viewed a manger’s tenure of office as 
depending on three things: first, the record the corporation makes financially; second the general 
standing the particular office-holder and his fellows make for it in the community; and third, 
“[P]artly on the acceptability of his personality and ideas – his reputation, in a word- in the 
business and financial community whose adverse opinion could end his career” (Berle et al, 
1950: 39). Considering this, then public opinion was extremely important to the control group. 
And it seemed evident that the corporate world had reached a time where both the media and 
political processes no longer tolerated negative results resulting from the pursuit of purely 
economic and competitive objectives (Berle, 1965a). Berle once again pointed out the influence 
and effect of the community, stating: 
“It follows that a general change in ideas in the business community could change the 
senior personnel, and then change the functioning and, in a large measure, even the 
objectives – economic and social – of the corporation itself” (Berle et al, 1950: 39). 
 
 




Over the decades Berle has been regarded as especially significant as an early and prominent 
advocate of shareholder primacy principles. But as laid out in the section above, Berle’s ideas 
and discussions were much more complex than this characterisation would suggest. Moreover 
his views clearly developed significantly and responded to perceived transformations in the 
corporate system and the political and economic environment he was observing. It is unfortunate 
that there has been so much focus on his writings around shareholder primacy since this has 
resulted in many valuable insights having gone largely unnoticed. It is particularly interesting to 
note that some of Berle’s points have been restated in current corporate governance debates by 
contemporary critics of shareholder primacy views – who are seemingly unaware of the link to 
Berle’s thought. In this section I provide some illustrations. 
Up until the early nineteenth century, most writers denoted private property as a unity 
involving “first the risking of previously collected wealth in profit-seeking enterprise; and, 
second, the ultimate management of and responsibility for that enterprise. But in the modern 
corporation, it seemed that “these two attributes of ownership no longer attach to the same 
individual or group” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 297). Specifically the “owner” is viewed as 
merely holding “a piece of paper representing a set of rights and expectations with respect to an 
enterprise” (Berle and Means, 1991[1932]: 5). Berle believed that this kind of “passive property” 
had “outlived most of the economic justification that gave it birth” and so “new philosophical as 
well as economic bases” must be sought (Berle, 1962: 448). It seems evident here that Berle did 
not believe shareholders to be able to defend their claims to the corporation’s profits through the 
arguments of ownership.  
 Lynn Stout (2002) puts forward an argument in a similar vein in her paper, Bad and Not-
So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy. She considers the argument “that the public 
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corporation ‘belongs’ to its shareholders” as “the most common, and worst, of the standard 
arguments for shareholder primacy” and suggests it is “misleading to use the language of 
ownership to describe the relationship between a public firm and its shareholders” (Stout, 2002: 
1190 - 1191). Arguing that lawyers are aware that shareholders do not own a corporation but 
instead own a type of corporate security commonly known as “stock” (Stout, 2002: 1191).  
 Robe
36
 (2012) has also vehemently argued against the ownership principle underlying 
shareholder primacy stating: 
“The first version of the fairytale [of shareholder primacy] runs like ‘shareholders own 
the firm so those who run the firm must obey the owners’ orders (they are their “agents”) 
and their purposes must be to maximize “shareholder value” i.e. today’s present value of 
the share price.’ Of course, as should be obvious to any lawyer at least half awake, 
shareholders do not own firms. They own shares. And owning shares does not make of 
them the firms’ owners in any way, shape or form” (Robe, 2012: 2). 
Furthermore, just as Berle was extremely concerned about the separation of ownership and 
responsibility, Robe raises these issues too, arguing that creating shareholder value works against 
“one of the pillars of a ‘free market economy’” (Robe, 2012: 3): 
“Just one ironical comment… in a ‘free market society’ an owner is responsible for his 
acts and things and for the damages they create. But as everybody knows, shareholders 
enjoy limited liability for the damages created in connection with the firm’s activity. 
Hence the genius of the shareholder supremacists: they treat shareholders as owners of 
the firm while leaving shareholders isolated from any liability or  responsibility deriving 
from the firm’s activities. They advocate a governance system in which the ‘owners’ 
interests are paramount while these ‘owners’ are not responsible for the ‘thing’ they are 
deemed to own and the damages it can generate” (Robe, 2012: 3). 
Over the course of the paper, Robe reiterates this by pointing out that ‘shareholders are not the 
managers’ “principals,”’ and so there is no “classic agency problem,” (Robe, 2012: 4). Instead, 
he argues, the corporation is “an autonomous legal person” so managers are not the shareholder’s 
agents but act “on behalf of the corporation and not of the shareholders”.  There is a significant 
                                                          
36
 Interestingly, Robe believes Stout to be “excessively generous” in her criticisms towards shareholder 
primacy and mentions it in the abstract of this particular paper (Robe, 2012). 
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difference between the shareholders’ interests and those of the corporation precisely “because 
shareholders have limited liability” (Robe, 2012: 4). The creation of such “irresponsible owners” 
has forced the “taking of excessive risks and the creation of massive negative externalities” 
(Robe, 2012: 4). 
With regard to Berle’s concerns about the rise of institutional investor some of these 
same reservations have been mentioned in another work by Lynn Stout (2012) titled The 
Shareholder Value Myth. She draws our attention to the ever growing presence of institutional 
investors and the resultant hyperactive stock market. In order to have a better understanding of 
the scale of operation of current financial markets she gives the following figures: In 1960, the 
annual share turnover for firms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) was merely 12 
percent. This implied an average holding period of around eight years. By 1987, however, this 
figure had risen to 73 percent. And by 2010, the same figure had grown to an astonishing 300 
percent annually which in turn implied an average holding period of only around four months. 
Stout (2012) explains that part of the reason for the expansion is the rapid deregulation of the 
market and advances in information technology which have made stock trading much cheaper 
and easier than it used to be. In previous times, someone who wanted to trade would need to call 
a broker, pay a fixed commission and then possibly pay a heavy transfer tax as well. Now, 
however, “trading has become so inexpensive that some funds specialize in computerized ‘flash 
trading’ strategies in which shares are bought and held for mere seconds before being sold again” 
(Stout, 2012: 66). 
However, there is an additional consideration she draws our attention to when discussing 
the causes of the spike in short-term trading and that is the growing role of the institutional 
investor. These include mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge funds. Such funds most often 
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invest on behalf of individuals with long-term goals. But the drawback lies in the fact that “these 
individual clients tend to judge the fund managers to whom they have outsourced their investing 
decisions based on their most recent investing records” (Stout, 2012: 67).  This provides an 
explanation as to why many actively-managed mutual funds have a turnover of 100 percent or 
more when it comes to their annual equity portfolios. In fact, hedge funds that choose to make 
long-term investments in order to improve corporate performance don’t usually hold shares for 
more than two years (Stout, 2012).  The latter would no doubt have a knock-on effect when it’s 
time to decide what kind of management strategies they would choose to support. In these kinds 
of instances, for example, a mutual fund manager would find it hard to resist strategies that 
would raise share prices for just the right period of time in order for her to sell and move on to 
the next stock that she foresees a short-term bump in its stock value. Stout writes: 
“In the words of corporate lawyer Martin Lipton, directors must decide ‘whether the 
long-term interests of the nation’s corporate system and economy should be jeopardized 
in order to benefit speculators interested not in the vitality and continued existence of the 
business enterprises in which they have bought shares, but only in a quick profit on the 
sale of those shares?” (Stout, 2012: 67) 
These comments are very much in line with the concerns we have seen that Berle expressed 
concerning the role of institutional investors. 
The shareholder primacy model of governance sought to align managers and 
shareholders’ interests but it would seem evident through the various corporate crises and 
collapses witnessed over the last few decades that whatever their efforts may have been, 
something is not working. But rather than taking a closer look at this model of governance, the 
US and UK have both instead invested time and resources into another means of curbing 
managers who seem ‘out of control’: an increase in the formalization of corporate governance 
codes has taken place. This was especially the case following the corporate fraud and resultant 
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collapse in organisations such as Enron and Worldcom in the early 2000s. Where corporations 
once had significant freedom (from the perspective of regulation) regarding benchmarks of 
corporate governance practice, they soon had to abide by formal rules.  
Despite the fact that over the last century, corporate law and securities regulation has 
become more complex and sophisticated and the formal requirements on corporations and their 
participants has increased,  we still continue to witness a wide range of corporate collapses and 
misconduct. To mention just a few famous recent cases - in April 2010, the Deepwater Horizon 
explosion in the Gulf of Mexico, caused by BP’s negligence, resulted in the deaths of 11 people 
and 4.9m barrels of oil being poured out into the ocean; JP Morgan’s senior management 
denying the board of directors access to information led to their portfolio’s being overvalued and 
resulted in a fines of $920m and more recently still VW falsifying their emissions tests. Some 
contemporary corporate governance literature have adopted a view where emphasis is placed on 
enhancing corporate culture over formal regulation - which seems to echo Berle’s thought to 
some extent. 
The debate over whether to enhance corporate culture rather than introduce further formal 
regulations has been ongoing since the early 2000s. For example, Jeffrey Sonnenfeld (2002) 
stated that corporate scandals occurred not because of bad corporate governance per se but rather 
due to governance abuse. He further highlighted the ‘importance of the human element’ when 
discussing directive boards (Sonnenfeld, 2002: 4) stating:  
“So if following good-governance regulatory recipes doesn’t produce good boards, what 
does? The key isn’t structural, it’s social… What distinguishes exemplary boards is that 
they are robust, effective social systems” (Sonnenfeld, 2002). 
Continuing in this line of thinking, Ribstein (2005) outlined that collapses like that of 
Enron and WorldCom were caused by a “new breed” of ruthless company executives. They were 
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the exception rather than the rule and he believed that such individuals would cause havoc within 
organizations irrespective of the formal controls implemented to prevent such abuse. 
Accordingly, Ribstein believed that it was best to improve the actual culture within the 
corporation. In this way, anyone behaving differently would be deemed inconsistent with the 
best interests of the corporation and would not be tolerated. He deemed this to be a better method 
than bypassing corporate culture altogether and choosing to focus instead on formal regulation.  
One possible means of changing senior executive’s attitudes is by changing the norms 
within corporate culture. ‘Stewardship theory’ is yet to attract the attention of legal 
commentators but would arguably be one that Berle would favour. In Thomas Clarke’s (2004) 
work, Theories of Corporate Governance, stewardship theory acknowledges a wider range of 
human motives which include orientations towards altruism, achievement and the commitment 
towards work that is meaningful.   
In another paper by Ribstein (2005) that reviews the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of 
formal regulation, it was observed:  
“A consequence of stewardship theory is that it is argued there is not the same imperative 
to separate the roles of chairman and chief executive in the corporation; rather it is 
considered favourable that boards have a majority of specialist executive directors rather 
than a majority of independent directors. According to stewardship theorists, this is the 
case as the corporation’s directors and executives ‘identify’ with the corporation, 
meaning directors and executives are naturally drawn to pursue what is best for the 
corporation, and to build corporate prestige rather than focusing on building personal 
wealth” (Ribstein, 2005: 32). 
Additionally, McConvil’s (2006) observes: 
“Bad apples, as opposed to bad corporate governance structures, are the major source of 
corporate collapses, and there will always be bad apples who find their way into public 
corporations, regardless of whether the laws of corporate governance take up 5 pages or 
500 pages – just as there will always be murderers regardless of the penalty we impose 




Other areas of the contemporary corporate governance literature have also partially echoed 
Berle’s arguments about there being a public consensus keeping corporations in check. In a 
paper titled “Managers’ and Investors’ Responses to Media Exposure of Board Ineffectiveness” 
Joe, Louis and Robinson (2009) examine the influence of media exposure on board 
ineffectiveness. The authors analyse the impact of the press on the behavior of various economic 
agents. The paper strongly puts forward the view that media exposure of board effectiveness or 
ineffectiveness affects not only corporate governance but also investor trading behavior.  
Dyck and Zyngales (2002) review various cases where the media has been influential in 
shaping corporate policy. The authors believe the media can play a role in corporate governance 
by affecting a company’s reputation in at least a couple of ways: First, media attention had the 
potential to drive politicians to introduce corporate law reforms owing to the belief that “inaction 
would hurt their future political careers or shame them” (Dyck and Zyngales, 2002: 4). Second, 
and perhaps most relevant to Berle, Dyck and Zyngales (2002) argued that media attention could 
not only affect a manager’s reputation in the eyes of shareholders and employees but also in the 
eyes of society at large. In this way, the media can be seen as helping to shape the public image 
of those running the corporation and in doing so, pressure them to behave according to what is 
viewed as acceptable within society.  
They use the interesting case in 1988 where all the major U.S. networks broadcast a tape 
where hundreds of dolphins were killed during the process of fishing for tuna as an example. The 
Panamanian tuna boat brought on much public outrage and building on this, the Earth Island 
Institute, Greenpeace, and the Humane Society launched a campaign to boycott tuna. Restaurant 
chains and school boards followed suit taking tuna off the menu until it was ‘dolphin safe,’ i.e. 
fished with nets that weren’t killing dolphins (Dyck and Zyngales, 2002). Then in 1990, Heinz 
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announced that it would only be selling tuna that was dolphin-safe. Within hours of this 
announcement another of the two largest tuna producers made a similar commitment.  
A further example occurred with the passage of the Pollution Act in 1990 whereby firms 
were required to disclose the amount released of each listed chemical by facility annually. 
Environmental groups like the Natural Resource Defense Council and the National Wildlife 
Federation collected the information and passed it on to the press in the form of publications 
such as The Who’s Who of Toxic Polluters and The Toxic 500. These were then selectively 
picked up on by print media as well as the broadcasting stations. The resulting impact of the 
public opinion pressure created by all this information was huge. Firms high on the list sought to 
get off the top ten as fast as possible and listed it as a point of corporate strategy. One firm, 
Allied, for example had “more than tripled its expenditures on environmental control facilities 
and voluntary cleanup following the release of this information” (Dyck and Zyngales, 2002: 8). 
Interestingly, this was all in the absence of any legal requirement. 
In his book, Fixing the Game, Roger Martin (2011) raised the interesting (and significant 
point) that focusing on a corporation’s stock price can drive directors and executives to become 
preoccupied with what Martin dubs as the “expectations market” instead of focusing on real 
corporate performance such as sales, revenue, etc. We can see a direct link here to Berle’s 
argument that ‘owners’ were becoming devoid of any responsibility towards the corporation and 
its business activities. Stock-based compensation schemes has created an unhealthy alliance 
between short-term institutional investors such as activist hedge funds and mutual funds and 
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executives whose compensation targets drive them to focus almost obsessively on the short term 




4.5          Elements of A New Governance Model Inspired by Berle 
 
It is of course sometimes suggested that a more socially responsible form of capitalism can 
be promoted by reforming corporate governance structures. For example political parties from 
time to time suggest policies that might tackle excessive executive pay in the hope this could 
usher in a more responsible and better capitalism.
38
 Such policy proposals have not only been 
advanced but adopted. Firms in the UK for example are now required by law to publish a single 
remuneration figure for the CEO in their annual reports. In essence, this means that shareholders 
have more information regarding what the chief executive is earning and this enables them to 
vote in a more informed manner on such matters. Meanwhile in 2015, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) set about enforcing a rule that requires companies to disclose the 
pay ratio of their CEOs as well as the median pay of their workforce.  
The popularity of these kinds of policy proposals is understandable: they simultaneously 
encourage restraint when it comes to executive pay while also empowering shareholders, but 
ultimately the impacts of such reforms are likely to be limited. From the kind of perspective that 
Berle finally arrives at we can see that for him where capitalism becomes irresponsible it does so 
                                                          
37
 Examples of this kind of short termism are legion, Stout considers the case of Kraft and their plan to 
split itself into two companies under pressure from hedge fund shareholders (Stout, 2012). This split is 
unlikely to cause any dramatic changes in the corporation’s manufacturing process or marketing strategies 
but this action was sought owing to the hedge-fund shareholders’ and stock-compensated executives’ 
belief that they “…can’t rev its shares by mixing together higher-growth brands such as Cadbury 
chocolate with refrigerator staples such as Oscar Mayer lunch meats and Jell-O desserts” (Chon et al., 
2011) and hope that by splitting the organization in two, they will be ‘unlocking shareholder value’.  
 
38
 See press releases issued by BBC, 2011 and 2012 and also, Channel4 News 2012. 
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not as the result of excessive executive pay but in part through the pursuit of incorrect 
shareholder orientated governance objectives. For example the crisis of 2008 did not result from 
directors not doing what shareholders wanted but on the contrary because they did so. As 
illustrated previously, it is the aligning of shareholder and manager’s interests that have brought 
about such a damaging focus on short termism. As Talbot (2013) observes: 
“Shareholders are not the bulwark against financialisation and short-termism; they are the 
engine of it. Executive pay is a convenient distraction. The key issue is what executives 
do for their pay. What they do now is to serve shareholders’ interests. What they should 
be doing is to serve in the public interest” (Talbot, 2013: 220). 
As reviewed earlier, the idea that corporations ought to serve the public interest was a 
belief that Berle strongly held to, which is just another example of how he further anticipated 
some of the problems now facing us in the 21
st
 Century. In Power without Property, Berle wrote: 
“If we were building the American economic system anew, we might wonder whether the 
present system of stockholders’ votes was the best way, or even a good way, of choosing 
managers or of locating power. It continues chiefly because no one has come up with a 
better scheme” (Berle, 1959: 107). 
Berle, although often viewed as the grandfather of shareholder primacy, in fact believed 
that in order for the corporation to fulfill its role in promoting the public interest the sectional 
interests of shareholders would need to be given much less prominence. If his ideas were not 
rooted in shareholder primacy and the shareholder primacy model of corporate governance is not 
in line with the broad sweep of his thinking then an important question that emerges is what kind 
of contemporary interventions would be more in line with his overall orientation?  
While it is beyond the scope of the current research to spell out in detail a model of 
corporate governance consistent with the principles Berle sets out in his later work it is possible 
to discuss a few illustrative reconceptualisations and reforms that could be seen as consistent 
with aspects of his thinking. One suggestion is reconceptualising the corporation so as to 
recognize the legitimacy of a broader range of objectives and linked to this might be a recasting 
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of the way directors see themselves and their assessment of professional achievement. Another 
would be to enhance the rights of employees and give them more prominent roles in corporate 
governance.  
The shareholder primacy model of governance promotes a very simplified and highly 
quantitative account of the corporation. The corporation is reduced to a single purpose which is 
to maximize shareholder wealth. In this way, its success or failure can be measured on a purely 
quantitative level. It is quite evident that Berle believed that there was much more to running a 
corporation. He viewed the corporation in a holistic way. Many of Berle’s discussions recognise 
that the corporation was an institution that had undergone and was continuing to experience 
tremendous change. The corporation had evolved into an entirely new and enormously 
significant social institution and Berle appreciated that its actions would have a great impact on 
the community at large along a range of different dimensions. This could be the reason why he 
strongly argued for the need to reconceptualise the corporation in the final chapter of The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property.  
Some contemporary writers develop similar arguments about the need for a 
thoroughgoing reconceptualisation of the corporation. Writing in Ethics and Excellence, Robert 
C. Solomon for example writes: 
“What makes a corporation efficient or inefficient is not a series of well-oiled mechanical 
operations but the working interrelationships, the coordination and rivalries, the team 
spirit and morale of the many people who work there and are in turn shaped and defined 
by the corporation. So, too, what drives a corporation is not some mysterious abstraction 
called “the profit motive.” It is the collective will and ambitions of its employees, few of 
whom work for a profit in any obvious sense. Employees of a corporation do what they 
must to be part of a community, to perform their jobs, and to earn both the respect of 
others and self-respect. To understand how corporations work (and don’t work) is to 
understand the social psychology of communities, not the logic of a flowchart or the 
organizational workings of a cumbersome machine” (Solomon in Buchholz, 2012: 222). 
 
Buchholz (2012) puts forward a similar argument, stating that: 
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“From a pragmatic perspective… the corporation is a community and the individuals who 
are in such an organization are what they are in part because of their membership in the 
organization, while the organization is what it is because of the people who choose to 
become part of the organization” (Buchholz, 2012: 221). 
According to Buchholz the current context is one calling out for the development of new 
relationships between employees and employers that will encourage the corporation to function 
as a true community, recognizing individual human beings who: 
“cannot be dismembered to become a diversity of cogs in a corporate machine, but who 
can, in their individuality, function as diverse centers of creativity in a unified corporate 
community. It is the corporate community as a whole that is responsible for the success 
of the organization in the larger society” (Buchholz, 2012: 227). 
 
Buchholz continues by extending this line of thinking to the corporation’s connection to society 
as a whole, echoing Berle’s own ideas on the subject: “Reduction of the corporation to a single 
purpose in society fails to recognize that the corporation is a multipurpose organization that has 
multiple responsibilities in society” (Buchholz, 2012, pp. 227). 
Berle recognized that the corporation is guided by the people who are a part of the 
organization and the moral agency located within these individuals. This is evident through his 
belief in the “corporate consciousness” reminding us that corporations are composed of men and 
women. Understanding the corporation as a complex institution with many constituent elements 
and numerous impacts means that any kind of moral responsibility and accountability only 
makes sense when it is applied to these individuals. The corporation ought not to be reified, on 
its own it does not make decisions, is not a moral entity and has neither a conscience or feelings 
of moral obligation. It is the people that run the corporation, who comprise its workforce that act 




If corporate executives are to take a broader perspective then it is apparent that there 
needs to be some sort of ideological shift, one that occurs at a societal and very possibly a 
political level too. As it presently stands, the company has come to be viewed as an entity that 
largely functions for the benefit of one group, shareholders, too often to the detriment of other 
groups such as employees, local communities and consumers. If we are to consider a governance 
model in the spirit of Berle’s work then it would call on those managing the corporation to 
recognize interests beyond those that shareholders have.   
The role of the corporate executive has been shaped in recent years by the influence of 
the shareholder primacy perspective. At present profit maximization and maximizing shareholder 
value is promoted as the standard by which managerial achievement is to be judged. Goals such 
as long-termism, corporate social responsibility and good industrial relations are not as highly 
prized (Talbot, 2013). Enhancing the value of the corporation as registered in its current share 
price is seen as the most valued achievement of them all and is therefore the most consistently 
pursued. In this way, the multiple purposes of a corporation are often lost sight of owing to 
management’s quest for profit.  
Berle highlighted the growing ineffectiveness of the profit motive in The Modern 
Corporation and Private Property and pointed out that ultimately it does not reach the most 
important individuals, vital to the organisation: 
“… we have already seen how the profit motive has become distorted in the modern 
corporation. To the extent that profits induce the risking of capital by investors, they play 
their customary role. But if the courts, following the traditional logic of property, seek to 
insure that all profits reach or be held for the security owners, they prevent profits from 
reaching the very group of men whose action is most important to the efficient conduct of 




In current times, directors are recognized and rewarded in various forms of remuneration 
and promotion. The performance related pay packages available to senior management have 
encouraged a reckless pursuit of a narrow set of goals. Remuneration packages for top 
management in the UK as well as the USA have increased extraordinarily over the last thirty 
years but the number of corporate failures have also increased alongside it. It is not just that the 
number of corporate scandals and failures have increased over recent years but so too has their 
scale. Observing these corporate debacles we can hardly ignore the huge financial and social 
costs involved. Some form of radical reform is required if we are to shift focus to the pursuit of 
progressive goals such as product development, community interests and employee contentment 
to name a few. Talbot (2013) observes that radical reform is necessary if we are to successfully 
‘reconceptualise share value as just one part of a director’s remit’ (Talbot, 2013: 225). In this 
context, substantial reform would be required so as to ensure that directors come to judge their 
own professional achievements on the basis of advancing a set of progressive goals. An example 
of a reform that could be considered is highlighted in her book, Progressive Corporate 
Governance for the 21
st
 Century, where Talbot (2013) points towards the work of Nadar, Green 
and Seligman who, in the 1970s, suggested that directors should operate as ‘public directors’ 
(Nadar et al., in Talbot, 2013: 225) with duties as public fiduciaries. This could be an excellent 
starting point as it would involve directors having to make socially responsible decisions and to 
act in the interest of the public. Talbot writes: 
“In so doing the corporation could be moderated by the state in order properly to realize 
what it really is, a public institution with public responsibilities that affects employees, 
consumers, neighbouring communities and the environment, as well as shareholders” 
(Talbot, 2013: 225 – 226). 
In the UK she notes that amending Section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 would be another 
move forward. At present, a company’s success is defined by whatever benefits shareholders. A 
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progressive move would be to give more of a balance and take into consideration the interests of 
other stakeholders such as employees, consumers and the wider community. It could then be 
possible to look into the creation of a progressive board.  
It is sometimes suggested that encouraging employees to become shareholders of the 
company in which they work is a progressive step since it helps align the interests of employees 
and shareholders. One of the dominant features of modern corporate governance has been the 
strategy to make individuals act as if their interests matched those of shareholders. It may have 
worked with directors by means of share options but this may not necessarily mean that 
employees would follow suit. Additionally, it has been evident that aligning these interests may 
not have been the best development from the perspective of the wider community. Employees 
face far greater risks from corporate failure as their entire livelihood depends on the longevity of 
the company. The sums involved from any share holdings is most unlikely to override their 
interests as employees of the enterprise. Talbot (2013) argues that progressive governance should 
represent employees in more direct ways. If progressive corporate governance is described as an 
environment where the interests of the people as a whole are promoted, it is imperative that the 
interests of labour become a central focus within corporate governance. It is worth mentioning 
that the level of importance placed on short term profit maximization by a shareholder may not – 
and most probably will not – match the employee’s list of priorities. Perhaps an employee 
committee given the responsibility of purely representing the interests of the employees rather 
than the company as a whole would be a good starting point.  
It is worth mentioning one further reform that might prove extremely progressive namely 
the reconceptualization of company law as public law. Under the current voting process, 
shareholders hold the final say on whether a director is made accountable for failing to fulfil their 
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duties. If we work to disempower shareholders then the question remains as how directors would 
be accountable. It has to come from another source. Talbot (2013) puts forward the suggestion 
this could be a government body, responsible for overseeing the proper governance of public 
companies under public law (Talbot, 2013). Private law is responsible for governing the 
relationships between private individuals whereby the state is very much excluded. Public law, 
on the other hand, is charged with overseeing the exercise of power by public bodies. It is 
evident that the largest corporations have reached a size and reach that makes their private status 
questionable. If company law were to become public law, the implementation of socially 
responsible standards could be more easily introduced. Furthermore, Talbot suggests 
reconceptualising company law as public law would also enable action to be taken against 
directors if they were found to be acting in breach of their duties or going beyond their authority. 
This kind of reform would ensure that there would be an alternative source of authority to 
shareholders, namely a government body, who would have the responsibility of ensuring that 
corporations follow proper governance with progressive goals.  
  
4.6.         Concluding Remarks  
 
This chapter has sought to delve further into Berle’s discussions regarding shareholder 
primacy as an effective mode of governance. It has been established that although Berle early on 
voiced some significant support for prioritizing the interests of shareholders this was done in a 
very specific context. This idea was forwarded in a context where Berle hoped and anticipated 
that the constitution of the shareholding class would be altered very substantially and where the 
prospects for meaningful political structural change seemed limited.  In The Modern Corporation 
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and Private Property, contrary to what many commentators suggest, Berle successfully 
challenged the notion that corporations should operate for the benefit of shareholders and felt 
that the political environment was such that a more substantial refocusing of the priorities of the 
corporation was possible.  Berle wanted the community at large to benefit from the presence of 
the corporation therefore he called for it to be conceptualized in a different way and ultimately 
oriented to the public interest. He argued that corporations could be encouraged to operate in the 
interests of the community and did not have to be orientated towards the interests of shareholders 
alone. 
Following The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Berle voiced many concerns 
regarding the shareholder primacy model. The separation of owners from the creative decision-
making process but also from any form of responsibility was of great concern to Berle. In his 
later work Berle came to adopt a more favourable view of managers, believing that the political 
and economic conditions had evolved in such a way that managers could guide the corporation in 
a way that could further the general public interest. 
Berle’s general framework of analysis can be seen as being at odds with the kind of 
theoretical frameworks and assumptions used to defend the contemporary emphasis on 
shareholder primacy principles. In fact we have seen that Berle anticipated many of the 
criticisms that are now regularly levelled against the shareholder primacy model. Some of 
Berle’s writings have also been seen to anticipate certain of the more progressive contemporary 






5.  CONCLUSION 
 
One objective of the current dissertation has been to demonstrate the importance of 
historical sensitivity when approaching questions concerning the nature and governance of the 
corporation. The accounts of the corporation provided by many mainstream economists are 
largely ahistorical in nature. Many mainstream scholars display a remarkable disregard for 
historical context. For example, the contractual accounts of the firm and the corporation that 
underpin the shareholder primacy perspective have been shown to be naïve if considered as 
attempted historical explanations of the nature and evolution of the corporation.
39
 These social 
institutions are crucially important and complex phenomena and these conventional theories do 
not offer compelling explanations of their emergence or current functioning. 
 This dissertation has focused on Adolf Berle and demonstrated that his approach stands 
in stark contrast to the largely ahistorical approach adopted by mainstream economists. Berle 
takes substantial care to consider the historical evolution of the corporation in the US context and 
his theorization of the corporation recognizes the changing nature of the entity he focused upon. 
For Berle the corporation was in no sense fixed but an institution that was evolving rapidly and 
subject to significant change and situated within a broader social setting that was also 
characterized by substantial change. For example, as part of his analysis of the corporation he 
was careful to discuss broader issues related to private property. Berle noted how the enterprise 
was increasingly no longer owned by individuals involved in day to day management and 
decision-making processes. His discussions of the issue of the separation of ownership from 
                                                          
39
 See Ireland, 2003, for a careful discussion of the various historical problems associated with the 
contractual account of the corporation. 
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control highlight that the very meaning of ‘ownership’ had changed and he insisted that this had 
to be recognized if an adequate understanding of the emerging corporate system was to be 
developed. Berle’s sensitivity to history and the need to ensure that our categories keep pace with 
the changing systems being studied are features of his work from early on right the way through 
to his last contributions. In one of his later books Power without Property Berle highlights the 
importance of not becoming trapped by out of date categories. Under the section heading “The 
Changing Picture of Capital” he wrote: 
“We live under a system described in obsolete terms. We have come to believe our own 
repeated declarations that our society is based on individual initiative – whereas, in fact, 
most of it is no more individual than an infantry division. We assume that our economic 
system is based on “private property”. Yet most industrial property is no more private 
than a seat in a subway train, and indeed it is questionable whether much of it can be 
called “property” at all” (Berle, 1959: 27). 
A further aim of the dissertation has been to situate Berle’s contributions within broader 
developments in institutional and evolutionary approaches. The argument developed especially 
in the first main part of the dissertation is that Berle needs to be understood as having been 
substantially influenced by earlier institutional writings, particularly those of Thorstein Veblen. 
The kind of fine grained historical analysis of the emergence of the corporate form that Veblen 
provides is to a large extent taken over and developed further by Berle. Chapter 2 discussed these 
themes in detail showing similarities in both methodological approach and in their respective 
substantive analyses of the emerging corporate system. This is not to suggest that Berle was 
some straightforward and uncritical follower of Veblen. There are significant differences 
between Berle and Veblen especially regarding their views on the possibility of significant 
policy interventions effectively promoting the public good. Nevertheless, in terms of 
methodological approach and orientation this dissertation supports those who note that there are 
important correspondences between Veblen and Berle. Furthermore unless these links are 
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appreciated it is easy to exaggerate the connections between Berle and modern shareholder 
primacy perspectives on corporate governance. Once the similarities between Veblen and Berle 
are fully understood then the methodological distance between Berle and the kinds of theories 
that are most typically used to support contemporary shareholder primacy norms can be 
recognized.  
 This dissertation has also sought to demonstrate that Berle was prepared to address 
fundamental questions about the nature of the modern corporation and its status and was 
interested in clarifying the role that the law played in the constitution of the corporation. Berle’s 
willingness to address these fundamental issues has been brought out in this dissertation by 
comparing certain of his writings with a recent philosophically informed account of the nature of 
the corporation developed by Tony Lawson. The argument developed in Chapter 3 is not that 
Berle adopted anything like the explicitly ontological approach that Lawson advances as he 
outlines his own community based account of the corporation. Rather the argument that I put 
forward is that Berle was at least prepared to raise certain fundamental questions concerning the 
essential nature of the corporation and the legal framework underpinning its foundations. These 
foundational questions are often not considered at all in modern conventional economics 
approaches. The comparison outlined in Chapter 3 shows that there is much to be gained by 
addressing these basic ontological issues and suggests contemporary corporate governance could 
benefit significantly if it were to take an ontological turn.  
Another major objective of the dissertation has been to contextualize Berle’s views on the 
role of shareholders and their significance for regulating the corporation. In view of his famous 
exchange with Merrick Dodd in 1932 Berle has often been identified as the original defender of 
shareholder wealth maximization in corporate governance. It was shown in Chapter 4 that such 
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an interpretation is highly partial and ultimately misleading. Even Berle’s early position that does 
indeed support the protection of and prioritizes shareholder interests needs to be considered 
alongside his anticipation of very significant changes in the make-up of the shareholding class. 
Moreover it was also shown that Berle’s initial position soon gave way to views that very much 
saw shareholders’ interests as being of altogether more limited significance. There is, of course, 
some continuity in Berle’s views but there is also substantial change. Berle’s writings spanned 
over forty years and during this period the American economy underwent tremendous change 
and Berle’s thinking about the corporation and the role of shareholders often responded to these 
changes.  
Many scholars have isolated particular elements of Berle’s writings, removed them from 
context, and attempted to piece together his discussions and arguments in a manner that makes 
them consistent with contemporary views. This dissertation suggests that there are serious 
problems with such approaches. History of thought done in this way is problematic for at least a 
couple of reasons. One problem is that such exercises are prone to misinterpret the target 
author’s ideas and contribution with the true meaning of passages and whole phases of 
argumentation being lost when taken out of context. Second, many authors, like everyone else, 
are likely to change their points of view over time and in seeking a single consistent perspective 
that an author develops over time  many subtle changes of emphasis and focus are likely to be 
downplayed or ignored entirely. In the context of the reception of Berle’s work the result of 
taking small extracts from his work and stringing them together for a specific interpretation has 
been to attribute to Berle a view that is more in line with contemporary shareholder primacy 





 If we are to truly appreciate the value of Berle’s contributions a method for 
exploring the history of his ideas is required that values context and searches for both continuity 
and change in his views.  
A further and final objective of the dissertation has been to demonstrate the contemporary 
relevance of Berle’s work at various levels. At a methodological level Berle provides numerous 
powerful examples of how historically sensitive research can be undertaken. When discussing 
different facets of the corporation Berle takes into consideration its historical evolution and the 
changing current context it faces. His arguments around the separation of ownership and control 
are one example of this. Secondly, on a theoretical level, Berle does not shy away from asking 
fundamental theoretical questions such as how are corporations constituted and do they represent 
real as opposed to fictional entities? Thirdly Berle’s work still holds much relevance at a 
practical level. As shown in Chapter 4, it would seem that many of the suggestions associated 
with progressive approaches to corporate governance have roots in Berle’s work.  
The various aspects of Berle’s work that have been considered in this dissertation suggest 
that far from being a figure of purely historical interest Berle retains considerable significance 
for us today. His methodological approach and substantive theorizing provide those seeking to 
                                                          
40
 Using concepts introduced by Tony Lawson we can note that some of the history of thought literature 
on Berle has fallen into a couple of related fallacies. Lawson argues that the notion “that small extracts of 
an author can always be understood in isolation” is the “fallacy of context-independent meaning” 
(Lawson, 2015c: 995). Meanwhile he describes “any supposition that an author’s intentions can always be 
usefully unearthed by arbitrarily stringing together extracts from different sources possibly appearing 
years apart as the fallacy of presumed fixity of meaning” (Lawson, 2015c: 995). Lawson acknowledges 
that in some contributions the aim may be to simply demonstrate that an author has at some point made a 
specific claim or used specific categories, in which case identifying selected extracts he concedes could 
be informative. The need to avoid both the noted fallacies occurs, Lawson suggests, when “the goal is to 
determine an overall position of an author, at least on a certain set of issues” (Lawson, 2015c: 995). It is 
possible that on certain aspects an author might actually maintain a consistent position over a 
considerable length of time. However, even in such a scenario demonstrating the continuity is an exercise 
that is quite different from merely joining numerous isolated snippets together without further argument.  
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develop a deeper understanding of the contemporary corporation and question if and how the 
corporation can be controlled in a manner that will assist in improving the lives of all members 
of the community with both inspiration and a wealth of insights.  
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